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CONFIDENTIAL

(12898)



**F.O.**

**406**

## FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE

RESPECTING

## EASTERN AFFAIRS

PART XVI

**CLOSED  
UNTIL**

1976

JANUARY TO JUNE 1925

**55**



F.O. 406/55

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(12898)

FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE

RESPECTING

EASTERN AFFAIRS

PART XVI

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CONFIDENTIAL.

Further Correspondence respecting Eastern Affairs.

PART XVI.

CHAPTER I.—MOSUL.

[E 2242/214/65]

No. 1.

*Mr. Austen Chamberlain to the Marquis della Torretta.*

Your Excellency,

*Foreign Office, April 23, 1925.*

THE position of His Majesty's Government having been regularised by the decision adopted by the Council of the League of Nations on the 27th September, 1924, I have the honour to inform your Excellency that His Majesty's Government are happy to give the Italian Government the explanations and assurances contained in the memorandum attached to the present note.

2. Copies of the Anglo-Irak Treaty of the 10th October, 1922, and subsidiary agreements, and of the above-mentioned decision of the Council of the League of Nations, are enclosed herein for convenience of reference.

3. I shall be grateful if you will be so good as to acknowledge the receipt of this communication.

I have, &c.

AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN.

Enclosure in No. 1.

*Memorandum respecting Irak.*

HIS Britannic Majesty's Government agree that article 11 of the Anglo-Irak Treaty shall be regarded as applying to Italy.

2. His Britannic Majesty's Government do not intend to preclude Italian enterprise from participation in public works, services and utilities and in the development of the natural resources of the country, so far as these matters are not directly undertaken by the Administration. In the event of such participation, His Britannic Majesty's Government are prepared favourably to consider using their good offices with the Irak Government to secure a special arrangement with the Italian Government with the object of regulating the conditions of such Italian labour as might consequently be admitted to Irak.

3. His Britannic Majesty's Government assure the Italian Government that, in virtue of the provisions of article 9 of the Anglo-Irak Treaty and of the Judicial Agreement made under that article, foreign nationals, including, of course, Italian nationals, will have the right to be tried by a court consisting of a single British judge, or presided over by a British judge, according to the gravity of the case, except in cases of contravention, and that in appeal or revision the court shall be presided over by a British judge and constituted in accordance with article 2 (d) of that agreement.

4. His Britannic Majesty's Government assure the Italian Government that nothing in article 3 of the Anglo-Irak Treaty is intended to restrict the opening of new schools, or to restrict the right of such schools to admit pupils of another



community. The supervision of the Irak Government will be strictly limited to the ensurance of public order and administration. His Britannic Majesty's Government affirm that they have no intention of authorising any arbitrary interference in the internal affairs of any religious community.

5. His Britannic Majesty's Government assure the Italian Government that consignments imported into Irak for the use of Italian religious, educational or eleemosynary institutions, will, in regard to customs duties, be admitted to the same privileges as those afforded to other foreign institutions of a similar character. Such institutions are at present granted the free import of articles of a nature or kind which can only be destined exclusively for religious use in mosques, churches, synagogues and seminaries, and also of school apparatus, other than school books, if imported direct by the school concerned, to the value of 60 rupees per annum for each pupil who is educated free of charge. There is no intention of withdrawing any of these privileges, and His Britannic Majesty's Government will use its good offices to see that they are maintained, and, if circumstances permit, extended.

Foreign Office, April 23, 1925.

[E 2676/214/65]

No. 2.

Marquis della Torretta to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received May 6.)

(Translation.)

Sir,

Italian Embassy, London, April 29, 1925.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Excellency's note of the 23rd instant, in which you inform me that His Britannic Majesty's Government are happy to give the Italian Government the explanations and assurances contained in the memorandum enclosed therein.

In thanking your Excellency for your courteous communication, I, on my side, have the honour to state, in conformity with instructions which I have received, that the Italian Government have taken note of the explanations and assurances in question which are contained in the memorandum mentioned above, dated the 23rd April.

I have, &c.

TORRETTA.

[E 2731/32/65]

No. 3.

Colonial Office to Foreign Office.—(Received May 9.)

(Secret.)

Sir,

Downing Street, May 8, 1925.

I AM directed by the Secretary of State for the Colonies to transmit to you, for the information of Mr. Secretary Chamberlain, copy of a despatch from the High Commissioner, Bagdad, on the subject of the Turco-Irak Frontier Commission.

I am, &c.

J. E. MASTERTON SMITH.

Enclosure in No. 3.

Sir H. Dobbs to Mr. Amery.

(Secret "B.")

Sir,

Bagdad, April 16, 1925.

I HAVE the honour to invite a reference to my despatch Secret "A," dated the 9th April, 1925, and to transmit herewith a copy of the final diary of the British assessor to the League of Nations Frontier Commission.

2. A copy of this despatch, together with its enclosure, is being sent to His Britannic Majesty's representative at Constantinople.

I have, &c.

H. DOBBS,

High Commissioner for Irak.

Final Diary of the British Assessor to the League of Nations Frontier Commission.

To complete my diaries I have written the following résumé of the work done by the commission and of what I thought were their final impressions and the probable line they will take in making their recommendations to the Council of the League:—

Looking back, I feel that the commission came to Irak from Europe and Turkey in such a frame of mind that their preliminary experiences in Bagdad and Mosul rendered them more suspicious of the British and Irak Governments than ever was realised at the time—very suspicious as they were thought to me. The reasons for this are not clear. They were without doubt *bien travaillés* by the Turks in Angora, and perhaps also the fact that Great Britain had ever consented to refer to the League the case of the "Mosul question" (as they always called it in loose conversation) had given them the idea that there were, in fact, very strong reasons for the rendition of the vilayet to Turkey. They possibly already felt before they reached Angora that, had Great Britain been convinced of the justice of her case, she would have had more courage of her convictions. It is not impossible, again, that after they had seen the representatives of the British Government in London, they may have met and had conversations with members of various British and foreign industrial groups, who may have given voice to apprehensions lest the Irak Government, if left to her own devices in four years' time, should be less able to safeguard industrial enterprises than the Turkish Government. Some of these may have even gone so far as to suggest that British officials whose careers depended upon Irak might conceivably be found to allow their personal desires to colour the evidence they had collected for the commission.

Whatever the reasons were, the three members of the commission during the first month of their stay in Bagdad and Mosul showed themselves extremely suspicious of any interpreters offered by the British assessor, and appeared to regard as unwelcome any information as to the character and social position of witnesses they called, or any information volunteered by our side other than the replies to their *questionnaires*. Even the replies to the questions of procedure were not welcomed; the president, in spite of the clause in the terms of reference requiring the commission to give "due consideration to the views expressed by the interested parties as regards procedure," stated the question had been wrongly included in the *questionnaire*. The commission at this time continually intimated that they would welcome no advice as to their procedure. The presence with the Turkish delegation of the two Iraki outlaws introduced complications which increased the suspicions of the commission. In their anxiety to show themselves neutral they seemed unable to appreciate the fact that the community called Irak might harbour such strong resentment against two traitorous members that the Government could not accept full responsibility for their security, without having the right to take what measures it thought necessary for their protection. This, again, was possibly due to the pictures they had formed in their imagination of a Mosul Vilayet inhabited by a majority of Turks whose importance had brought the territory into contest. The comparison by Djevad Pasha of the quarters offered to the Turkish delegation in the Levy camp to his prison quarters at Malta struck a sympathetic chord with the commissioners. The measures which the commissioners would accept for the protection of the Turks could not unfortunately be settled before the commission moved to Mosul, and the unfortunate situation created by Count Teleki and Djevad Pasha going out into the streets of Mosul immediately upon their arrival, when the police were confused by Teleki's interference with their rightful attempts to stop the small demonstrations which had been arranged by the pro-Turkish party in Mosul, increased their resentment with the British and Iraki side. Persuaded as it now seems they must have been that a substantial proportion of the inhabitants of Mosul were inclined to Turkey, they read in the combination of the admittedly somewhat obvious police measures which had really been arranged for the protection of the Turks, and the pro-Iraki demonstrations which were arranged by the Committee of Defence, and which, as the commission had interfered with the suppression by police of the pro-Turkish demonstrations, were difficult to restrain by the local administration, an organised conspiracy between the police (supported by the military forces) and the pro-Irak party for the suppression of the views of the substantial pro-Turkish population. Their suspicions actuated them to visit almost surreptitiously the houses of certain inhabitants, most of whom were disreputable persons whose names they had received presumably from Djevad

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Pasha, but one or two of them were notables who had been for a long time cloaking pro-Turkish intrigues under the guise of patriotic but extreme Arab nationalism. These are the people one was wont to describe in reports as "extreme Arab," but not pro-Turk—their anti-British activities are dictated solely by the hope that they may thereby get better terms for Irak from the British. The commission, when they visited and talked privately to such people, whom they had seen posing as sincere members of the Independence and Defence Committees, found, as they thought, confirmation of their suspicions that these outwardly fervent Iraqi committees were really artificial organisations set up by fear and bribery by the local Government. The arrest of twelve persons, who, after visiting Djevad Pasha, gave by their talk grave cause for concern to the local authorities, was taken by the commission as a further attempt to suppress legitimate pro-Turkish sentiment. Similar arrests made in Arbil, Kirkuk and Suleimanieh just before or during the investigations of the commission in those liwas when their previous ideas of enormous pro-Turkish populations had been dispelled and their suspicions allayed, were accepted as necessary for law and order, and as not affecting the impartiality of the enquiry. Meanwhile, they had still considered the Irak Government as fully responsible for the security of the Turkish delegation, as the Turkish Government did not reply to a request that they should accept the measures of discreet surveillance proposed by the commission for their protection. The situation was brought to a head when the commission announced an intention of dividing into sub-commissions and leaving Mosul suddenly for secret destinations, and the British assessor replied that the matter had now got beyond his competence and asked for his Excellency the High Commissioner to visit Mosul. Before the High Commissioner reached Mosul, the commission produced a certificate signed by Djevad Pasha, accepting in the name of his Government full responsibility for the security of his delegation, thus changing the whole position. The plans of the commission at the same time underwent a complete *volte-face*; they declared that the sub-commissions would depart publicly for Arbil, Kirkuk and Kifri. His Excellency the High Commissioner spoke frankly to the commission, and they admitted that they had been allowing themselves to get into a "defensive" attitude towards Irak. After the three sub-commissions had left Mosul, the president, who had remained behind, visited Sinjar, Tel Afar, Akra and the home nahiyas of Mosul. Although the obvious police escorts in Mosul had been removed, and no pro-Irak demonstrations were allowed, a series of unfortunate incidents further embellished by the tongue of the youngest of the subordinates of the commission, M. Weber, kept alive the president's suspicions. At Tel Afar the pro-Irak answers of the majority of the witnesses of both sides consorted strangely with a pro-Turkish demonstration, and the whole incident seemed to the president explained by the complaints of police attempts to suppress Turkish demonstrations, and the excessive activity of the armed police before his own eyes on the previous day. Unfortunate accidents of stupid but really innocent farashes suspected of listening at the door to the president's enquiries, the prominence of the Committee of Defence at Tel Afar and Akra when the president was annoyed that Asif Effendi always seemed to have preceded his visits, and the parrot-like replies in many cases vitiated the impressions which should have been left in his mind by a large majority of pro-Irak witnesses.

Before he left Mosul for Kirkuk, the president was still sufficiently suspicious to listen to the venomous prattle of M. Weber, who had apparently insinuated that delays in the receipt of the president's letters were caused by their being held up and opened, presumably by me.

The commission had no doubt heard in Angora a great deal in praise of the plebiscite as a method of settling the dispute. I feel now that the commission were keenly desirous themselves to make recommendations for the frontier and not merely to recommend that the council should resort to a plebiscite. At the same time they appeared to have already decided before they came to Bagdad to carry out themselves a species of plebiscite. They announced a scheme of having the troops withdrawn from and holding a plebiscite in areas which they would choose suddenly, so as to avoid the possibilities of propaganda. The difficulties of removing troops were pointed out and the scheme was never again heard of, but the president's investigations in the Mosul Liwa resolved themselves into a plebiscite conducted amongst the witnesses suggested by the two assessors. As his suspicions still prevented him from receiving from me any notes to explain the relative importance of each witness, the replies were really at the time very little indication to him of the feeling of the

people. Meanwhile, the commissioners in Arbil and Kirkuk had been working in an atmosphere which they declared much more congenial than Mosul. The police surveillance of the Turkish experts, if it existed, was not obvious or even visible, and no demonstrations of any kind were ever allowed. Colonel Paulis, at Kirkuk, eventually approved of the local administration dealing quite severely with pro-Turkish agitators. The commissioners were of course reminded that the whole question had changed when Djevad had given his certificate of responsibility, and that Arbil and Kirkuk were much smaller than Mosul and therefore demonstrations were easier to control. It was not possible to explain another and very real reason, that in Arbil and Kirkuk the commandant of police was feared by the people, and therefore his merely known wishes were respected; while in Mosul the commandant not only was neither feared nor respected by the people, but also had forfeited any hope he had of controlling the demonstrative elements of either side by his foolish belief in the loyalty of the Kashmulla family, whose labours during the stay of the commission were of more value to Turkey than the Turkish delegation themselves.

Besides having their suspicions gradually dispelled by the strict calm and gradually discovering that there was not, in fact, quite such an enormous pro-Turkish element as they must have at first imagined, the commissioners were gradually finding out for themselves that the organisation of the country was patriarchal and almost feudal, and that witnesses varied in importance according to the number of their followers and the extent of their property. Colonel Paulis, in Kirkuk, had already begun to ask for notes on the personality and property of each witness he had seen. At Suleimanieh the president adopted a procedure suggested by Colonel Paulis, which eventually became the regular procedure used by the commission. A group of about a score of witnesses would be summoned and a preliminary discourse would be addressed to them by Colonel Paulis in the presence of both assessors and translated in turn by them or by their experts. Certain general ethnologic and economic questions would be asked and then the witnesses would be asked to go into the commissioner's room one by one for a secret enquiry. This procedure was maintained during the investigations made after the commission's return to Mosul, and right up to the end of the enquiry.

With regard to the witnesses interviewed at Suleimanieh, Arbil and Kirkuk, those named on the Turkish and British lists were summoned, and the British assessor would be asked for list describing their property, personality and social importance. These notes were normally to be verified from the Turkish experts and the witnesses themselves, but in actual practice, as the ignorance and fallibility of the Turkish experts became more evident, they were more and more accepted as true. After the return to Mosul a start was made by choosing the first twenty-five or fifty from each list. The British assessor, however, pointed out that his list had been compiled to include both pro-Turkish and pro-Irak witnesses, and those names mentioned on Djevad's lists and not mentioned on his list were persons of no importance and no status in this country. The commission accepted the contention, and demanded in their place the following list:—

1. The principal proprietors of Mosul town with their properties.
2. The secondary electors of Mosul town.
3. Persons who had been members of the municipal council during the last twenty years.
4. The ulama of eight mosques chosen by Colonel Paulis on account of their size as it appeared on the chart of Mosul town.

The commission later asked for notes upon each of these witnesses to be handed to them if possible before they left finally or, if this was not possible, to be sent after them to Geneva. The president came to me and asked for similar notes upon the witnesses he had seen before he left Mosul for Kirkuk. It will be seen from the above that the commission gradually began to rely upon the local administration and the British assessor for their information instead of upon the Turkish delegation. As a means of assisting the commission with information, Djevad was not well chosen by the Turkish Government for the appointment of assessor. His ignorance was complete, and when separated from his experts, pathetic; at meal times, for instance, he would hang on the replies of the British assessor until the latter had barely managed to get them off his tongue, and then he would repeat them in a loud voice in the hope that the commission might believe that it was he who had the information. On the other hand, being in his own country a very senior general



with European reputation, he at first was naturally treated with greater respect than his counterpart, a junior and little known official. It became evident very soon to me, and before the end it must have been realised by the commission, that the Turkish case depended entirely upon sentiment. Signor Roddolo, before the commission left Bagdad, stated several times that the Turkish delegates had been chosen for "propaganda." It may appear that Djevad was chosen partly because, having been the military commandant of the Diarbekr front, he would be the most likely to remind the inhabitants of the prestige of their Governors during recent past centuries, and partly, perhaps, because he was commanding in the Dardanelles when the president was his military attaché. Nazim was chosen since he accompanied the Turkish troops which transgressed the frontier last autumn and because he was a pro-Turkish rebel of Kirkuk, and Fattah because of his relationship to Sheikh Mahmud. Kiamil, who appeared to be the one gentleman of the party, was chosen for his ability and his knowledge of Irak, where he was educated and fought during the war. The Turks sent no one who had anything to do with the compilation of their case for the Lausanne, Constantinople, Geneva or Brussels Conferences, and no one who could assist the commission with accurate (and therefore, perhaps, prejudicial to the Turkish case) information. As far as I can make out the Turkish delegation never requested the commission to investigate any of the facts of the case, nor ever drew their attention to points made in their memoranda. When asked by the commission to produce proof of some of the statistics of population, they had included in their memoranda such as the existence of 32,960 Turks in the Suleimanieh district, Djevad either replied that the police prevented him from having such intercourse with the people as would enable him to prove the assertions, or he took the line that all the original memoranda and statements of both parties were made wildly under the impression that they would not be subjected to local investigation, and they should therefore be disregarded; the only important point was the wishes of the mass of the people, and not those of the notables cited as witnesses. I believe the commission eventually tied down Djevad to a written admission that the Irak Government population statistics were in the main reliable; he made for the errors in the statistics of his own Government the plea that they were made before the war.

The Turkish assessor gradually lost by his childish behaviour the prestige which he had at the beginning of the commission. The British experts gained accordingly. At Tel Afar he became so excited that he gave away the president's lunch to the pro-Turk demonstrators, and when leaving Mosul for Arbil he involved himself in an unseemly *fracas* with an Arab army officer at the Kuwair ferry. At every place he visited, he hastened out to the bazaar and demonstratively salaamed everybody, doing his best to provoke outbursts by shouting in a loud voice. His ungovernable tempers irritated the commission. At Dohuk he sat in a chair, posing like a king upon a throne, while the commissioners remained standing, and demanded to take over the administration straight away.

Though he had freedom of movement in Mosul, he made only one visit, and that to the disreputable quarter of the town, where a demonstration had been arranged by one of his experts who had visited it on the previous day. In most cases the witnesses he included on his lists were persons of no social standing or of the criminal classes. The police in Mosul strongly suspect him of endeavouring to stir up disorder in the town and the liwa.

He told me that he was on bad terms with the members of the modern Turkish party—this lends some weight to the rumour that Mustafa Kemal had sent him upon this mission to discredit him. Signor Roddolo told Mr. Edmonds that he would be the Turkish general who would command this front in case of war with Great Britain—in this case Great Britain's responsibilities are the greater, since Djevad has been allowed to tour the whole area and will have compiled, no doubt, useful notes upon the persons who exhibited anti-Turk sentiments, especially in Zakho and Mosul. The presence of the much-discussed undesirables, Nazim and Fattah, assisted or damaged the Turkish cause in various degrees in various places. In Mosul city their existence, in that it had caused all the vexatious delays and suspicions over the question of their protection, was of assistance to the Turks. In Arbil and Kirkuk, the Iraki cause benefited from the splitting up into sub-commissions, as pro-Turk notables of many families, which were jealous of the Naftaji family, voted pro-Irak partly out of their personal grudge against Nazim. In Suleimanieh the Turks lost through playing the Sheikh Mahmud tune through Fattah Beg. In Zakho the presence of Nazim, though he had accompanied the Turkish punitive forces last autumn, was of little assistance to the Turks. In Kifri,

where Count Pourtales was given, curious as it may seem, the status of commissioner, and when Fattah Beg was given wide opportunities of propaganda, the Suleimanieh outlaw's presence assisted the Turks. In this respect the whole commission may perhaps be considered to have been at first somewhat unfair. While the Turkish delegation might expect the right of bringing before the commission any pro-Turkish feeling that had already existed, they should not have the right to stir up new feeling where none had existed. The licence given to the Turks to mix with the people gave them just this opportunity. It is true that the commission expressly forbade the Turks to indulge in propaganda, but it would have been impossible to obtain proof of their guilt. If the Turkish Government had any right to claim that pro-Turkish feeling existed in the vilayet they would have had registered in Turkey the names of the pro-Turks, and it was therefore, I consider, rather unfair that the commission should consider that Djevad's mission was to stir up and produce pro-Turkish feeling. Otherwise, and especially in the case of Colonel Paulis at Kirkuk, and the rest of the commission after their return to Mosul, they showed themselves fairly considerate and sympathetic towards the local administration. They were ready to admit the enormous strain they had put upon the administration by their enquiries, and, at the first sign of peace and order breaking, they hastily closed down the enquiry and made preparations to leave immediately. Mosul had to bear the strain of some part of the commission permanently residing in Mosul, and of the commission returning to Mosul and recommencing its enquiries. It was not perhaps surprising that one place should break under the tension.

With regard to their methods of enquiry, their procedure appears never to have been thought out, and the method finally maintained was one which they gradually subsided into rather than deliberately planned and adopted. They did not appear to have read more than superficially the answers to the additional *questionnaires* they put before us in this country, and they never, unless specially requested or reminded by the British assessor, sat down to test their veracity by special investigations in the districts concerned in those answers. They were probably suffering from acute mental indigestion of reading matter when they left, but it is hoped that they will accept for gospel the statements made in the answers to the *questionnaire* when they re-read and consider them, as they found reliable our village lists and population statistics and other matter which they were able to verify. As soon as I found the enquiry was developing upon the lines of a plebiscite, and it became more and more certain that the Turkish witnesses included an indiscreetly large proportion of persons of low standing or ill-repute, I endeavoured to strike at this weak point. I refrained from pressing the president too hard during his early tours in Mosul to accept my criticisms of the pro-Turkish witnesses, and endeavoured to disarm his suspicions by occasionally dispensing with a list of witnesses and arranging for the assembly, in addition to the Turkish witnesses, of all the mukhtars of the particular district and allowing him to choose as he liked. Sometimes this plan produced, as it did at Maklub, a large number of pro-Turk witnesses, of whom Djevad did not know, but, in the long run, I think it vastly reduced M. de Wiersen's suspicions. After leaving Mosul I found that Colonel Paulis had already been accepting notes upon the importance of each witness, and by this time the president of his own accord was beginning to ask for them, and from Suleimanieh onwards I endeavoured to develop an intensive campaign of crediting and discrediting witnesses, and of assisting the commission to form a suitable estimate of the size of the population which was represented by each witness. In the Mosul town and kadha where the population is much thicker, and, at the same time, more races and religions are mingled than in other districts of the vilayet, the commission made a serious attempt to obtain representative witnesses. In this respect they were greatly impressed by the lists which exist for this liwa only, showing the numbers and composition of every single village in every single nahiya of the whole liwa. They checked the veracity of these lists by enquiring from various witnesses, and the president one day made an expedition by himself to check them by enquiring from various villages picked at random. I noticed that, having verified their lists in the case of the Mosul Kadha, they were accepted as infallible for the other kadhass. This will be a great assistance, when they come to work out the population represented by the Doski, who voted pro-Turk, and find that only 5,000 people are represented out of a total for the kadha of 24,000, 9,000 of whom are Christians and Jews. Similarly, the doubtful Guli and Sindi number only 4,800 out of a total in the Zakho Kadha of 15,000, of which 5,000 are Christians and Jews. I found the



president one day in his room, after I had given him a list of the names of the villages owned by witnesses he had seen at Sinjar, laboriously going through the village population lists and filling in from them the numbers of the population for the villages named as properties. Owing to sickness, Count Teleki was not able to take part in the enquiry in the Kirkuk and Suleimanieh divisions and not in the whole of the enquiry in the Arbil and Mosul divisions. As the president took no notes in Suleimanieh, and very few in Arbil, it would appear that only Paulis had notes in connection with every single liwa. Colonel Paulis took the fullest notes in a note book—the president took short notes on paper—generally upon the lists of witnesses which he could easily have typed. I fear that the notes taken by Colonel Paulis and Count Teleki will take some time to reproduce in the report. The commissioners are obviously afraid of finding in Paris that they have omitted small but essential details from their notes, and of committing important errors of fact which might diminish the value of their report. They were, therefore, anxious for a British expert to be at call unofficially while they are preparing their report. I imagine that, of the things they came across during their investigations, the following have left the deepest stamp upon their minds. First of all, they have all shown themselves convinced of the inability of Irak to stand alone at the end of the present treaty period. Colonel Paulis repeatedly uttered his opinions that the country was more suitable for direct colonisation than for self-rule, and that the worst enemies of the country were the Nationalists, who thought they could stand alone at the end of the treaty period. The commission, during their stay in Bagdad, declared themselves impressed neither by the Irak Ministers nor by the Irak army. In Mosul certain of the Arab patriots expressed anti-British views which the commission thought had been instigated by the Committee of Defence. They appeared to regard Great Britain's surrender of executive control to the Irak as dictated rather by a wish to avoid expense and slide out of responsibilities than by a sincere conviction that Irak was ready for such a liberal measure of self-government. They were greatly impressed by the pro-British feeling in Suleimanieh and the way the witnesses thrust their dislike of the Turks upon the commission.

In the north what interested them most was the disgusting way, as they called it, in which the Christians were bought and sold by the Kurds, and had been ill-treated during the Turkish régime. There is no doubt that the Assyrians and the other Christians seen by the commissioners left a very great impression upon their minds. Colonel Paulis said that he would not sign any report which did not make recommendations for the adequate protection of the Christians, and Count Teleki at Alkosh promised the Christians to represent to the League all that they had said. After the Christians, the commission, especially Count Teleki and Colonel Paulis, were particularly interested in the Yezidis, whom they visited at Sheikh Adi without the assessors of either side. One may be certain that those people with their views will be given a prominent place in their report.

Colonel Paulis at Kirkuk attached enormous importance to the railway, whose extension towards Kirkuk he thought had not been mentioned in the British memoranda. In a lesser degree, the commission appeared to have been impressed by the brigand-like appearance of the Kurds of the northern liwas, by the intelligence of Sayyid Taha of Rowanduz and Mulla Effendi of Arbil, the truthfulness of Subih Bey, the Irak representative, as compared with the mendacity of Nazim and Fattah.

With regard to the probable line of their recommendations, one can be certain that the commission do not conceive it their duty to demarcate in detail on the existing maps what they consider the frontier line should be. They have always stated that this would be the work of a boundary commission and survey parties. I have a feeling that they will stipulate that Great Britain shall extend her responsibilities for the protection and guidance of the Irak Government for a much longer period than the present treaty, and they will make recommendations for the future security of the Assyrians and the Christians of the Mosul Vilayet. What these recommendations are likely to be is difficult to say, as they did not show a unanimity of opinion on this question before they left. At any rate, all the Christians made it clear that they did not wish to return to Turkish rule, and during the stay of the commission in Mosul a continuous stream of Christian refugees was entering Irak from Mediat and Mardin.

The present frontier—the Brussels line—is bound to have in the minds of the commission a great importance as a frontier which has been, if only temporarily, accepted by both sides, and the commission will possibly feel that they would incur a

great responsibility if they handed over any of the Barwar Bala Christians to Turkey, while, on the other hand, they may be afraid of recommending a frontier further to the north for fear of the Turks refusing to accept their decision. The frontier proposed by the British Government was inspected from the air, and its wall-like nature certainly impressed those who flew upon this flight.

The commission are now in possession of a very full documentation on the question. Besides the ethnological, economical, geographical, political, statistical, fiscal, military subjects treated in the two *questionnaires*, they have received detailed information as to the economic effects of the Basra Port Development and Irak railways, as to the source of the salt supply of Bagdad and Mosul, and as to the subsidisation of tribal chiefs, and reports of the Departments of Health, Police, Public Works, Education, Irrigation, Veterinary Services, showing the work done by them compared with that done in Turkish times. In addition to the above they have received short notes upon the populations and witnesses of the various districts visited.

The Turks may be considered to have suffered a crushing defeat upon the ethnographical aspects of the question. Their foolish contentions of exclusively Turkish populations in the Suleimanieh and Ashair-i-Saba Nahyas and of large Turkish populations in the Mosul Nahya and Suleimanieh Liwa deserved such a defeat. Their repeated declarations that the Kurds had decided to live a common life with the Turks were made to look ridiculous by the aggressive hatred of them displayed by the Kurds of Suleimanieh and other places, and by the existence of a great Kurdish rising in Turkey during the time that the commission were pursuing their enquiry in Mosul, a Kurdish rising for fear of which the Turkish delegation were afraid to return through Turkey from Zakho. Upon the economic and strategic sides of the question the Turkish Government had never put up a case against the Irak case. There is good reason to hope that the results of the enquiry will have persuaded the commission that the Turks would have little chance of winning upon a plebiscite. On the other hand, very few mis-statements were discovered in the British memoranda. The Jabal Hamrin may perhaps have been considered as something more than a "line of dunes" when compared with the plains to the south of it, and it may be considered that the economic statistics do not prove that Bagdad would starve if cut off from Mosul. Assuming that the commission are not excessively affected by Count Teleki's alleged pro-Turkish prejudices and by the president's peace-at-all-costs attitude to the problem, there is some reason to hope that the eventual decision will be one which will enable the Irak to live. There is unfortunately also some apprehension that the Turks may not accept any decision which rejects their claim to the Mosul Vilayet. Their press has been talking of the inhabitants of the Mosul Vilayet held down with savage cruelty by the British and Iraki military and police, and of restrictions put upon the liberty of movement of Nazim and Fattah. They will no doubt make much of the incident of the arrest in Mosul of the twelve persons who visited Djavad Pasha, and of the Turkish witnesses (few as they were) who did not accept the invitation to meet the commission. They may also distort the unfortunate prominence of police at Tel Afar, and of the armoured-car escort on the road to Suleimanieh. The enquiries of the commission, though they may have left the seeds of trouble for the immediate future, will possibly have been useful to the Irak Government.

The pro-Turks are now known, and various agencies for Turkish propaganda have been discovered. The excuse that used to be made for certain pro-Turks, "that they were really fervent Nationalists hoping by displaying of Anglophobia to get better terms," will, it is hoped, in the future lose its validity. The enquiry showed that certain useful if not indispensable records have not yet been collected. Accurate village-by-village population lists exist only for the Mosul Liwa, and great difficulty was experienced in obtaining accurate figures to show the relative production of grain in the three vilayets of Irak. The existing records are insufficient to prepare an accurate map to show the boundaries and composition of the population of the southern vilayets.



*Report of the Irak Frontier Commission.**Note on the British Obligation to Accept the Recommendations.*

BY article 3 (2) of the Treaty of Lausanne, 1923, the frontier between Turkey and Irak was to be agreed between Turkey and Great Britain. In the event of no agreement, the dispute was to be referred to the Council of the League. No agreement was arrived at, and the fixing of the frontier was referred to the League accordingly on the 6th August, 1924.

2. The Council of the League was obliged to deal with a troublesome question as to the maintenance of the *status quo* in the area through which the frontier would ultimately pass, and the matter was therefore before the council in meetings at Geneva in September and again at Brussels in October 1924. At the meeting on the 30th September the council decided to set up a special committee of three persons to advise it as to the frontier which should be adopted, and settled at that meeting the scope of the committee's duties. At that meeting Great Britain repeated an undertaking already given on the 25th September (see annex), and Turkey also gave an undertaking to accept the decision of the council.

3. In accordance with this decision a committee of three was appointed, presided over by Count Teleki, a Hungarian. This committee has visited Irak and is now preparing its report. It is possible that the report of the committee may be unsatisfactory from the British point of view; it might even be a dishonest report, and the question for consideration is whether His Majesty's Government will be bound to accept the report, and, if so, for what reason.

4. This point is not covered in terms by the undertakings given at Geneva on the 25th and 30th September, because what the parties bound themselves to accept was the decision of the council, and the report of the committee is not a decision of the council.

If evidence were available and could be brought forward that the committee had been bribed or that the committee had been false to its trust and had deliberately made recommendations for reasons other than a desire to settle the dispute in the way best calculated to promote the welfare of the two countries concerned, the report could be contested by the British representative in the council on the ground that the committee had not performed the function for which it was appointed.

It is unlikely that any such situation will arise. What may well happen is that the report may seem so unsatisfactory that the British authorities in Irak, and even in London, may find it difficult to believe that it is an honest report, and the British member of the council may therefore be pressed to object to it, and even to protest against its acceptance by the council; but nevertheless there may be no specific breach of duty on the part of members of the committee which can be pointed to. It is, therefore, necessary to know—

- (a.) Whether, when the question of accepting the report comes before the council, the British member will be entitled to vote;
- (b.) Whether acceptance of the report requires a unanimous decision; and
- (c.) Whether it is now open to the British member to vote against the acceptance of the report and thus prevent a unanimous decision.

*Question (a).*—There is no provision in the covenant depriving Great Britain of the right to vote in this case. It is article 15 which provides for the exclusion of the votes of the parties to a dispute in the calculation of unanimity, and article 15 only applies when the council is dealing with a dispute which has been brought before it as one likely to lead to a rupture. The Irak frontier has not come before the League on that footing at all. It has been submitted to the council as a neutral and impartial body well qualified to decide between two parties who have failed to come to a direct agreement.

*Question (b).*—Unanimity will be necessary. Under article 5 of the covenant unanimity is necessary except where otherwise expressly provided, and there is no provision which authorises a majority vote in this case.

*Question (c).*—The practice of the council since the League came into being has been to accept the report of an expert committee appointed to investigate and

recommend a solution of a matter such as that with which the League is confronted in the Irak frontier. Only where the committee has exceeded its functions or misconceived its instructions has the council modified or rejected a report.

When the British and Turkish representatives undertook, on the 25th and 30th September, 1924, to accept the decision of the council, the other members of the council will have understood them to have pledged themselves not to obstruct acceptance by the council of the report of the committee which was to be appointed if the rest of the council thought it wise to accept that report. On no other basis would it be possible for the council to come to a decision as to a settlement of a dispute in such cases. The report of a committee dealing with a difference as to which the two parties are in acute disagreement is never likely to give complete satisfaction to both of them, and if, when they pledged themselves to accept the decision of the council, they retained the liberty to prevent the council coming to any decision at all, the pledge would be valueless and the council would be impotent as a body for harmonising such differences.

It is immaterial whether a pledge such as that given by the British member on the 25th September (see annex) is regarded as a pledge not to vote at all when the report ultimately comes before the council or whether it is regarded as a pledge not to vote against the opinion of the majority. The important point is that the pledge will have been understood by the other members of the council as an undertaking to refrain from destroying the unanimity required. What obliges the British member, therefore, to refrain from voting against the acceptance of the report is the pledge given by his predecessor, coupled with the assumption it will have created in the minds of the other members that it implied acquiescence in the council's practice of accepting the report of the expert committee if the members of the council not concerned in the dispute thought it wise to do so.

It may be well to add a word as to the position of Turkey. Turkey is not a member of the League, and the provision in article 4 as to representatives of States not on the council sitting as members of the council during the consideration of matters specially affecting their interests is limited to States which are members of the League. There is, in fact, no provision in the covenant which in terms gives Turkey the right to vote when the matter comes before the council. It is inconceivable, however, that Turkey would have agreed to article 3 of the Treaty of Lausanne except upon the assumption that she would stand on a footing of equality with the British Empire when the question came before the council. The council will no doubt desire Turkey to sit at the council table during the discussion of the Irak frontier, but, if it came to a vote, it is difficult to see how Turkey could be allowed to vote. This is a strong argument in favour of the view that, as a matter of equity, the British representative should not vote either.

C. J. B. H.

*Foreign Office, May 21, 1925.*

## ANNEX.

(Thirtieth Session of the Council of the League.)

*Extract from the Minutes of the Eleventh Meeting, held at Geneva, Thursday, September 25, 1924, at 10.30 A.M.*

M. BRANTING (*rapporteur*) read the following note:—

"In the first place how do the British and Turkish delegations understand the reference to the council provided for in article 3 of the Treaty of Lausanne? I believe that I am right in thinking that, according to the statements of the British delegate, his Government considers itself bound in advance by the decision of the council."

LORD PARMOOR: . . . . To the first of the two questions which the *rapporteur* has asked, my reply is entirely in the affirmative. The British Government does regard the treaty as placing the council in the position of an arbitrator whose ultimate award must be accepted in advance by both parties. Therefore, in the most explicit terms, I desire to say that the British Government would consider itself bound by the determination of the council.



*Extract from the Minutes of the Seventeenth Meeting, held at Geneva, Tuesday, September 30, 1924, at 10:30 A.M.*

M. BRANTING read the following report:—

"After conversation with representatives of both parties concerned, I have ascertained with satisfaction that the divergence of views on the scope of the question submitted to the council is not such as had at first appeared to me.

"Lord Parmoor reminded me that the effect of his declaration to the council was that his Government accept in advance the council's decision regarding the frontier between Turkey and Irak. . . .

"His Excellency Fethi Bey, to whom I communicated the results of this conversation, informed me that the misunderstanding which had arisen appeared to him to be dispelled, and that he agreed to the question being submitted in the form indicated by Lord Parmoor.

"I then reminded him that the British Government had declared that they accepted, in advance, the council's decision, whereas the Turkish Government, through the medium of their delegate, had declared that they would submit to the authority of the council under the terms of article 15 of the covenant. I asked his Excellency Fethi Bey if he could, on behalf of his Government, now give an undertaking to accept the council's recommendation.

"His Excellency Fethi Bey replied that on this point there was no disagreement between his Government and the British Government, and that he would be prepared to make a declaration in the sense referred to. . . ."

M. BRANTING: . . . I beg to move the following resolution:—

"The council, having had the question of the delimitation of the frontier between Turkey and Irak referred to it under article 3, paragraph 2, of the Treaty of Lausanne;

"Having heard the statements of the representatives of the British and Turkish Governments, who undertook on behalf of their respective Governments to accept in advance the decision of the council on the question referred to it;

"With a view to collecting the facts and data which it requires to fulfil the mission entrusted to it under article 3, paragraph 2, of the Treaty of Lausanne;

"Decides to set up a special committee of three members. . . ."

In reply to the president, LORD PARMOOR said that he accepted the resolution.

His Excellency FETHI BEY also accepted the resolution. He hoped that the observations he had just made would be taken into consideration.

[E 2986/32/65]

No. 5.

*Colonial Office to Foreign Office.—(Received May 23.)*

Sir,

*Downing Street, May 22, 1925.*

I AM directed by the Secretary of State for the Colonies to transmit to you, for the information of Mr. Secretary Chamberlain, copies of papers on the subject of the Turco-Irak frontier question.

I am, &c.

J. E. MASTERTON SMITH.

Enclosure 1 in No. 5.

*Count Pourtales to Mr. R. F. Jardine.*

(Translation.)

THE Commission of Enquiry, nominated by the League of Nations with the view of settling the question of the frontier between Turkey and Irak, would be grateful to Mr. Jardine if he would kindly have furnished to it with the shortest possible delay, an account of the stages of the British military occupation of Mesopotamia. The commission begs him also, when furnishing this information, to indicate in the most detailed manner the dates of occupation of the different localities of the old Mosul Vilayet.

*Geneva, May 14, 1925.*

[E 3365/32/65]

Enclosure 2 in No. 5.

*Note by Mr. Jardine on the British Military Occupation of Irak.*

*First Stage: Capture of the Basra Vilayet.*

War between Turkey and Great Britain was declared on the 29th October, 1914.

On the 6th November a British force took the Fort of Fao, and after defeating the Turks in several small engagements, entered Basra on the 21st November. The Turks were followed to Kurna, which was occupied on the 9th December. Another Turkish defeat at Shu'aibah on the 12th April, 1915, was followed, on the 3rd June, by the occupation of Amara. Nasiriya, the western apex of the strategic triangle formed by Basra, Kurna, Nasiriya, was captured on the 25th July. Practically the whole of the Basra Vilayet was now under the British military occupation.

*Second Stage: Advance to Kut. Siege of Kut. Unsuccessful Operations for Relief of Kut.*

On the 29th September, 1915, Kut was captured and the Turks were followed by the British cavalry as far as Aziziya. On the 22nd November the British defeated the Turks at Ctesiphon, but were forced by the arrival of large Turkish reinforcements to withdraw to Kut, where the force was invested, on the 7th December, by a superior Turkish force. The early months of 1916 were spent in unsuccessful operations to relieve the beleaguered garrison, which was compelled by starvation to surrender on the 29th April, 1916.

The Turkish commander had promised to refrain from reprisals upon the persons of the inhabitants of Kut, who had perforce shared the rigours of the siege, but immediately upon entry hanged some of the best-known citizens.

*Third Stage: Operations for the Recovery of Kut and Capture of Bagdad. Occupation of the Bagdad Vilayet.*

Having completed his preparations, General Maude began operations at the end of 1916 for the dislodgement of the Turkish forces at Kut from the position in which, with its immense natural advantages for defence, they had strongly entrenched themselves. On the 23rd February, 1917, the position was forced, and by the 24th February the Turks were in full retreat. Bagdad was captured on the 11th March, 1917, and the British forces advanced to a line short of the Jabal Hamrin on the east, to Samarra on the north and Feluja on the west. Ramadi on the Euphrates and Tekrit on the Tigris were captured in the autumn of 1917. The Turks were raided at Hit, which was permanently occupied on the 9th March of the following year. British forces also occupied Khanakin near the Irak-Persian frontier. The greater part of the Bagdad Vilayet was under the British military occupation at the end of 1917.

*Fourth Stage: The advance into the Mosul Vilayet. Destruction of the Turkish Forces in front of Mosul. Occupation of the Mosul Vilayet and the whole of Mesopotamia at the Armistice.*

At the beginning of 1918 the British forces advanced to Kirkuk and Kifri, withdrawing for the hot weather to Tuz Khurmatu between Kifri and Kirkuk.

From Suleimanieh, Sheikh Mahmud sent letters offering either to hand over the reins of government to the British, or to act himself as British representative. He was appointed to carry on the local administration. In October 1918 the British forces in Irak were instructed to occupy Mosul, and at the end of that month the whole of the Turkish Tigris army, which constituted the bulk of the force defending Mosul, was cut off and forced to surrender. Meanwhile, Kirkuk had been reoccupied on the 25th October and the British forces operating on the eastern line pushed on towards Altun Kupri and Arbil. The Mudros armistice came into force on the 31st October, 1918. By the clauses of the armistice the Turks were bound to surrender all garrisons in Mesopotamia, and the Allies had the right to occupy any strategical point. On the 1st November Turkish officers met the British cavalry at Hammam Ali and informed them that an armistice had been signed. On the 2nd November the general officer commanding-in-chief informed the Turkish



general officer commanding that he had instructed the British troops to occupy Mosul; the British troops entered the town on the 3rd November.

The general officer commanding-in-chief of the British troops informed the Turkish commander that the boundaries of Mesopotamia would be considered as laid down in the German military report on Mesopotamia dated Berlin, October 1917. (This line included Sairt, Diarbekir, Gerger, thence down the Euphrates to Meskene). On the 7th November, after a meeting with the Turkish commander, the general officer commanding-in-chief of the British forces, both verbally and in writing, ordered the complete evacuation of the Vilayet of Mosul by such Turkish troops as still remained. The Turkish general officer commanding carried out these measures, but protested at the same time. His protest was not upheld by the Turkish Government, and the War Minister at Constantinople instructed him to comply with the requirements of the British general officer commanding. He left for Nisibin on the 9th November, and Colonel Leachman took over charge of the Mosul division. Colonel Leachman, before the end of November, visited Tall'Afar, Sinjar, Zakho, Amadia, Bira, Kapra, Dohuk, cleared out any Turkish officials who had lingered in these places, and set up an administration in them. British military detachments occupied Tall'Afar on the 21st November. Zakho was occupied on the 19th November by a British military force which was reinforced on the 23rd November by forces which detached troops at the same time to occupy Faish Khabur and the junction of the Khabur and Tigris. A British political officer or Governor was appointed to Zakho. A small column of British troops in December visited Amadia, where a Kurd called Ahmed Fakhri Effendi had been installed as British Government agent. Until the arrival of a British political officer in January 1919, this agent was subordinate to the British political officer at Zakho. British troops were permanently stationed in Amadia from the 11th January, 1919, and British columns operating on the northern frontier in the course of the next few months of 1919 visited Ashita, Geramus and Keroar, in the Goyan area. All these places are north of the present ("Brussels" line).

British political and military officers entered Rowanduz on the 18th December, 1918, and organised the administration of the districts to the north and east of Rowanduz, and British political officers were posted in the town. Mr. Marshall, who was British Governor of Rowanduz in December 1918 and January 1919, was succeeded by Major Ross. A British garrison was posted at Kani Watman, near Rowanduz, in the winter of 1918-19.

Suleimanieh was formally occupied on the 15th November, 1918, by a political officer escorted by a small force of cavalry. The history of the administration of Suleimanieh has been described in one of the answers to the supplementary questionnaire.

Rania (including Kuala Diza) and Halabja were occupied, and an administration set up, at the same time as Suleimanieh, in which liwa these kazas then were. A British political officer was stationed at Rania. Koi Sanjak, which with Rania is now in the Arbil liwa but which was also at first administered from Suleimanieh, was occupied by a British political officer on the 15th December, 1918, and the administration was organised there.

Kirkuk, of course, had been occupied and governed from the 26th October, 1918, and Altun Kupri was taken over on the 2nd November by a British political officer. British administration of Arbil began on the 11th November, 1918.

In order to ensure an effective military occupation of the Mosul Vilayet, it was not of course necessary to distribute troops in equal proportions in each square kilometre of the area; points which were considered to give the most effective command over the area were chosen and strongly garrisoned. It was not, and never has been the practice of the British occupying forces to mark the frontier line by small military posts set upon it at regular intervals. Ever since their first occupation the principal strategic points such as Zakho, Mosul, Kirkuk have been occupied by permanent strong garrisons which dominated the vilayet, and from which as need arose smaller and less permanent garrisons, or mobile columns, were despatched to Arbil, Rowanduz, Suleimanieh, Amadia, Sinjar, Tell'Afar, Akra, Rania, &c. Since April 1923 Rowanduz (in winter, Kani Watman) has been added to the list of places at which permanent large garrisons have been stationed.

## APPENDIX.

*Brief Chronology of Important Dates of 1918-19.*

- February to May 1918.—Advance to Kifri and Kirkuk.  
 May 1918.—First occupation of Kirkuk and withdrawal to Tuz Khurmatu.  
 May 1918.—Administration set up in Kifri and Tuz Khurmatu.  
 October 1918.—Mesopotamia Expeditionary Force instructed to occupy Mosul.  
 October 25.—Kirkuk reoccupied and administration set up.  
 October 30.—Turkish army defending Mosul almost completely captured.  
 October 31.—Mudros armistice signed.  
 November 1.—Turkish officers met British cavalry at Hammam Ali and asked for cessation of hostilities.  
 November 2.—British general officer commanding informed Turkish general officer commanding of his intention to occupy Mosul and ordered Turks to surrender garrisons in whole of Mesopotamia.  
 November 2.—Administration set up in Altun Kupri.  
 November 3.—British occupied Mosul.  
 November 7.—Meeting between British general officer commanding and Turkish general officer commanding at Mosul. Turkey to withdraw all Turks from Mosul Vilayet.  
 November 9.—Turkish general officer commanding left Mosul for Nisibin.  
 November 11.—British administration set up in Arbil.  
 November 15.—Suleimanieh occupied by political officer and cavalry.  
 November 23.—Zakho occupied.  
 November 23.—British military force at Tall'Afar.  
 November 26.—Military reinforcements sent to Zakho and Faishkabur occupied. During November the British Governor of Mosul visited all the kadhas of the Mosul division and set up British administration in them.  
 December 15.—British political officer occupied Koi Sanjak and set up administration.  
 December 18.—British political and military officers entered Rowanduz and set up administration. During December a small column of British troops visited Amadia and Bira Kapra.  
 Winter 1918-19.—British detachment posted near Rowanduz at Kani Watman.  
 January 11, 1919.—British troops posted at Amadia.  
 July 1919.—British columns occupied Lower Tiari, Guli and Goyan country north of present frontier.

## No. 6.

*Mr. Austen Chamberlain to the Marquess of Crewe (Paris).*

(No. 153.)  
 (Telegraphic.)

[By Bag.]

*Foreign Office, May 29, 1925.*

BRITISH liaison officer at Beirut reports that First Turkish Army Corps is now passing over the Syrian section of the Bagdad Railway and that the French authorities have granted permission for two trains to pass daily for twenty days from 24th May inclusive.

As headquarters of that corps are at Afium Kara Hissar, presumably they are passing eastwards in direction of Irak frontier.

At time of Kurdish revolt French authorities restricted passage of troops to number necessary for suppression of revolt (see your despatch No. 547 of 3rd March). Turkish Government have themselves announced complete suppression of revolt, and there is consequently no apparent explanation or justification for despatch of a further corps to neighbourhood of Irak frontier.

Please bring this matter urgently to M. Briand's attention, and enquire on what grounds Turks have based their request and French authorities granted it. I leave it to your discretion to decide whether it is necessary to refer once again to French pledge to us.



## No. 7.

*The Marquess of Crewe to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received May 31.)*

(No. 204.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Paris, May 30, 1925.

YOUR telegram No. 153.

Ministry for Foreign Affairs has no precise information, but will enquire as to reason for movements of troops. It presumes reason to be return of tired troops from scene of Kurdish revolt and their replacement by fresh troops.

## No. 8.

*The Marquess of Crewe to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received June 2.)*

(No. 207.)

(Telegraphic.)

Paris, June 1, 1925.

MY telegram No. 204.

Ministry for Foreign Affairs received yesterday through Ministry of War a telegram from General Sarraill, to the following effect:—

“Kurdistan situation is without change. For twenty days from 24th May fresh Turkish reinforcements will be taken across Syria. Government is actively engaged in crushing Progressists.”

M. Briand being away, I requested Mr. Phipps to point out to M. Berthelot that as situation in Kurdistan was reported to be without change, and as Turkish Government had previously announced suppression of revolt, there was no apparent reason for despatch of reinforcements. M. Berthelot said that instructions were being telegraphed to French Ambassador at Constantinople to inform Turkish Government that it was inadmissible that slightest semblance of a menace should be directed against Great Britain or Irak by Turkey. M. Berthelot added spontaneously that French Government were ready to take any action in the matter which His Majesty's Government might desire.

## No. 9.

*The Marquess of Crewe to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received June 4.)*

(No. 210.)

(Telegraphic.)

[By Bag.]

Paris, June 3, 1925.

MY telegram No. 207 of 1st June.

The Political Director at the Quai d'Orsay states that the Turkish Ambassador informed him yesterday that the trains now being sent across the Syrian railways were carrying a certain number of recruits to reinforce the Diarbekir division, which was below strength. The trains on their way back were bringing away the two divisions, i.e., those of Adana and Konia, which had been dealing with the Kurdish rebellion. More troops, therefore, were coming back to the west than were being sent eastwards.

## No. 10.

*Mr. Austen Chamberlain to the Marquess of Crewe (Paris).*

(No. 163.)

(Telegraphic.)

[By Bag.]

Foreign Office, June 4, 1925.

YOUR telegram No. 207 of 1st June: Turkish troop movements.

Please inform French Government that I greatly appreciate their offer to take any action which His Majesty's Government may desire.

I am advised that, prior to present transfer eastward, Turks had more than sufficient forces on the spot for suppressing remaining rebels in Kurdistan, where the revolt had been officially declared at an end. Further reinforcements, therefore,

unless balanced by corresponding withdrawal, can only be regarded as increasing potential threat to Irak.

Failing definite corroboration by French military authorities in Syria of Turkish Ambassador's statement (your telegram No. 210 of 3rd June) that more troops are returning westward than are being sent eastward, I shall be grateful if French Government can see their way to suspend immediately permission for passage of Turkish troops eastward. If, however, French military authorities are satisfied that fresh troops are really required by withdrawal of troops already there, and by persistence of revolt calling for military force, such action would not be necessary.

Matter is urgent, as over half the period has already elapsed.

(Repeated to Constantinople, No. 90, in R.)

## No. 11.

*Mr. Austen Chamberlain to Mr. Lindsay (Constantinople).*

(No. 91.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Foreign Office, June 4, 1925.

NEWS that the French military authorities in Syria have accorded permission for the transfer of the 1st Turkish Army Corps over the Syrian Railway at the rate of two trains daily for twenty days from 24th May is causing His Majesty's Government some anxiety. There are already in Kurdistan the VIth and VIIth Corps which should be amply sufficient to suppress any remaining rebels in Kurdistan, where the revolt has been officially declared at an end. The despatch of further reinforcements, therefore, in the absence of reliable information of a corresponding withdrawal of troops already in Kurdistan, can only be regarded as increasing the potential threat to Irak and must have a disturbing effect in the Mosul Vilayet.

Turkish Ambassador in Paris has informed French Government that the trains now being sent across the Syrian Railway are only carrying recruits to reinforce the Diarbekir division, and on their return are bringing westward the Adana and Konia divisions, so that more troops are returning westward than are going eastward.

French Government have offered to take any action we may desire, and you will see from my telegram No. 163 to Paris, repeated to you as No. 90, what we are asking them to do. They have already instructed their representative at Constantinople to inform the Turkish Government that it was inadmissible that the slightest semblance of a menace should be directed against Great Britain or Irak by Turkey.

With reference to the assurances given to you by the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs on your recent visit to Angora, you should, unless you have information rendering such action unnecessary, inform Turkish Government that His Majesty's Government are at a loss to understand present reinforcement of troops in Kurdistan now that the revolt has been officially declared at an end, and cannot but regard it with some disquiet as constituting a potential threat to Irak and an actual and immediate element of disturbance within the Mosul Vilayet. They will therefore be glad to receive any reassuring explanation the Turkish Government may be able to offer.

## No. 12.

*Mr. Austen Chamberlain to Consul-General Satow (Beirut).*

(No. 11.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Foreign Office, June 4, 1925.

YOUR telegram No. 15 of 31st May: Turkish troop movements in neighbourhood of Irak frontier.

Following for liaison officer:—

“Is there any explanation of the eastward transfer of the 1st Corps now that suppression of the Kurdish revolt has been officially announced by the Turkish Government. For example, is anything known of the relief or demobilisation of the VIth or VIIth Corps already in Kurdistan? Turkish Ambassador in Paris states that trains are carrying recruits to reinforce the Diarbekir division and are bringing back on their return journey the Adana and Konia divisions, so that more troops are returning westwards than are passing eastwards.”



## No. 13.

*The Marquess of Crewe to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received June 6.)*

(No. 214.)

[By Bag.]

Paris, June 5, 1925.

(Telegraphic.)

YOUR telegram No. 163 of 4th June: Movement of Turkish troops.

I saw M. Briand this afternoon, having first ascertained that French War Office, while aware of transport of demobilised men, could not give proportion of those going westward. M. Briand had received further communication from Turkish Ambassador here regarding return of demobilised men, which he considered satisfactory. He had himself shared your uneasiness at the figures of troops gone eastward, and has been communicating with General Sarraill, instructing him to provide two trains a day to transport troops westward. He assured me that the utmost vigilance will be exercised, he having impressed this on the French authorities in Syria.

## No. 14.

*Consul-General Satow to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received June 6.)*

(No. 17.)

(Telegraphic.)

Beirut, June 5, 1925.

FOLLOWING for Air Ministry from liaison officer:—

"French officially informed from Angora that reservists of Vth and VIIth Corps being demobilised and replaced by recruits. This partly accounts for present movement of troops, although number proceeding east still appears greater than number going west.

"Between 29th May and 1st June inclusive 15 officers and 7,321 men passed eastwards. No units mentioned, so presumably recruits and reinforcements. 31st May, 18 officers and 705 men passed westwards, presumably reservists for demobilisation. Destination of eastbound troops Derbisieh.

"Foreign Office telegram No. 11 just received. Think above explains position."

(Repeated to "Aviation," Palestine, and Bagdad.)

## No. 15.

*Mr. Lindsay to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received June 8.)*

(No. 80.)

(Telegraphic.)

Constantinople, June 7, 1925.

YOUR telegram No. 91.

I have spoken to French Ambassador about situation, and neither he nor I believe that Turks intend any action so serious as to cause a breach with His Majesty's Government. His military information received direct from General Mougin is that Turkish Government is moving only recruits to eastern provinces. He tells me that General Sarraill was seriously concerned at Turkish concentration at Adana, and therefore gladly allowed troops to pass eastward over Syrian Railway, but actually stopped at Jerablus a trainload of troops proceeding westward. French Ambassador caused him to countermand latter measure.

I have addressed note to Turkish Government in the sense of your instructions asking for reassuring explanations, but omitting only reference to disquieting effect in Irak of their manœuvres, which I think would be injudicious.

Copy by bag.

(Repeated to Bagdad, No. 27.)

## No. 16.

*Mr. Lindsay to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received June 10.)*

(No. 83.)

(Telegraphic.)

Constantinople, June 10, 1925.

FOLLOWING for War Office from military attaché:—

"Reliable observer located practically all units of Ist Corps in Smyrna-Aidin-Menemen area between 24th May and 6th June. Saw no movement of troops except approximately one battalion in the train in Menemen station, destination unknown.

"24th and details of 51st infantry regiment in train at Reshadieh station (junction for Sokia) en route for Sokia.

"Reliable American source states that demobilisation of reserves called up for suppression of Kurdistan rebellion was definitely ordered on 25th May. To replace these in the force now operating in eastern vilayets, 850 men from each division not now engaged will be drafted to that area, approximately 10,000 men. Demobilisation of reservists will proceed concurrently with arrival of these drafts."

## No. 17.

*Mr. Lindsay to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received June 10.)*

(No. 84.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Constantinople, June 10, 1925.

MY telegram No. 82.

I have now received note reaffirming Minister for Foreign Affairs' oral declaration to me that "Turkish Government desire to cultivate best relations with His Majesty's Government, and that nothing is farther from its intentions than to take any action liable to constitute a menace to Irak." Note adds that demobilisation is proceeding, and that such movements of troops as are taking place are governed solely by necessities of internal situation, and in no way constitute menace to any neighbouring Power.

Copy by bag.

(Repeated to Bagdad, No. 29.)

[E 196/32/65]

## No. 18.

*Mr. Lindsay to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received January 12.)*

(No. 20.)

Sir,

Constantinople, January 7, 1925.

I HAVE the honour to report that the League of Nations Sub-Commission for the Delimitation of the Irak Frontier arrived in Constantinople in the last days of the year, and while in Turkey are the guests of the Government. They have now left for Angora, and, after discussion there with the Turkish Government, propose to proceed by rail to Syria and Irak. It is said that they will stop at Konia en route to be received by the President of the Republic, who is just now paying an official visit to that city.

2. I have avoided contact with the sub-commission, thinking it better to allow the Turks to do their worst with them unhampered by any influence I might try to exert. I have therefore forwarded to them documents from yourself, and an invitation from Sir H. Dobbs to stay with him at the Residency while they are at Bagdad—an invitation which the sub-commission have accepted. Beyond that, and apart from a short friendly conversation with Count Teleki at a social function, I have had no communication with the sub-commission.

3. The Turkish press have clearly received a *mot d'ordre* to write about the frontier question during the presence here of the League's representatives. A number of articles have appeared emphasising the importance of the Mosul Vilayet to Turkey, and insisting usually that for Great Britain the whole question is one of oil. The articles have been moderate in tone and nothing more than could have been expected in the circumstances.

I have, &c.

R. C. LINDSAY.



*Consul London to Sir W. Tyrrell.—(Received June 12.)*

(No. 252.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Geneva, June 12, 1925.*

FOLLOWING from Secretary of State:—

"Council of League of Nations yesterday dealt with remaining items of agenda. At private session British delegate explained anxiety of His Majesty's Government that decision on Irak frontier should be taken as soon as possible. As it seemed unlikely that council would be prepared to take question before September session he hoped council might meet two days earlier than would be normally the case, in order that it might get this question out of the way if possible before assembly sessions interfere with its work. Council of League of Nations is therefore provisionally summoned to meet on 2nd September."

## CHAPTER II.—ARABIA.

[E 100/10/91]

No. 20.

*Consul Bullard to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received January 6, 1925.)*

(No. 116. Secret.)

Sir,

*Jeddah, December 11, 1924.*

I HAVE the honour to enclose a report on the situation covering the period the 20th November to the 11th December.

2. Copies of this despatch and of its enclosure are being sent to India, Egypt, Khartum (through Port Sudan), Jerusalem, Bagdad, Beirut (for Damascus), Aden, Singapore, Bushire, Koweit and Bahrein.

I have, &c.

R. W. BULLARD.

Enclosure 1 in No. 20.

*Report for the Period November 20–December 11, 1924.*

THE Indian newspaper, the "Moslem Outlook," has cited the use of the term "Wahabis" by the English press as an attempt to prejudice the Moslem world against Ibn Saud. As several prominent Indian Mahometan Nationalists have used the same term in interviews reported in the "Moslem Outlook," the charge need not be taken seriously. Nevertheless, it appears to be true that the followers of Ibn Saud object to the name "Wahabi," and that they call themselves Moslems, or Ikhwan (brethren), and claim to be plain Hanbalis, *i.e.*, members of one of the four orthodox Sunni sects. The common name for them here is "Mudaiyinah." This is apparently a corruption of "Mutadaiyinah" (singular Mutadaiyin) from "tadaiyana" = to follow the (true) religion.

2. The proposal to bring down foreign subjects (chiefly Javanese) in caravans under escort came to nothing, because the Hedjaz Government have no control outside the defences of Jeddah. The Wahabis hold the road down to Bahrah, the half-way halting-place, but from there to the Jeddah defences there are tribes which, while nominally under Hedjaz Government control, would probably rob the caravans, and the Hedjaz Government cannot provide an escort of "regular" troops.

Very few foreigners have reached Jeddah since the date of the last report. They were all Javanese. Some of these maintained that the Wahabis had prevented them from reading Maulids—the various lives of the Prophet, by which they, and, indeed, most Moslems, set great store.

3. The Wahabis followed up the lesson to the Harb by nearly annihilating two small tribes, the Bani Jabir and the Barakit, within 10 or 15 miles of Jeddah. There seems good evidence that women and children, as well as men, were killed. Both tribes had sent to Mecca and declared themselves to be "Mudaiyinah," but they had doubtless given similar assurances of loyalty to Ali, and the ruthless attack was presumably meant as retribution for double-dealing. As a warning, the fate of these two tribes has been most effective; it is unlikely that the Wahabis would have anything to fear from the tribes if they advanced on Jeddah. Ali has lost all faith in the promises of tribal support, and, moreover, he has no money or supplies to give the tribes, and without that not even promises are to be had. All Bedouin have been sent away from Jeddah. This rids the city of a most disorderly and untrustworthy element, and, moreover, helps to relieve the strain on the water supply.

The Hedjaz Government are therefore dependent upon the so-called regular army, strengthened—or, at least, increased in number—by several hundred volunteers, most of whom are from the mandated territory of Palestine. The health of these volunteers has been bad; a very high proportion have been suffering from dysentery or malaria, or both. Many of them still want to get away, but this agency is acting on a policy, approved by His Majesty's Government, of refusing to receive applications for release while doing what can be done unofficially to secure an improvement in conditions.



Tahain Pasha professes to believe that he could beat off an army of 20,000 Wahabis, but it is doubtful whether he is serious in this contention. People here who know the Wahabi methods of fighting say that Khalid would think nothing of sending 200 or 300 camelry to death against the barbed wire if he could thereby effect an entry. It is unlikely that the Hedjaz army would stand once the defences were pierced, even if it waited for that.

4. The P. and O. steamship "Nore" called at Jeddah on the 22nd November and landed three aeroplanes from England for the Hedjaz Government. The first to be assembled proved to be a D.H. 9 with a Siddeley-Puma engine—a war plane, but not fitted with a machine gun. The second, also a De Havilland, has a Diesel engine; it is a commercial machine fitted with a cabin to carry two passengers besides the pilot and a mechanic. The third is said to be of the same type as the second. None of the machines is new.

The only pilot, the Russian, Shirokov, goes out on a reconnaissance nearly every morning and evening. He always uses the first machine, having smashed the undercarriage of the second on landing after his first flight in it. As he refuses to fly over enemy territory at less than 9,000 or 10,000 feet, and as his observer is a one-eyed officer, who always wears dark glasses when he goes up, it is not believed that the reports brought back are of great value. M. Shirokov is constantly being pressed by the army commander, Tahain Pasha, to drop bombs on supposed enemy concentrations, but has so far refused. There are no aeroplane bombs in the country. Tahain Pasha wanted M. Shirokov to drop hand grenades, and was with difficulty persuaded that if they didn't blow the machine to pieces they would burst before reaching the ground. He then proposed that shells should be dropped, and himself made an experiment with two, but neither exploded. He is, nevertheless, pressing that explosives of some kind should be dropped on Mecca, and he and M. Shirokov seem to persuade the King alternatively for and against this policy. It is difficult to see what could be gained by the bombing of Mecca by a non-Moslem airman, whereas the drawbacks, from the point of view of the Hedjaz Government, are clear; they could hardly provide Ibn Saud and his Moslem world with a better cry. It is possible that M. Shirokov may eventually yield to pressure. He receives from the Hedjaz Government, besides a salary of £60 gold a month, a bottle of whisky a day, and, as he supplements this quite inadequate ration by heavy purchases and by drinking at the expense of his admirers, he may one day reach the point of exhilaration at which the prospect of dropping explosives on Mecca will cease to appear objectionable.

There are several British airmen in Suez who appear to have been engaged for service in the Hedjaz. They have undertaken not to proceed to the Hedjaz without the express permission of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

The Resident at Aden reports the arrival there, for some unknown consignee in Jeddah, of over a million rounds of small-arms ammunition from England.

The authorities were greatly disappointed that no rifles or bombs arrived on the "Nore." They have paid about £50,000 to a General Newland, who has a business of some kind in Egypt, to purchase munitions for them in England, and they hoped that at least part of the material would arrive on the "Nore." They have, however, heard through the Arab agent in Cairo that His Majesty's Government have refused a licence for the export. This they cannot understand, as the Hedjaz is a signatory of the Arms Traffic Convention of 1919, but they have probably not read the articles of the convention which prescribe elaborate measures for preventing munitions from falling into the hands of people who have no stable Government.

5. Ibn Saud arrived at Mecca on Friday, the 5th December, and all Jeddah is hoping for a speedy decision of the dispute. The question of the safety of foreign subjects is, it is hoped, finally settled by the latest letters which have been exchanged between Ibn Saud and the consular corps in Jeddah. Copies of these letters are attached. The contention, implicit in his letter of the 21st November, that, having once warned us to remove our nationals either to Mecca or to some other specified place, he could with impunity kill anyone he found in Jeddah, could not be accepted. His last letter, to which a formal acknowledgment has been sent, is more reasonable.

6. From Ibn Saud's letters to the foreign representatives and to Amin Rihani, Sayyid Talib Pasha and Mr. Philby, three points emerge clearly:—

- (1) He considers Jeddah essential to Mecca;
- (2) He still insists that "the Shereef" Ali should leave Jeddah;
- (3) He still maintains that the decision must be left to the Moslem world.

What is not known is whether he is prepared to try to seize Jeddah by force if Ali refuses to leave the country, and, above all, who, in Ibn Saud's opinion, constitute the Moslem world. It is known that he has been working with the Caliphate Committee in India, and, less openly, with Egyptian extremists, and it is, therefore, not surprising that he should cling so tenaciously to their policy. So far as is known here, however, the only delegates actually appointed to attend the proposed conference at Mecca are five Indians, of whom His Majesty's Government have found it necessary to state that they are nominees of the Caliphate Committee, and must not be considered as representing Indian Moslem opinion, still less as having any credentials from His Majesty's Government or from the Government of India. Java and Malaya appear to be disinclined to take any active part in the decision, and not even the Egyptians have appointed a delegation. It is true that the president of the Syrian Federation has sent a telegram to Ibn Saud applauding his policy, but this is generally regarded as a French rather than a Moslem pronouncement, and has, moreover, been openly attacked by many Syrians.

7. Of the would-be peacemakers assembled in Jeddah, the only one who has much chance of seeing Ibn Saud at present is Sayyid Talib Pasha. Even he has been told by Ibn Saud that he cannot be allowed to intervene in the Nejd-Hedjaz dispute, but he hopes to go to Mecca in a few days, as an old friend of Ibn Saud's, and to have an opportunity to discuss the general situation. Amin Rihani and Mr. Philby have both been reminded that, as non-Moslems, they must not interfere in a purely Moslem question. The latest letter to Mr. Philby says that Ibn Saud is prepared to meet him, later, at Bahrah, if he has any purely personal business to discuss; but Mr. Philby is debarred from going to Bahrah, even for that limited purpose, by the instructions from His Majesty's Government, which do not permit him to go into the interior.

8. I understand that the Foreign Secretary here has protested to the acting French consul very strongly in regard to the telegram sent to Ibn Saud by the president of the Syrian Federation, Subhi Bey Barakat. The Hedjaz Government contend, with some reason, that the telegram could not have been sent without the approval of the French authorities, and that it therefore constitutes a serious breach of neutrality by the French.

9. The Egyptian Red Crescent Society has sent a unit to Jeddah. They wished to send one to the Wahabis also, and they had some difficulty in understanding that this might not be feasible at present. The Jeddah unit was welcomed by the Hedjaz Government with open arms and given the whole town to choose a place on which to pitch its tents.

At the official opening of the hospital King Ali made a very cordial speech—the sort of speech which, if it had been made by the ruler of the Hedjaz four or five years ago, might have had some effect on the course of events. He thanked His Majesty King Fuad, the people of Egypt and the Red Crescent Society for sending the hospital, and said he hoped that it would mark the beginning of an era of mutual understanding and friendship.

10. A party of about fifteen Javanese who left Mecca three days after Ibn Saud's arrival have reached Jeddah. The information they bring was received while the earlier part of this report was being typed. They state that Ibn Saud assembles the ulama every day and that long theological disputes are held. They confirm the stories of interference by the Wahabis in various religious practices and the report that the Wahabis have destroyed the Prophet's house and the tomb of his wife, Khadijah.

11. The ex-King Hussein is still at Akaba, and he still sends frequent telegrams to his son and to various officials, all signed, as though he were still King, by his "Head of the Hashimite office." Two telegrams received from him within a few hours of each other a day or two ago give the key to his character. The Hedjaz steamship "Tawil" ran aground near Akaba, and Hussein wired:—

- (1) "Your steamer has sunk."
- (2) "Our steamer has floated off again."

R. W. BULLARD.



Enclosure 2 in No. 20.

*Ibn Saud to Consular Corps.*

(Translation.)

(After greetings.)

Riyadh, 24th Rabi' al Thani, 1343

(21st November, 1924).

WE inform you that we have read the letter dated the 4th November which you sent to the generals of our army, Khalid-bin-Mansur and Sultan-bin-Bijad, regarding the attitude of your Governments towards the war between Nejd and the Hedjaz. I sincerely desired that an end might be put to bloodshed and that effect might be given to the wishes of the Moslem world, which has suffered such trials for eight years. The Shereef, Ali-bin-Hussein, however, by remaining in Jeddah, prevents our attaining our sacred aims. Consequently, out of love for the security of your nationals, and in order to protect their lives and property from any harm that might happen, we desire to inform you—

1. That you should appoint for your nationals a suitable place either in or outside Jeddah and inform us of its situation, so that we may send some of our men to guard and protect them.
2. That, if you wish, you should send them to Mecca, where they would be near the sacred shrine and far from the calamities and perils of war. We would give them a warm welcome, and allot them a place suitable for their occupation.

We beg you to send to the people of Jeddah our enclosed letter, so that they may understand the matter fully. We do not hold ourselves responsible for anything subsequent to this our proclamation.

(Compliments.)

(Seal of Ibn Saud.)

*Ibn Saud to "All the People of Jeddah."*

(Translation.)

(After greetings.)

Riyadh, 24th Rabi' al Thani, 1343

(21st November, 1924).

YOU are doubtless aware that the greater part of the Moslem world have declared that they do not wish the Hedjaz to be ruled by Hussein and his sons. Now therefore we, desiring to keep the peace and to prevent bloodshed, inform you that you are under the treaty and protection of Allah, both yourselves and your property, if you follow the course adopted by the people of Mecca. As to the presence of the Amir Ali among you and his leaving in accordance with the views of the Moslem world, we advise you to leave the town and to stay in some appointed place or to proceed to Mecca for the protection of your lives and property, or to seize the Shereef Ali-bin-Hussein and to deport him from your country. If you act otherwise, by helping the said (Ali) or adhering to his cause, we are free from blame before the Moslem world, and the consequences of whatever may happen are upon him who gives rise to them.

(Seal of Ibn Saud.)

Enclosure 3 in No. 20.

*Consular Corps to Ibn Saud.*

Jeddah, 5th Jamada 'l Awwal, 1343

(2nd December, 1924).

(After greetings.)

WE have received your letter of 24th Rabi' al Thani (November 21st, 1924), and have noted what you say. As to the remarks regarding the protection of our nationals and the safeguarding of them against the dangers of war, we think it necessary to remind your Highness that the respect for our nationals (i.e., the right they have to be respected in person and property) is based on the rules of international law applicable to war time, and we invite you, in the names of our Govern-

ments, to respect the persons and property of our nationals; otherwise, you will be responsible for anything that may happen to them anywhere and at any time.

As to the letter addressed to the people of Jeddah, we are unable to deliver it on account of the rule of neutrality we follow, which does not permit our interference in any manner whatsoever. We therefore return it herewith.

(Compliments.)

HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S AGENT AND CONSUL.  
ITALIAN CONSUL-GENERAL.  
ACTING FRENCH CONSUL-GENERAL.  
NETHERLANDS VICE-CONSUL.  
ACTING PERSIAN CONSUL.

Enclosure 4 in No. 20.

*Ibn Saud to Consular Corps.*

(Translation.)

(After greetings.)

Mecca, 9th Jamada 'l Awwal, 1343

(5th December, 1924).

I HAVE received your letter of 5th Jamada 'l Awwal (December 1st) and noted its contents.

Your nationals are respected by us with the respect due to the people of the Moslem lands, and we will in no wise allow any harm to come upon their persons or their property. Only, as Jeddah may become the scene of hostilities, and since without Jeddah the material and moral situation of Mecca cannot be good, I beg you to notify your nationals that, in case of conflict between our forces and the forces of the Shereef Ali, everyone who is under your protection should refrain from approaching the scene of conflict and should take refuge in his house. By this means alone can we safeguard the lives of your nationals, whom we respect and honour with all our hearts.

(Greetings.)

(Seal of Ibn Saud.)

No. 21.

*Consul Bullard to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received January 17.)*

(No. 8.)

(Telegraphic.)

Jeddah, January 17, 1925.

YOUR telegram No. 4.

Southern blockading force consists of steamer "Tawil" and (Foreign Minister declares) certain number of dhows. Northern, steamship "Ragmatan."

No British craft brought in. I have reserved our rights in writing, and will watch developments.

No. 22.

*Consul Bullard to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received January 17.)*

(No. 9.)

(Telegraphic.)

Jeddah, January 17, 1925.

CIRCULAR. All addresses.

Wahabis closing in; expected to make a night attack about new moon. They can hardly fail to take Jeddah.



No. 23.

*Consul Bullard to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received January 17.)*

(No. 10.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Jeddah, January 17, 1925.*

INDIAN deputation admit in writing that their aim is to establish republic in Hedjaz in which King Hussein and his family shall have no part, and that until Islamic conference it is proposed to summon has decided about Government, they wish country to be under Ibn Saud. Authorities here consequently refuse to facilitate their meeting with Sultan, who seems very anxious to meet them.

(Sent to Simla.)

[E 354/10/91]

No. 24.

*Consul Bullard to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received January 21, 1925.)*

(No. 119.)

Sir,

*Jeddah, December 30, 1924.*

I HAVE the honour to enclose a report on the situation covering the period the 12th to the 30th December.

2. Copies of this despatch and of its enclosure are being sent to India, Egypt, Khartum (through Port Sudan), Jerusalem, Bagdad, Beirut (for Damascus), Aden, Singapore, Bushire, Koweit, Bahrein and Muscat.

I have, &amp;c.

R. W. BULLARD.

Enclosure in No. 24.

*Report for the Period December 12-30, 1924.*

(Secret.)

A LONG report is not required, as there is hope of peace between Nejd and the Hedjaz, in spite of Ibn Saud's apparent intransigence and of the warfare of words and propaganda which is being conducted between Mecca and Jeddah. Ibn Saud has started a newspaper at Mecca, the "Umm-al-Kura" (i.e., "Mother of Villages"—a name given to Mecca in the Koran). It is printed at the "Kiblah" press, but it differs from the "Kiblah" in that, not being written or corrected by King Hussein, it is intelligible. Some extracts from the first two numbers are given as an appendix to this report. Ibn Saud suppressed the first edition of No. 2, but a copy of it came into my hands and the passages which were omitted from the second printing will be found in the appendix. They show that Ibn Saud is more reasonable than some of the people with him. Nevertheless, the account, given in the first number, of the alleged agreement between the ulama of Nejd and Mecca as to the main articles of faith suggests to what extent Ibn Saud is compelled to countenance the puritanical views of his followers. It is incredible that the ulama of Mecca would ever approve of tenets which are repugnant to most of the pilgrims by whom they live. Taking oath by Mahomet, praying in the name of Mahomet or of a saint, and saying prayers and burning candles at tombs are common practices which it would be impossible to suppress without stirring up fierce opposition. There can be little doubt now that several tombs, e.g., those of Khadijah, Mahomet's first wife, and of his mother, Aminah, have been demolished. The Wahabis have also demolished a house which is said to be the Prophet's, and is, in any case, very ancient.

Jeddah now publishes twice a week a small newspaper called "Burid-al-Hijaz," i.e., the "Hedjaz Post." It lays stress on the Wahabis' intolerance and their barbarity towards the people of Taif, and on the almost complete failure of Ibn Saud's appeal to the Moslem world, the only delegates appointed to attend the proposed conference at Mecca being two Indians chosen by the Caliphate Committee. On the 18th December it published a long proclamation to the people of Mecca, in which King Ali announced that he was about to march out to recapture Mecca, and urged them to stand firm and to endure a little while longer the sufferings which the necessity to blockade Ibn Saud compelled the Hedjaz Government to inflict on

them. The "Burid-al-Hijaz" has also published what is probably a false report of a revolt against Ibn Saud at Hail. The news came from Abdullah, but the Hedjaz Government claim to have received independent confirmation from Medina. The latest number, which appeared while this report was being written, strikes a more peaceful note: the Arabs of Nejd and of the Hedjaz are brothers, their real interests are identical, and so on.

2. After an interval, so long that the Hedjaz Government had almost given up hope of a reply, the three would-be peacemakers in Jeddah received, on the 22nd December, further letters from Ibn Saud. Sayyid Talib Pasha was told not to come to Mecca, as people whom Ibn Saud did not wish to offend had spoken against his coming. The letter to Mr. Philby was friendly, but vague. It was only the letter to Amin Rihani, the Americanised Syrian Christian, who visited Nejd a year or two ago, which was important. Ibn Saud asked Rihani to send him a full and frank expression of his views. Rihani at once sent him a memorandum warning him, I understand, that he would be foolish to allow himself to be entangled in Hedjaz affairs to please the self-styled Moslem world. Ibn Saud's reply arrived on the 25th December. The Foreign Secretary, Sheikh Fuad, tells me, in confidence, that the reply offers good hopes of peace. Ibn Saud is willing to meet representatives of the Hedjaz Government. Two of the points on which Ibn Saud insists are guarantees against the return of Hussein and the abandonment of the Anglo-Hedjaz Treaty. The latter is presumably wanted as a sop to the Moslem extremists, who pretend that the object of the treaty is to bring the Hedjaz under British influence.

3. There has been no military move on either side since the last report was written, except that, on the 9th December, two aeroplanes, piloted by Russians, dropped four shells near Bahrah, the half-way halting place on the road to Mecca. The Hedjaz Government believe that it was this that induced Ibn Saud to send a conciliatory reply! The promise to advance on Mecca contained in King Ali's proclamation can be dismissed as baseless: the Hedjaz army could not possibly undertake an offensive movement.

The Hedjaz air service now has three pilots and six mechanics—all Russians. Mr. King, one of the three British airmen who were stated in the last report to be at Suez, decided to come to Jeddah to try to come to a settlement with the Hedjaz Government, as he had not enough money to take him home. The Hedjaz Government acceded to the representations of this agency that Mr. King should not be employed, and he himself, on having the provisions of the Foreign Enlistment Act pointed out to him, gave a written declaration not to work for the Hedjaz Government either as pilot or mechanic or instructor. He leaves for England on the 31st December with about £100 more than the Hedjaz Government could be required to pay under their contract with him. The person to whom the affair does least credit appears to be General Sir Foster Newland, who engaged Mr. King and signed the contract in the name of the Hedjaz Government.

Six Germans arrived on the 25th December for service in the Hedjaz army. According to their own statements they belong to various arms, but possibly they are intended for the armoured cars about which there has been much talk. The place of origin of these cars is given sometimes as Germany, sometimes as Denmark. They are probably the "goods" which someone in Germany is unwilling to despatch until £6,000 has been placed at his disposal "irrevocably," but which the Hedjaz Government, warned by the failure of their attempt to get £50,000 worth of munitions from England, refuse to pay for until they reach Jeddah.

4. There is little doubt that Ibn Saud could take Jeddah if he made a serious attack. His failure to do so is attributed here mainly to the presence of foreigners and to Ibn Saud's fear that his followers might get out of hand and indulge in indiscriminate killing and looting. There is fairly good evidence that when the Mecca people urged him to open the Jeddah road so that they might procure food, he asked them to give him a signed document accepting full responsibility for any consequences which the capture of Jeddah might entail. His hesitation may be due in part to the lack of response to his invitation to a conference in Mecca. Two Indian delegates are to arrive in a day or two, but there is no news of the departure, or even the appointment, of delegates from anywhere else.

5. It is difficult to say to what extent Jeddah is necessary for the feeding of Mecca at the present time. The Mecca newspaper speaks of ample food supplies arriving from Rabigh, Lith and Kunfudah, and doubtless trade could be diverted to those ports in time; but private news from Mecca shows that the town is still very short of such imports as rice, sugar, tea and petroleum. To increase the



economic pressure the Hedjaz Government decided to blockade Lith and Kunfudah, with effect from the 24th December. Later they included Hali. They gave the foreign representatives ten days' notice, and this Agency telegraphed the information to Aden, Egypt and the Sudan, so that dhows might be warned. I have reminded the Foreign Secretary orally that His Majesty's Government cannot recognise any blockade which is not effective, but, owing to the nature of the shipping, conflicts are not likely to arise. The blockade, such as it is, cannot begin until about the 3rd January, as the steamship "Tawil," which constitutes the blockading squadron, did not leave Jeddah until the morning of the 30th December.

6. Sayyid Talib Pasha leaves for Egypt on the 31st December. Mr. Philby wishes to leave for Aden, but is at present suffering from dysentery. He would have left some days ago, but gave in to the King's pressing request that he should stay. This pressure Mr. Philby attributes to his beautiful eyes, but it is mainly due to the belief of the military party that he wants to get to Ibn Saud by another route and tell him the secrets of the defences of Jeddah. To fill up the time Mr. Philby has been making a map of the surroundings of Jeddah and incidentally helping a Turkish officer to make a plan of the trenches. He would be much surprised to learn that such action in wartime by a foreigner who is known to be friendly to the other side is calculated to arouse suspicion.

R. W. BULLARD.

#### APPENDIX.

##### "Umm-al-Kura," Mecca.

No. 1.—December 12, 1924.

A proclamation by Ibn Saud dated the 12th Jamada 'l Ula, 1343 (9th December, 1924) is published. Four of the five clauses are either repetitions of previous statements or unimportant—the Holy Places are to be cleansed of Hussein and his sons, the decision must rest with the Moslem world, ulama, mosque officials, &c., will be left in undisturbed possession of their posts unless found to be unworthy, and no one who acts rightly has anything to fear from Ibn Saud; but the third clause is worth translating in full.

The source of all (religious) legislation and laws is to be found only in the Koran and what came from the Prophet (*i.e.*, the traditions or sunnah), and—in regard to matters on which the Koran and the traditions are silent—in the decisions which Moslem divines have adopted by way of analogy ("kiyas") or consensus of opinion ("ijma'").

An Egyptian divine, Sheikh Hafidh, gives an address to the Ulama of Mecca. He says, without explaining exactly what he means, that Ibn Saud does not want the House of Allah (the Ka'bah) to be the private property of anyone, but the joint property of all Moslems. He rails against "civilised progress" as the main source of heresy in Moslem countries. Moslems need no progress but religious progress, which can be attained only by a return to the injunctions of the Koran and of the Prophet.

It is announced that the leading Mecca and Nejd divines (names given) have come to an agreement on the fundamental articles of religion, viz. :—

1. Any person who, after making the profession of faith and performing the five duties of Islam falls into unbelief, in word or deed or belief, shall be held to be a kafir (unbeliever). He shall be invited to repent: if he repents, well; if not, he shall be killed.
2. Whoever makes any creature an intermediary between him and Allah and prays to it, and asks it to bring him advantage or to ward off evil or to bring him near to Allah, is a kafir. It is lawful to take his life and his goods.
3. Whoever seeks intercession between him and Allah is guilty of polytheism.
4. Graves shall not have buildings made over them, or candles lighted or prayers performed at them; for that is heresy forbidden by the Shara' law.
5. Whoever petitions Allah in the name of one of his creatures is a heretic and a criminal.
6. It is unlawful to take oath except by Allah—whether by the Ka'bah, or by the Faith, or by the Prophet, or by anything else.

No. 2.—December 19, 1924.

Leading article: "Our Political Position."

We want, for the present, to speak of the Hedjaz alone and not of the position of the Arabs in general in the Jazirah. (Suppressed passage: "There will be a time for that when we have done with the matter in which we are now engaged and the question has been settled in the interests of Moslems in general and of the Arabs in particular.")

By the help of Allah the injunction that none but believers should enter the Holy Places has been observed. The Holy Places have remained untouched by foreign intrigues or by the ambitions of colonisers. Some blind people, however, wished to trade in the sanctity of the Holy Places, and to work for British protection in return for British assistance in bringing Nejd and the Yemen into submission. The British, however, who consider the consequences, did not accept the proposal (suppressed passage: "because it would give them much trouble, and they wanted to gain their ends in the Hedjaz without that trouble; so they set to work to put off the Anglo-Hedjaz Treaty. The latest move was Dr. Naji-al-Asil's return to London with certain modifications, by means of which Hussein hoped to get what he desired from the rulers of Arabia").

When war broke out between Nejd and the Hedjaz, Hussein and his sons asked for British troops. This not being granted, Ali ordered his representative in London to sign any treaty the British might want on condition that they should drive Ibn Saud away from the Hedjaz. The British, however, decided not to interfere, not out of love for the Hedjaz or dislike of Ali, but because they knew that Ali was offering what was not his to offer, and that the Hedjaz belongs to the Moslems and not to Ali or his father.

Ali and his father, who are descendants of the Prophet, would have done better to follow the example of Ibn 'Abad, ruler of Andalusia. When he was besieged by the Spaniards and his courtiers tried to dissuade him from asking the help of a Moslem king on the ground that the latter, after helping him to defeat the enemy, would overthrow him and take his kingdom, he replied that descendants of the Prophet should repeat day and night . . . (suppressed passage: ". . . 'It is better to feed camels than pigs'"). If the sherif and his sons had appealed to the Moslem world instead of to Europe for help they would not now be abandoned by all. The European Powers have declared their neutrality—witness the letter dated the 4th November from the Consular Corps in Jeddah to the Nejd generals. This letter is not quoted as implying that the European Powers could interfere under any circumstances, since intervention in Hedjaz affairs is permissible to Moslems only. The letter, however, reassured Moslems. Perhaps the declaration may be a happy preliminary to the removal of their (*i.e.*, foreign) influence from all parts of Arabia (suppressed passage: "which the Prophet ordered before his death to remain confined to one religion").

An article entitled "The Sultan's Journey." After the failure of the Koweit Conference, Ibn Saud, seeing that Hussein and his son wished to destroy Nejd and were trying to strangle it by an economic blockade, was obliged to take action. (Suppressed passage: "Feisal was given a severe blow in Irak, a blow was struck at Abdullah in Transjordan, and a detachment came to the Hedjaz.") The Imam (Ibn Saud) was not pleased to hear of the fighting which took place inside the walls of Taif, but it was Ali's fault for hiding behind the walls and fighting there. The Imam ordered his army not to fight at Mecca, &c.

Copy of a letter addressed to King Ali by a large number of religious and other notables of Mecca. It addresses him as "His Highness the Amir Ali," says that they are in great difficulties for lack of money and food, throws the blame on Ali, and invites him either to turn out the Nejd forces or to see that they get their remittances and food supplies.

Conversation between Ibn Saud and the Mecca divines. Ibn Saud said that Ali wrote asking for peace, and certain persons intervened who, as non-Moslems, have nothing to do with the matter. He replied that it was for the Moslem world to decide, and that Ali should leave Jeddah so that the Moslem delegations might go to Mecca for a conference.

Notice to hospital out-patients issued by "The Public Health Department to the Government of His Highness Ibn Saud."



## No. 25.

*Field-Marshal Viscount Allenby to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received January 27.)*

(No. 38.)  
(Telegraphic.)

Cairo, January 27, 1925.

FOLLOWING from Khartum:—

"Should Jeddah fall and Russian aviators there be evacuated to Suakin, it is proposed to treat them like other refugees, i.e., undergo quarantine and then await steamer for European or other port. As regards members of Soviet agency (*vide* Jeddah despatch No. 89 of 18th August last), can these be refused admission to Sudan or, alternatively, sent to Egypt on completion of quarantine?"

"Am anxious not to allow them to stay in Sudan longer than absolutely necessary."

I should be glad of immediate instructions in order that I may, if necessary, approach Egyptian Government with reference to entry of members of Soviet agency into Egypt.

(Repeated to Jeddah.)

## No. 26.

*Consul Bullard to Field-Marshal Viscount Allenby (Cairo).—(Repeated to Foreign Office; Received January 28.)*

(No. 12.)  
(Telegraphic.)

Jeddah, January 28, 1925.

YOUR telegram No. 38 addressed to Foreign Office.

Soviet staff would leave only in case of a general evacuation, which is not anticipated.

The only remaining airman obtained visa for Persia.

All Russian mechanics came from Egypt, where they had been working, and will want to return there. They are not recognised by Soviet here, and I believe them to be anti-Bolshevik.

(Sent to Khartum.)

## No. 27.

*Mr. Austen Chamberlain to Consul Bullard (Jeddah).*

(No. 6.)  
(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, January 29, 1925.

CAIRO telegram No. 38 of 27th January repeated to you and your telegram No. 12 of 28th January: Proposed evacuation of Russian aviators and Soviet mission from Jeddah.

If and when you are satisfied that general evacuation is imminent, but not otherwise, you should warn airmen and Soviet mission that they cannot be permitted to land in the Sudan.

If they should wish to proceed to Egypt, you should inform Lord Allenby.

(Addressed to Jeddah, No. 6. Repeated to Cairo, No. 33. Latter to repeat to Khartum.)

## No. 28.

*Consul Bullard to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received February 2.)*

(No. 14.)  
(Telegraphic.) R.

Jeddah, February 2, 1925.

NO harm done to foreign subjects in the course of recent fighting. Wahabis, using guns captured at Mecca, are dropping small shells on the town, but none of them explode.

## No. 29.

*Consul Bullard to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received February 2.)*

(No. 16.)

(Telegraphic.)

Jeddah (*via* Port Sudan), February 1, 1925.

AFTER some fighting in villages within 2 miles of Jeddah, and two partial night attacks on entrenchments, Wahabis seem to have abandoned for the present hope of taking the town by force.

Hedjaz Government unduly elated at this unexpected success, but I think secretly conscious that unless Ibn Saud gives up the struggle in a month or two (this is most unlikely; he seems more determined than ever to get rid of Ali somehow) they must collapse from lack of funds.

Immediate prospect is inaction on both sides for some weeks.

(Sent to India.)

[E 623/10/91]

## No. 30.

*Consul Bullard to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received February 3.)*

(No. 3. Secret.)

Sir,

Jeddah, January 8, 1925.

I HAVE the honour to enclose a report on the situation covering the period the 31st December, 1924–8th January, 1925.

2. Copies of this despatch and of its enclosure are being sent to India, Egypt, Khartum (through Port Sudan), Jerusalem, Bagdad, Beirut (for Damascus), Aden, Singapore, Bushire, Koweit, Bahrein and Maskat.

I have, &c.

R. W. BULLARD.

Enclosure in No. 30.

*Report for the Period December 31, 1924–January 8, 1925.*

THE hopes based—by no means unreasonably—on the letter from Ibn Saud to Amin Rihani, to which I referred in my last report, came to nothing. After an ominous silence of ten days, Rihani received, on the 4th January, another letter from Ibn Saud, saying that he must not interfere, and that the sword must decide. At the moment when this letter arrived, all the Jeddah guns were firing in the direction of a considerable body of horsemen—assumed to be a Wahabi reconnaissance party—which had emerged from the foothills into the plain at a distance of 4 or 5 miles from Jeddah. This movement was not altogether unexpected, as fairly reliable reports had already been received that the Wahabi force had left Mecca in the direction of Jeddah and other places on the coast, and that Ibn Saud himself was at Hada, near Bahrah, on the Jeddah–Mecca road. The only casualties in the bombardment, which lasted for several hours, were some perfectly friendly sheep, but the Hedjaz Government announce a great victory, and urge the people of Mecca to cut the Wahabis' communications. But that is not at all in the Mecca people's line. If it were a question of the purse or throat of a pilgrim . . .

2. Since the "battle" of the 4th January nothing whatever has happened, and, as the moon is near the full, the Wahabis, who like to attack on dark nights, are not expected to make a serious attempt on Jeddah for the next few days. The only offensive weapon the Hedjaz Government possess—the air arm—is very weak. Only one of the three recently arrived De Haviland aeroplanes is working, and only one of the three Russian pilots makes any serious flights. This officer dropped a shell or two near Bahrah on the 4th or 5th January.

3. Rabigh, a small port to the north of Jeddah, is to be blockaded with effect from the 16th January. The blockade of the southern ports of Lith, Kurfudah and Hali has been undertaken in so casual a fashion that it has been necessary to remind the Hedjaz Government in writing that His Majesty's Government cannot recognise a blockade that is not effective. The blockading force consists of the Hedjaz steamship "Tawil," which is so slow that she must take over twenty-four hours merely to pass from one end of the blockaded line to the other—a distance of about



120 miles. There are rumours that two Aden dhows have been seized at Lith, but no definite news is to be had yet.

4. Mr. Philby left for Aden on the 3rd January. He has a journey of exploration in mind, but the severe attack of dysentery from which he is suffering has the upper hand at present of the spirit of adventure, and it would need little encouragement from doctors at Aden to make him return to England. But sick or well, he sticks tenaciously to his religion—a simple dualism in which the spirit of darkness is represented by His Majesty's Government.

5. The Caliphate Committee delegates, including a third, who seems to have been added at the last moment, arrived on the 2nd January. In an interview with King Ali, and in another with a journalist, which is reported in the "Hedjaz Post," they represent themselves as simple peacemakers with no prejudices one way or the other. This is, however, belied by documents signed by them which are in the possession of the Hedjaz Government and by the speech made by Shaukat Ali at the farewell meeting in India, in which the final removal of the whole family of Hussein from power was laid down as an essential condition. The Hedjaz Government have told them that, while they would welcome assistance by any Moslems in improving conditions in the Hedjaz, they could not allow any interference in the administration of the country. The views of the Caliphate Committee are well known, and it is not to be expected that the Hedjaz Government will make it easy for the delegates of the committee either to visit Ibn Saud or to correspond with him.

6. It would be interesting to know whether Ibn Saud was ever as well disposed towards peace as his correspondence with Amin Rihani seemed to show, and, if so, what made him at last resolve to fight it out. He has with him several Syrians of no importance in their own country, who are probably opposed to the return of a Government in which they would have no place, and no doubt he receives encouragement and urgent entreaties not to make peace with Ali from the Indian Caliphate Committee. There is some reason to think that he has gained valuable support in Mecca—probably from the Dhawi Zaid, the hereditary opponents of the Dhawi 'Abadilah Shereefs, to whom Hussein belongs, and a well-informed person suggests that the Shereef Sharaf Adnan Pasha may be appointed ruler of the Hedjaz if Ibn Saud wins. It is known that Shereef Sharaf hurried to Mecca from Constantinople, via one of the southern ports, quite recently. Such an arrangement would leave things very much as they were before, except that, failing a miracle, no Government could be so difficult to deal with as that of King Hussein. Whether it would satisfy the Caliphate Committee is not known. Their inspiration is mainly hatred of the family of Hussein as pro-British and anti-Turk, but they appear to have also a positive policy which aims at the internationalisation, within Moslem limits, of that part of the Hedjaz which contains the Holy Places and the ports of access. This policy is hardly compatible with the existence of a strong Central Government, and without a strong Government it would be difficult to maintain reasonably good conditions for the pilgrimage. Possibly the Caliphate Committee imagine a Moslem committee in Mecca dealing with the pilgrimage only while public order is maintained by a remote Ibn Saud. But the pilgrimage is so closely bound up with public order and (being the only industry) finance that to separate the management of the pilgrimage from the general administration of the country would be exceedingly difficult. And no local Arab ruler, whether of the Zaid or the 'Abadilah or any other section, could bear to sit quiet while an international Moslem committee played with the pilgrimage revenues.

R. W. BULLARD.

No. 31.

*Consul Bullard to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received February 10.)*

(No. 24.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

MY telegram No. 14.

*Jeddah (via Wireless), February 9, 1925.*

Wahabis resumed bombardment of town 6th February, but with shells that exploded. A number of killed and wounded amongst local people, but no British casualties. This agency hit once and narrowly missed several times, but no serious damage done. Considerable number of British Indians are leaving for Suakin 11th February.

(Sent to India.)

[E 883/10/91]

No. 32.

*Consul Bullard to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received February 13.)*

(No. 6. Secret.)

Sir,

*Jeddah, January 19, 1925.*

I HAVE the honour to enclose a report on the situation covering the period the 9th to 19th January.

2. Copies of this despatch and of its enclosure are being sent to India, Egypt, Khartum (through Port Sudan), Jerusalem, Bagdad, Beirut (for Damascus), Aden, Singapore, Bushire, Koweit, Bahrein and Muskat.

I have, &c.

R. W. BULLARD.

Enclosure 1 in No. 32.

*Report for the Period January 9–19, 1925.*

(Secret.)

IT is expected that Ibn Saud will make a night attack within the next few days, towards the time of the new moon. His forces have raided to within a mile or two of Jeddah, without encountering any resistance from the Hedjaz tribes, and are now encamped at places some 6 or 8 miles from the town. The Jeddah defences consist of a semi-circular barbed-wire fence (it can hardly be described as an entanglement), which must be about 3 miles in length. To defend this, there are—apart from orderlies, stretcher-bearers, &c.—about 700 men. These are armed with at least four different kinds of rifle: British, German, Russian and Austrian; and there is so little ammunition for the British rifles (some 200 in number) that they would soon be useless. Few of the officers and still fewer of the men are Hedjazis, and the officers are by no means united; the Arabs hate the Turks, the Turks despise the Arabs, and of the Arabs many are politicians rather than fighting men. Some 200 men (said to be Druses, most of them) arrived from Akaba a few days ago, but it is too late for them to be turned into an integral part of the Hedjaz army. The artillery will be useless against a night attack by scattered forces, and even in daylight it is ineffective, as the gunners have not yet learned how to prevent the shell from bursting high in the air.

2. It would seem that even if the Hedjaz Government were not defeated in battle, they must collapse very soon for lack of funds. They have been trying to recover from General Sir Foster Newland at least part of the sums paid to him for the purchase of munitions in England, but so far without success. King Hussein is known to have large sums put aside, but he supplies his son with nothing but advice not to give Ibn Saud an exaggerated sense of his importance by condescending to negotiate with him. Meanwhile, the Hedjaz Government seems to exist precariously on forced loans, which produce £10,000 or so every few weeks. The troops—mostly Palestinians, to whom the attraction offered was good pay—have not been paid for the Arabic month, which ended over three weeks ago.

3. The six Germans whose arrival was reported, left on the 9th January. They seem to have been engaged on silly orders from the Amir Abdullah, and to have been promised salary at a rate far beyond the Hedjaz Government's power to pay. They refused to be beaten down, and left in a body. One was an officer, the others n.c.o.'s; two were for armoured cars, two for artillery and two for infantry. It appears that armoured cars and munitions were ordered in Germany, but the export was forbidden by the German Government because the buyers tried to get them out under a false name. After this, attempts seem to have been made, through an Arab in Trieste, to purchase armoured cars and aeroplane bombs in Italy, with what success is not known.

4. For several days two aeroplanes went up every day. They dropped "bombs" on several occasions, but the main effect of their flights has been to make the Hedjaz Government more and more uneasy. On the 18th January, when the two aeroplanes were flying over the Wahabi camps, an explosion was seen to take place in one of them; it turned over and over and crashed. The pilot was M. Shirokov, a Russian refugee, and with him were two Arabs, one of whom was Umar Shakir, editor of

[13651]

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the "Falah" newspaper in King Hussein's time. This man, a Syrian, was a trained agriculturalist, but preferred violent journalism to the more humdrum occupation of agriculture. Having been condemned to death by the French authorities in Syria, he fled to King Hussein, who of course received him with open arms. He had been clamouring to be allowed to go and drop bombs on the Wahabis, and on the fatal occasion he seems to have secured a seat in the aeroplane, without authority, through friendship with the Arab observer. It is assumed that he tried to throw one of the make-shift bombs, and that it exploded in the aeroplane. The explosion probably killed all the occupants; if not, they cannot have survived the crash, for the machine fell from a great height. The Jeddah guns kept the Wahabis off in daylight, but after dark the aeroplane was seen to have been set on fire. With this casualty and the departure of a pilot who fell ill, the number of Russian pilots is reduced to one.

5. The blockade can probably be considered dead. In reply to the contention raised by this agency, that the steamship "Tawil" could not be regarded as constituting an effective blockade of the southern ports, the Hedjaz Government stated that the blockade was quite effective, the "Tawil" being supported by a patrol of dhows, the number of which was, however, an Admiralty secret! Just after this, however, the "Tawil" returned to Jeddah, as did the "Raghmatain," which had been sent up to institute the blockade of Rabigh. Both of them, as well as the larger steamer "Radhwa," are standing by for a possible evacuation. So far as my information goes, only one craft was captured and condemned—a Hedjaz dhow. This was at Kufudah.

6. It had been hoped that the pompous correspondence between the Consular Corps and Ibn Saud about the safety of foreigners was at an end, but he revived the subject with a rather naive letter which, with the subsequent correspondence, is given as an enclosure to this report. The contention that any harm that might happen to foreigners could only be caused by other people, since the Wahabis are above such things, and above all, the incidental statement that the atrocities at Taif were committed by the Hedjaz troops, could not be left unchallenged. It is possible that Ibn Saud is a little uneasy about some of the local Arabs, whose help he has tried to enlist (doubtless by promises of loot, since nothing else that he can give would appeal to them), and that his letter is for quotation if these Arabs should get out of hand. In any case, our only weapon is to continue to insist to Ibn Saud on the rights of non-combatant foreigners, since, if the Jeddah defences give, the King, with all the officials and as many of the troops as can join them, will leave the country, and public order will depend on the extent of Ibn Saud's control over his people. We do not, in point of fact, expect that there will be any serious trouble.

7. The delegates sent to Jeddah by the Indian Caliphate Committee finally gave up the pretence that they had come to the Hedjaz solely in the interests of peace, and gave the Foreign Secretary a copy of their aims (see Enclosure 3). The references to Hedjaz participation, at the end of paragraphs 2 and 7, were not in the original they had with them, but were added here as a sop to such nationalist feeling as there is in Jeddah; the last thing the Caliphate Committee seem to have thought of is the views of the Hedjaz people. The aims agree closely with those set forth by Ibn Saud, and support the evidence that he and the Indian Moslem extremists have been working together. The reference to the Imam Yahya is interesting. It was stated here several months ago that Ibn Saud and the Imam were to co-operate to seize the whole of Asir and to divide the spoil between them; Hodeidah, of course, going to the Imam. This may explain the rather greater activity the Imam has been showing lately.

The delegates are still here. They wrote to Ibn Saud saying that they wanted to see him, and asking him three questions: (1) whether the reports of atrocities committed by Wahabis at Taif were true; (2) whether by treaty he had placed Nejd under foreign influence; and (3) whether he had given any concession or concessions to foreigners. Ibn Saud replied urging them to join him quickly, and telling them that as to their questions they should not believe his enemies; they would be fully satisfied when they met him. In view, however, of the delegates' admitted hostility to King Ali and of the general nature of their proposals, the Hedjaz Government will not allow them to leave Jeddah to join Ibn Saud, unless they sign a declaration recognising the independence of the Hedjaz under King Ali as the basis of negotiations. The delegates called on me (not until ten days after their arrival) in the hope, apparently, that I would try to get them permission to go to Ibn Saud, but a reference to the complete independence of the Hedjaz quenched that hope.

The delegates are greatly disappointed, I think, to find no British officers here. However, they will doubtless make the most of the presence of the Palestinians, whose enlistment in the Hedjaz army at the critical moment might rouse suspicion in more open minds than these Indians seem to possess.

The delegates called on the Soviet agent. He attacked them at once, describing their programme as useless and asking why the Moslems of the U.S.S.R. (who, he said, constituted one third of the Moslems of the world), had not been consulted. It is possible that the scene was staged for the benefit of the Foreign Secretary, who was present, but the Foreign Secretary does not think so; and I think that if the delegates had been in touch with the Soviet agency I should have heard of it, and I have heard nothing. On the other hand the Caliphate Committee programme has points which could hardly fail to attract M. Zinoviev.

8. The compulsion to observe the duty to pray five times daily, which has long been in force in Nejd, has been extended to Mecca. The municipality have issued an order that everyone is to go to the Great Mosque, or, if that is very far off, to some other mosque, when the call to prayer is given. Inspectors have been appointed to see that the order is obeyed; disobedience will be punished in accordance with the Shara' Law.

It is pleasant to think of the idle, self-indulgent parasites in Mecca turning out to pray an hour and a half before sunrise every morning.

R. W. BULLARD.

#### Enclosure 2 in No. 32.

#### *Correspondence between Ibn Saud and the Consular Corps at Jeddah.*

##### (i.) *Ibn Saud to Consular Corps.*

(Translation.)  
(After greetings.)

Mecca, January 9, 1925.

OUT of respect for your subjects, and in order to safeguard their precious lives and their property, to fulfil my undertaking, and to be free from responsibility before history and the civilised world for what our enemies may do and attribute to us and our guiltless troops, I have to inform you that our brave troops have begun skirmishing and will shortly meet the enemy in battle in order—if God wills—to drive them from Jeddah.

I wish to draw your attention to the fact that during their retreat the army of our enemy, when they have despaired of defeating our troops, may behave according to their custom in committing acts of robbery and looting in the houses of the peaceful inhabitants, for I fear that they may repeat the tragedy of Taif and attack your subjects and others, and then maintain that the attacks were made by our troops. I have also to draw your attention to the unintentional damage which our guns may cause.

We have been driven to this by the Sharif Ali taking refuge in Jeddah and refusing to come out and fight in the open; and the responsibility for any harm that may be done to buildings or people, will rest on him who compelled us to take this action.

I call upon you and upon the civilised world to witness that it is impossible that our troops should (even) touch one of the non-combatant inhabitants or of your respected nationals. I have already conveyed this to you in my letter dated 9.5.1343, but I wished to draw your attention so that you might know beforehand about the harm which our enemy may do to us.

(Compliments.)

[Seal of Ibn Saud.]



(ii.) *Consular Corps to Ibn Saud.*

(Translation.)

(After greetings.)

Jeddah, January 11, 1925.

WE have the honour to acknowledge receipt of your Highness's letter dated the 14th Jamad-al-Thani, 1343 (the 9th January, 1925). We desire to take this opportunity to remind your Highness of our various replies regarding the protection and safeguard of the lives and property of our nationals. We desire also to remind your Highness of the categorical assurances which you gave us in this connection in your reply dated the 9th Jamad-al-Awwal.

\* In view of the presence of consuls in Jeddah representing their Governments or Governments interested, those Governments will naturally be accurately informed as to the responsibility for what may happen.

As to the Taif incidents, we reserve all our rights in their entirety.

(Respects.)

[Signatures of British, Italian, French, Dutch, Persian, Russian and Belgian representatives.]

(iii.) *Ibn Saud to Consular Corps.*

(Translation.)

(After greetings.)

Mecca, January 14, 1925.

I HAVE received your letter dated the 11th January, 1925, and noted its contents.

I beg to assure you again that our troops respect your subjects (their properties and their souls) as they respect all other non-combatant inhabitants, and that they cannot exceed the limits of the orders given to them. But I wished to draw your kind attention to what may occur in future in order that you may bear witness on us and our opponents.

With best respects.

[Seal of Ibn Saud.]

Enclosure 3 in No. 32

*Aims of the Indian Caliphate Committee as given to the Foreign Secretary to the Hedjaz Government by the Delegation, in writing, about January 13, 1925.*

TO set up a lawful (i.e., in accordance with Shara' Law) Republican Government in the Hedjaz, which shall be independent internally and whose foreign policy shall be such as to satisfy the Moslem world and meet its views in regard to the complete and absolute independence of the country—an independence free from foreign influence whether open or concealed.

2. To call a Moslem conference for the formation of this republic, in which there shall participate delegates from admittedly independent-minded Moslem societies in Moslem lands which are under domination, and representatives of the independent Moslem Governments, and delegates of the Hedjaz.

3. Neither the Sharif nor his family to have any connection whatsoever with this assembly or in any matter affecting the centralisation† [sic] of the Hedjaz.

4. To bring about general unity and religious brotherhood between the Arab rulers as the commands of Islam dictate, so that no room may be left for foreign greed that the way not be opened for strife to enter the country, that the shedding of innocent blood may be stopped, and that the Arabs may appear in perfect unity before the world and with united force against the enemy.

5. Mecca to be the seat of the conference, if circumstances permit.

6. The Sultan of Nejd and the Imam Yahya to be entrusted with the task of assembling the delegates of the Arab Moslem rulers for the proposed conference.

\* There is a piece of bad drafting here, due to the difficulty of preparing an exact draft to satisfy seven individuals when they have no common language but Arabic, and of that several have only a very elementary knowledge.

What should have been written is this: "In view of the presence of consuls in Jeddah, the Governments represented or interested will naturally . . . ."

† Presumably means "Central Government."

7. To fix as early a date as possible for the conference [ : it should be ] before the expiry of the coming pilgrim season. The invitations to the Moslem world to be issued by Ibn Saud and the Imam Yahya and the Hedjaz people.

8. Until the conference has come to a final decision about the Hedjaz and the form of its Government, the Hedjaz territories to be governed temporarily by elected delegates of the people [sic] under the over-lordship of Ibn Saud.

SHAH SULAIMAN NADWI.

ABDUL KADIR KUSURI.

MAULVI ABDUL MAJID BADAYUNI.

No. 33.

*Mr. Austen Chamberlain to Consul Bullard (Jeddah).*

[By Admiralty Wireless.]

(No. 11.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Foreign Office, February 17, 1925.

"TIMES" quotes message from Beirut stating that several members of staffs of European consulates have been wounded by shell fire

What are the facts?

No. 34.

*Consul Bullard to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received February 18.)*

[Viâ Admiralty Wireless.]

(No. 31.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Jeddah, February 18, 1925.

YOUR telegram No. 11.

Beirut message unfounded; it is perhaps Hedjaz propaganda.

Shelling, which was fairly heavy for four days, has decreased steadily. Shells fired into Jeddah yesterday probably not more than twenty, and usual morning shelling entirely omitted to-day. Agency buildings have been hit twice, and consulates of other countries all hit or narrowly missed, but not only are there no casualties among staffs, but, so far as I know, not a single foreign subject has been hurt by shell fire, dangers of which can be almost entirely eliminated by living in lower rooms.

Shelling is unpleasant, but as we are living in fortified town we have no cause for complaint against Ibn Saud.

No. 35.

*Consul Bullard to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received March 1.)*

[Viâ Admiralty Wireless.]

(No. 37.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Jeddah, February 28, 1925.

SITUATION unchanged; some shelling morning and evening. I learn confidentially total civilian casualties [ ? about ] 80 killed, over 100 wounded. British subjects safe.

(Sent to India.)



[E 1397/10/91]

No. 36.

*Consul Bullard to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received March 9.)*(No. 12. Secret.)  
Sir,

Jeddah, February 10, 1925.

I HAVE the honour to enclose a report on the situation covering the period the 20th January to the 10th February.

2. Copies of this despatch and of its enclosure are being sent to India, Egypt, Khartum (through Port Sudan), Jerusalem, Bagdad, Beirut (for Damascus), Aden, Singapore, Bushire, Koweit, Bahrein and Muscat.

I have, &c.  
R. W. BULLARD.

Enclosure in No. 36.

*Report for the Period January 20 to February 9, 1925.*

THE expected general attack on Jeddah was not made. The Wahabis seized three villages situated one on the south the other two on the north, at a distance of a mile or so from the wire, and in spite of the shells which are continually dropping there they still hold them. On two successive nights, when there was no moon, bodies of men were seen approaching the wire, but after much rifle and machine-gun fire for half an hour all was quiet again. The failure to make an attack at several points at once is attributed to a shortage of Nejdīs in the Wahabi ranks. There is some evidence that the local tribes enlisted by Ibn Saud would not join in the attack, except on conditions that would have given the Nejdīs most of the casualties and the local tribesmen most of the loot, and that the two parties came to rifle shots over it; and it is stated that Ibn Saud discharged the local men and sent for more of his own people. I was inclined to think that this would lead to a state of inaction for some weeks, the Wahabis being content to hold the villages so as to contain the Hedjaz forces; but after a lull of a few days artillery fire on both sides began again.

For the Wahabis have guns. These guns were left at Mecca at the time of the evacuation, and Sabri Pasha, the Bagdadi who was Minister of War at the time, was supposed to render them useless, but he did nothing. Ibn Saud has with him one Turk and some Arabs who were formerly gunners in the Hedjaz service, and they seem to be rather better than the artillery on the Hedjaz side. At the time when a general attack seemed to be in preparation they scattered a good deal of shrapnel over the trenches. They then, though outranged by the Hedjaz guns, moved in closer, and dropped small high-explosive shells (about 2½-inch) on various parts of Jeddah. None of these exploded, but either that was merely a warning or the Wahabi gunners have since found out how to deal with high-explosive shells, for during the last few days many shells (perhaps 200), most of which have burst, have fallen into the town. The casualties have been very few, two killed and a few slightly wounded. This agency has been narrowly missed several times and hit once, but not seriously damaged.

No legal objection can be raised to this bombardment, since Jeddah must be regarded as a fortified town. The main targets seem to be the King's "palace" and a former magazine, two buildings which stand in the same road on the edge of the town, facing the desert, at a distance of some 400 yards from each other. It is inconvenient that this agency, flanked by the Italian and Dutch consulates, should stand midway between these two targets; but there is reassurance in the knowledge that the Wahabi ammunition has to be brought from Mecca by camel.

The futility of Arab desert warfare seems to have been imported into the siege of Jeddah. So far as can be seen the artillery duel does no serious damage to either side, and though there is a pretty constant crackle of rifle fire from the Wahabi positions, they are too far from the trenches on this side for their shots to take effect except by a rare chance. If they think by bombarding the town to induce the Jeddah people to revolt against King Ali, that is probably more futile than their other ideas. The people of Jeddah are too mean-spirited to take any action whatsoever.

It is to be noted that the advent of the month of Rejeb, one of the four sacred months when fighting by Moslems is supposed to be unlawful, has not put a stop

to the hostilities. The reason is that the Wahibis regard the Hedjaz people as "polytheists," because of the exaggerated respect they are alleged to pay to the Prophet. The close season does not apply when polytheists are the object of attack.

2. For weeks the Hedjaz Government have been pinning their faith to some "tanks" which they were to get from Germany. It was assumed by those who had seen tanks that they would turn out to be at most some sort of armoured car, but no one suspected how useless they would be. On the 31st January five motors and fourteen cases of plates were landed from the "Kertosono," of the Rotterdam-Lloyd line. The cars were from Hamburg, but they are not of German manufacture. They are American four-wheel-drive lorries, Nash-[? Gadd] make. It seems that they belonged to a large number which were sold off at scrap prices when the United States army evacuated the Rhine area. They are all old and in bad condition, and the petrol tank of one of them was full of mud when it arrived at Jeddah—a circumstance which leads one of the Russian mechanics here to believe that all the lorries belong to a batch which were under water for some time owing to a flood, and which he afterwards saw on sale in Bremen for about £5 apiece. The plating sent with them is iron, not steel, and only an eighth of an inch thick, so that it would probably not keep out a bullet fired from a good rifle. On the other hand it is heavy enough to overload the engine, which is only 36 h.p., and to make it pretty certain that the cars will hardly get far outside the wire, since there are patches of loose sand everywhere on the desert, and the wheels are ordinary narrow single-lorry wheels with solid tyres. However, two have been fitted up, and one of them manages to run at 8 or 10 miles an hour on the hard roads of the town.

3. Of the six Germans who left Jeddah after a very short stay because they could not agree with the Hedjaz Government about their pay, one returned from Cairo. He says that he saw the German representative there and obtained permission to accept an engagement with the Hedjaz Government in a technical capacity. His return probably has something to do with the armoured cars. He has been working on them with three other Germans, who arrived on the 5th February. He gives his name as Willi Beiersdorff, and says he is a Berliner and an ex-officer.

4. As the Hedjaz Government refused to allow them to go to Ibn Saud unless they first recognised the independence of the Hedjaz under King Ali as the basis of negotiations, the Indian deputation, after consulting the Caliphate Committee by telegram, left Jeddah for India, via Suez, on the 30th January. The Caliphate Committee seem to be very angry at the attitude of the Hedjaz Government, but in view of the admittedly hostile views of the committee, King Ali seems to have acted more generously than most Governments would have done in such circumstances, he would have been justified in putting the delegates into prison and preventing them from coming into contact with the people.

5. The Sheikh-ul-Islam of Cairo has telegraphed to the King (addressing him, it may be noticed, as "His Majesty King Ali"), saying that the Caliphate conference which it had been proposed to hold in March has been postponed for a year, for three reasons:—

- (1.) Certain Moslem countries want to send delegates beforehand to find out what the objects, scope, &c., of the conference are.
- (2.) The Hedjaz and other Arab countries are at war.
- (3.) Egypt is busy with the elections.

King Ali has replied, expressing the readiness of the Hedjaz to take part in the conference whenever it may meet, and protesting against the conference to which Ibn Saud has issued invitations as likely to sow dissension among Moslems.

6. Amin Rihani has returned to Syria, after writing to Ibn Saud once more to ask whether it was of any use his staying any longer. There are no signs of yielding in Ibn Saud now. He was particularly violent in his last letter to the Caliphate Committee delegates. His war against Ali is now a jihad.

7. Among the persons other than Nejdīs, who are known to be with Ibn Saud, are the following:—

Jamal Ghazzi, of Damascus. Formerly aide-de-camp to Enver Pasha.  
Mahmud Hammudah, a Syrian doctor.  
Yusuf Yasin, a Syrian journalist of no repute.  
Muhammad Bey Nahhas, a Syrian, who was in the Finance Department when Faisal was ruler of Syria.  
Hafiz Wahbi, an Egyptian belonging to the Hizb-al-Watani.



8. The Jeddah-Port Sudan cable touches land on this side at a point some 2 miles north of Jeddah town. This point is some distance outside the fortified area, and the Wahabis have cut the cable and have hitherto frustrated the attempts of the Hedjaz Government to repair it and keep it intact. The Hedjaz Government have therefore applied to the Sudan authorities for the Eastern Telegraphs cable ship "Mirror" to be sent to transfer the head of the cable to a point inside the wire. The political objections to this are obvious, and there would appear to be military risks too, unless a fresh piece of cable could be laid from Jeddah town and joined to the cable at a point some distance out to sea. The Sudan Government have consented to accept and transmit wireless messages from and to Jeddah wireless station, but this is an emergency measure.

9. The Hedjaz Government are still maintaining the blockade in theory. A few days ago the steamship "Raghmatan" made a raid to the south, and brought back five or six dhows which are alleged to have been attempting to evade the blockade. They are all Hedjaz craft. According to our information, plenty of small craft, owned by Hedjazis and Yemenis, are entering the blockaded ports, and it has been necessary to recommend to His Majesty's Government that British subjects should be told that the declaration of blockade can be disregarded.

In reply to an enquiry, in what court and under what law cases by which British subjects might be affected would be heard, the Hedjaz Government replied that "maritime cases, if there are any, will be heard in the maritime court, under the special law applicable." The Hedjaz authorities know nothing about international law, and no court they could set up could be expected to act in a manner which would satisfy a foreign Government.

10. No pilgrims have arrived except about thirty-five Africans (most of them Nigerians), who seem to have been allowed to leave the Sudan through some mistake. It is not the moment to add to the foreign population of Jeddah. No useful forecast about the Haj can be made at present. All we can say is that the pilgrimage will be impossible unless Jeddah and Mecca are in the same hands by then, and that the chances are in favour of their being in Ibn Saud's hands.

Mecca appears to be quite quiet, but prices are very high. Several score of Javanese refugees from there have just left Jeddah for Batavia. According to their story all the Javanese would leave Mecca if they could bring their luggage with them.

February 10, 1925.

11. The Wahabis on the southern side of the town seem to be making unskilful attempts to approach the wire by means of trenches. Two or three attacks by small bodies of men (perhaps a hundred or so each) were made on the night of the 9th-10th February, but they were beaten off.

The Wahabi bombardment of Jeddah, which went on during the hours of daylight (with decent intervals for lunch) for four days, seems to have come to an end for the present. Six or seven guns were used. Most of the shells were very small, but there were some 7.5 cm. and—it is said—some 9 cm. The total civilian casualties are stated officially to be four killed and seven wounded, some of them severely.

R. W. BULLARD.

No. 37.

Consul Bullard to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received March 9.)

(No. 39.)

(Telegraphic.)

Jeddah (via Port Sudan), March 6, 1925.

SOME Palestine soldiers in the Hedjaz army recently mutinied, demanding arrears of pay. Collapse of defence seemed probable, but Hussein sent £10,000 and postponed disaster.

Failing serious attack by Wahabis, of which there is no sign at present, situation might continue for months if ex-King would provide funds, but probably at least £20,000 a month required.

(Sent to India, Singapore and Bushire.)

No. 38.

Consul Bullard to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received March 10.)

[Via H.M.S. "Clematis" W/T.]

(No. 41 A.)

(Telegraphic.)

Jeddah, March 10, 1925.

HEDJAZ Government reported confident, owing, firstly, to arrival from Trieste of two [? German] armoured cars, 1,000 rifles and a large stock of ammunition for the latter; secondly, [? various] circumstances, which in their opinion indicate decline in Wahabis' strength, particularly private appeal addressed by Ibn Saud to commander of Hedjaz army. They [group undecypherable] of advancing, but I do not think that they can risk that.

(Sent to India, Jerusalem, Bagdad and Bushire.)

No. 39.

Consul Bullard to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received March 12.)

[Via "Clematis" W/T.]

(No. 43.)

(Telegraphic.)

Jeddah, March 11, 1925.

MY telegram No. 41.

Cars were made by Ansaldo and Company of Genoa, rifles are Austrian, and so, I believe, is ammunition, name on rifle is Steyr. British Khedivial steamer landed 5th March 200 boxes of small arm ammunition, ordered Antwerp, transhipped at Suez.

No. 40.

Consul Bullard to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received March 16.)

(No. 44.)

(Telegraphic.)

Jeddah (via Port Sudan), March 15, 1925.

ATTEMPT to take Wahabi positions made 14th March with maximum force was a complete failure. Unless more and better troops obtained, this must, I think, quench the wild hope of advancing on Mecca and inaugurate a contest between Ali's funds and Ibn Saud's patience, with heavy odds on the latter.

(Sent to India, Jerusalem, Bagdad, Bushire, Aden, Cairo and Singapore.)

No. 41.

Consul Bullard to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received March 17.)

(No. 45.)

(Telegraphic.)

Jeddah, March 17, 1925.

NEWS from Yambo suggests that Wahabis may take the town at any time.

Hedjaz casualties 14th March very heavy for this small force. Wahabis establishing superiority incontestably.

(Sent to India, Jerusalem, Bagdad and Bushire.)



[E 1779/25/91]

No. 42.

*Consul Bullard to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received March 23.)*

(No. 15.)

Sir,

*Jeddah, February 27, 1925.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith a report on the pilgrimage of 1924. Copies of the report are being sent to Delhi, Singapore, Cairo and Khartum. I would suggest that, if a wider distribution is considered necessary, copies should be sent to Palestine, Bagdad, Constantinople, Beirut, Aden, Nigeria, Somaliland and South Africa.

I have, &amp;c.

R. W. BULLARD.

Enclosure in No. 42.

*Pilgrimage Report, 1924.*

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## 1. Introductory.

SUCH value as this annual report may have depends mainly on its usefulness as a guide to the future. Its composition this year has therefore been postponed, in the hope that a definite solution of the Hedjaz-Nejd conflict might be reached and a useful forecast as to the conditions at the time of the Hajj of 1925 might be made. The conflict, however, though it has now been in progress for six months and the collapse of the Hedjaz Government has seemed certain several times, is still undecided, and the report must be sent in for what it is worth. It has been shortened by the elimination of many details which might have been of interest if there had been no war and King Hussein had still been on the throne.

It can be assumed that there can be no pilgrimage on a large scale while Mecca is under one control and Jeddah under another. In theory it should be possible for pilgrims to travel to Mecca via one of the ports which are in the Wahabis' hands, *e.g.*, Rabigh on the north or Kufudah on the south. In practice, however, this diversion of the pilgrim traffic is not possible except on a small scale. Pilgrims

would hardly like to come in such conditions, and, if they did come, they would find the lack of accommodation at the smaller ports, and the longer journey to Mecca, serious drawbacks. Moreover, while the Hedjaz Government would hardly prevent pilgrims from going to Mecca by such routes, they keep Mecca short of food by retaining its port, Jeddah, in their hands. That Jeddah is essential to Mecca is acknowledged by both sides. Ibn Saud has admitted it in writing more than once.

Who will eventually obtain control of the two towns it is difficult to say. Ibn Saud seems the stronger candidate. If he should give up the struggle for the present it is not impossible that the ex-King Hussein would oust the present King, Ali, and return to the throne. On the ruler of the Hedjaz depends very largely the treatment of pilgrims. Ibn Saud would keep order and make the pilgrim routes safe, but he would probably be compelled, out of deference to the Nejd, on whom his power depends, to continue the Puritan policy he has already applied to Mecca, by which fines are imposed for smoking, attendance at mosque for prayer five times a day is enforced, and certain practices which are very popular with some foreign pilgrims, *e.g.*, visiting tombs, reading "maulids" or lives of the Prophet and studying certain commentaries on the Koran, are forbidden. Hussein, if he should return, would be, as before, greedy, stupid and childishly obstructive. Ali is full of good intentions, and would not himself squeeze the pilgrims as his father did, but, being very weak, he would probably be unable to check the exploitation of pilgrims by others. Indeed, it is doubtful whether, whoever the ruler of the Hedjaz may be, the pilgrim will ever take much money away with him after his visit. Even Muhammad had to compromise with the vested interests of Mecca and to allow the Kuraish to continue to levy toll on visitors to the ancient shrine, and any reforming ruler would be opposed by a coalition consisting of the greed and corruption of the Hedjaz people and the piety and ignorance of the pilgrims. We can hope for an improvement in matters where the difficulties of the last few years have been due to stupidity and a desire to obstruct rather than to greed. For instance, it is unlikely that any other ruler than Hussein will enforce quarantine at Jeddah on pilgrims who have already passed through the station at Kamaran, or will interfere with pilgrims who wish to make the journey to Medina on foot. But it is only a great change in the mentality of the pilgrim which could effect real reforms here, and, as a change of that extent would very likely include a doubt whether the transfer of the physical body from one point of the earth's service to another is essential to salvation, it is questionable whether, so long as it lasts, the pilgrimage will ever differ in essentials from what it is now. This theoretical pessimism, however, should not, and will not, prevent this agency from trying to remedy grievances, even if these grievances continue, as at present, to be felt more acutely by the British Agent and by His Majesty's Government and the Government of India than by the sufferers themselves.

## Statistics.

## 2. General.

There was a still further increase in the number of pilgrims arriving by sea. The totals for the last three years are:—

1922	...	...	...	...	56,319
1923	...	...	...	...	75,221
1924	...	...	...	...	92,707

The increase of 1924 is accounted for by the larger number of pilgrims who sailed from British Malayan and Netherlands East Indies ports. The increase was not normal; it was due to the low price of tickets resulting from a rate-cutting war between the steamship companies.

The diminution in the number of pilgrims sailing from India is attributed to two causes: (1) the exclusion, by the deposit system, of the class of Indian who would otherwise have sailed with the deliberate intention of getting repatriated at someone else's expense; (2) the opinion expressed by certain religious leaders in India that intending pilgrims would be justified in postponing their journey until conditions in the Hedjaz improved.



The approximate figures in detail are:—

Country of Embarkation.	Number of Pilgrims.
British Malaya ... ..	21,263
Dutch East Indies ... ..	32,037
India ... ..	18,432
Persian Gulf ... ..	1,404
East Africa—	
Massawa ... ..	231
Elsewhere ... ..	326
Sudan (including many pilgrims from Nigeria and some from French African territories) ... ..	3,926
Egypt (including a considerable number of Palestinians, Syrians and a few Turks) ... ..	11,231
Syria ... ..	3,440
Mokalla ... ..	316
Aden ... ..	101
	<hr/> 92,707

The shipping by which these pilgrims were carried was as follows:—

Flag.	Number of Pilgrims.
British ... ..	58,260
Dutch ... ..	23,351
Italian ... ..	7,833
Egyptian ... ..	2,290
French ... ..	794
Greek ... ..	179
	<hr/> 92,707

As usual, it is not possible to estimate the number of pilgrims who arrived by dhow.

The first pilgrim ship arrived at Jeddah on the 26th January. The first ship carrying pilgrims from Jeddah left on the 19th July. The return pilgrimage cannot be said to be over yet (February 1925), since pilgrims from last year who have been delayed by the hostilities are still leaving as opportunity offers.

#### Public Health.

It is calculated that there were about 150,000 pilgrims at Arafat on pilgrimage day (the 11th July), but, in spite of the accumulation of so many human beings in very primitive conditions, there was again no trace of plague or cholera, and the Quarantine Board at Alexandria, having received a favourable report from the medical officer whom they had sent to keep them informed, declared the pilgrimage clean. The British delegate on the board telegraphed asking whether there was any truth in the rumour that there was an epidemic of dysentery in the Hedjaz. I replied that, while both amoebic and bacillary dysentery were fairly common, there was no ground for thinking it worse than in 1923. The death rate on pilgrimage day seems to have been high this year, but most of the deaths were due to heat and lack of water. There was a shortage of water all through the season, and prices at Mecca were very high. This shortage was due to interference with Ain Zubaidah, the stream which comes to Mecca from a place near Arafat, but the responsibility for the interference has never been traced—or, at least, never revealed. Pilgrims were glad to pay high prices for brackish well water. The shortage on the journey from Arafat to Mecca was very serious. The agency doctor, the acting French consul (an Algerian) and other reliable witnesses had pitiful tales to tell, how the old and weak fell by the roadside dying for lack of water, while the younger and stronger hurried on fearing lest a like fate should befall themselves.

Dr. Munir-ud-Din, the agency doctor, reports that, besides dysentery, there were sporadic cases of typhoid fever, and that diarrhoea was common. He also reports many cases of a mild form of influenza with sore throat. Pilgrims returned to Jeddah in a very exhausted state. My Netherlands colleague reports that, of 1,750 pilgrims who had booked by a steamer due to leave the following day, twenty-five died during the night. A death rate of over 1·4 within twenty-four hours is startling

The only exact figures we have for British pilgrims are furnished by the records of those British Malays who deposited their return tickets at the agency; of these, over 17 per cent. died during the season.

As in earlier years, no serious effort was made by the Hedjaz Government to provide medical treatment for pilgrims. For the greater part of the return season the so-called hospital maintained by the Government at Jeddah had no doctor; it received casual visits from the Director-General of Quarantine, who was himself absent from Jeddah for a long time, his place being then taken by a dentist, and from an overworked private doctor. Dr. Munir-ud-Din was invited by King Hussein to visit the public hospital at Mecca. He reports:—

“The hospital had about twenty beds, two of which were occupied by surgical cases. The remaining eighteen were empty. In the court-yard there was a large canopy, under which about thirty pilgrims (not all Indians) were lying on the ground in a state of disorder without any mattresses or bedding, &c. Many of them were unconscious or moribund.”

#### Law and Order.

Order was maintained on the Mecca-Jeddah road, but the routes from Mecca and Jeddah to Medina again proved to be beyond King Hussein's control. The first caravan of the season, which consisted mainly of Javanese, not only had to pay from £1 to £3 a head as toll to the Bedouin, but suffered beatings, woundings, and the loss of one man and four women carried off in slavery.

To secure immunity for the great caravan which was to leave Mecca a few days after Ramadan, King Hussein proposed to the Bedouin, who provide the camels, that £2 per camel out of the money due to them should be kept back until the pilgrims reached Mecca again. The Bedouin not only scoffed at this proposal, but even demanded a larger share of the proceeds than they had received the previous year. A long wrangle ensued between them and King Hussein as to the division of the spoil. At last, some weeks after the traditional date for the departure of the caravan, it was announced that an agreement had been concluded. The accumulation of pilgrims by that time was so large that they were split up into two bodies; the smaller started from Jeddah, the larger a little later from Mecca. Both were to go to Rabigh, and thence to proceed by the same route. The two caravans contained about 25,000 persons, and all of them, except a few Afghans who finished the journey on foot, had to return without reaching Medina. It appears that King Hussein broke faith with the Bedouin and gave them, when the caravan was about to leave, a smaller sum than he had promised, and that they thereupon took oath to let no caravans through. The death rate in these two caravans must have been high, for the pilgrims waited in the open for ten days or longer, hoping to get through, and the weather at that time was particularly hot.

King Hussein made an attempt, after the Hajj, to settle the dispute with the Bedouin, but without success. A few Indians and Africans went to Medina on foot, but no caravans organised by the Government were allowed to pass. The alternative route via the railway from Maan was therefore organised, and many pilgrims went to Medina that way.

King Hussein was so badly shaken by the failure of so large a body of pilgrims to get through to Medina that he promised that the Indians should receive a refund of £10 a camel, and the Far Eastern pilgrims £2 a camel, together with free transport to Arafat at the time of the Hajj and back to Jeddah. What is more remarkable is that the promise was (for the Hedjaz) tolerably well kept. The Netherlands consul had to use pressure in many cases to secure a refund for Javanese pilgrims, who had not been given free transport to Arafat, but most of the British Malays seem to have been fairly treated. All the Indians seem to have given receipts for £10, though there is reason to believe that they had received only £9 or £8. But this agency finds it difficult to defend the rights of pilgrims who consider it more in accordance with their religion to make false statements than to complain to this agency about the hardships or wrongs they suffer during the pilgrimage.

#### The Hedjaz Railway.

On his way to Palestine in December 1923, King Hussein inspected the Hedjaz Railway. The immediate results were an order to all officials to subscribe a month's pay to the railway fund and the institution of a Hedjaz Railway stamp, in imitation of the Turkish practice, as a means of raising revenue. Very few trains ran to



Medina before the Hajj, but the King's quarrel with Bedouin on the roads from Medina to Mecca and Jeddah made it imperative to open the railway route. The—so to speak—"all green" route was boomed in the press and elsewhere; passengers would travel to Akaba by Hedjaz Government steamer, thence by motor or camel to Maan, and from Maan to Medina by train. The published tariff of charges was not observed; the Hedjaz Government cars and lorries were run as might be expected; and the pilgrims suffered various hardships—lack of drinking water on the ships, waits of as long as fourteen days for trains at Maan and Medina, and journeys in cattle-trucks which would have been intolerable if the train had not stopped every half-hour or so for the line to be repaired; but the route did work after a fashion, and some 2,000 pilgrims went to Medina that way. The Palestine Railways Administration, however, had to come to the help of the Hedjaz Government by running their trains as far as Tebuk.

#### *European Moslems as Pilgrims.*

A young Englishman from British Malaya, Mr. J. H. Bamber, who had professed Islam for three years and bore the Moslem name of Abdul Hamid, came to Jeddah with pilgrims from Penang, but was not allowed to go to Mecca. He might perhaps have got through, but he was foolish enough to have two passports with him, one the British passport on which he had left England after the war, the other the ordinary pilgrim passport giving his Moslem name. This was meat and drink to that spy-maniac, King Hussein. Mr. Bamber was kept in Jeddah while his papers were being sent to Mecca for examination, and was then, in spite of letters of recommendation from the Sheikh-ul-Islam of Kedah State and other persons of importance, told to leave as quickly as possible. I refused to enter into Mr. Bamber's claim that as a Moslem he had a right to go to Mecca, and confined my assistance to watching that he suffered no ill-treatment and facilitating his departure. It is probably good Moslem law that any person who repeats the simple Moslem confession of faith is entitled to go to Mecca, but it is a religious question into which it would be unwise for this agency to enter, even if the circumstances had not given the Hedjaz authorities ground for suspicion. Whether Caliph or not, King Hussein was the highest spiritual and temporal authority in Mecca at the time, and it seemed that the question who might or might not go to Mecca could well be left to him and to Moslem opinion. There is in Jeddah a Netherlands subject (a European) who was converted to Islam five or six years ago, but could never obtain permission to go to Mecca. The excuse King Hussein gave was that to grant permission would lend colour to the accusation that he was subject to European influence; he had only allowed Lord Headley to perform the pilgrimage because Lord Headley had already been publicly recognised in Egypt as a Moslem.

It seems to have been not uncommon formerly for Europeans who professed to be converts to Islam to be allowed to go to Mecca. Snouck Hurgronje, the great Dutch Orientalist, not only went to Mecca without hindrance, but stayed there for some time, and even taught in a mosque, and not many years before the war an Englishman called "Hajji Abdullah" Williams, who was subsequently well known in Irak, found no difficulty in getting to Mecca as a convert. Whether, now that King Hussein has gone, a more liberal spirit will prevail we cannot say; and it would therefore be well that the British authorities concerned should not issue a passport for Jeddah to any Mahometan pilgrim of European birth unless the applicant has first obtained permission from the authorities here to perform the pilgrimage.

#### *Useless Luggage.*

There is a form of extortion always practised on pilgrims, and particularly rife last season, which consists in compelling them to hire for the journey from Jeddah to Mecca more camels than the weight of their baggage warrants. This practice is agreeable to the camel drivers in any case, and last year it was enforced by King Hussein to an outrageous extent, by means of penalties, in order that the revenue from the tax levied on each camel-load might be increased. The pilgrims could circumvent this to a large extent if they would cut down their luggage to a minimum. Indians are reasonable, and as a rule bring nothing beyond their personal effects but rice and ghee. The Far Eastern pilgrims, however, bring the most fantastically unnecessary things: firewood, fruit, coconuts with the fibre on, &c. Apart from the expense of getting the stuff to Jeddah and the landing and customs dues, they have to pay on such things, in camel-hire to Mecca alone,

many times the price at which they could buy similar food or fuel in Mecca. It is even doubtful whether they are wise in bringing rice. Rice imported into the Hedjaz from India wholesale must be cheaper than single sacks of Indian rice brought here via Java. The practice of bringing superfluous luggage has another disadvantage for the pilgrim. It increases the congestion of luggage at the custom-house and the consequent risk of loss. Every year there is a mountain of unclaimed (or unrecovered) luggage left behind by pilgrims.

#### *Estates of Deceased British Pilgrims.*

We are still cut off from the Mecca records, but the returns furnished by the Hedjaz authorities of estates left by pilgrims who died in Jeddah show no improvement on those of 1923. According to these returns, of 101 Indians, 73 left nothing but a passport with a deposit receipt; and 28 Malays out of 29 and 13 Egyptians out of 15 left nothing but a return ticket. Doubtless in some cases relatives or friends take charge of any money or valuable effects that a pilgrim may have with him when he dies, but the phenomenon is too frequent for the guides and the officials of the Bait-al-Mal to be entirely acquitted of suspicion. The procedure needs overhauling.

#### *Slavery.*

The stock of slaves in the Hedjaz, which is very large, is maintained partly by raiders who abduct Africans for the purpose—mainly from Abyssinia, but partly by the enslavement of Africans who come or are brought to the Hedjaz on the pilgrimage. It is not uncommon for a caravan of Nigerians or Sudanese travelling to or from Medina on foot to be raided by Bedouin and to have several of the younger members of the party carried off into slavery. A considerable number of African slaves have taken refuge in this agency during the last two months, and several stated that they were stolen from caravans in the Hedjaz while travelling on the pilgrimage. It is also, I am afraid, quite common for children or young people whose parents die on the pilgrimage to be sold by anyone who can get hold of them—often a relative; and it is stated with some authority that children are even sold by their own parents. To these penniless people the offer of £20 or £30 for a child must be a sore temptation. There is evidence that Africans who are coming on the pilgrimage sometimes bring with them, as though out of charity, young people whom they sell on arrival; and one Nigerian who had been in slavery for many years told me that he was brought to the Hedjaz as a child by a religious teacher to whom his parents had entrusted him for religious instruction in Mecca. Cases have even been discovered during the past year where young Javanese girls were handed over, by Javanese pilgrims, to men of pious reputation in Mecca, nominally for religious instruction, but in fact as concubines.

The question of the liberation of slaves is too wide for discussion here, but it is pertinent to enquire whether anything can be done, in the countries of origin and the ports of embarkation, to see that minors do not sail from the Hedjaz unless they are under the care of some trustworthy person.

#### *Travelling to Medina on Foot.*

In June the Hedjaz Government published a notice stating that no pilgrim would be allowed to go to Medina on foot unless he produced a certificate signed by himself and counter-signed by the consular authority concerned, declaring that he insisted on going on foot, and that he held the Hedjaz authorities free from all responsibility for what might happen to him. In view of the additional risks to which pilgrims who travel on foot are exposed, a tolerably good case might be made out for this regulation. There are objections, however, and some of them were subsequently put forward by the Government of India; but the regulation does not seem to have been applied seriously, and unless the ex-King Hussein should recover the throne the question is not likely to be raised again.

### *3. Shipping.*

#### *The Far East.*

Messrs. Nemazee were again conspicuously inferior to the Holt and Dutch lines. This was particularly noticeable when the state of hostilities between Nejd and the Hedjaz compelled many Malay and Javanese pilgrims, who had intended to stay at Mecca for at least another year, to come to Jeddah in the hope of finding ships to



take them home. The season being over, there were no direct sailings, but the Holt and Dutch lines called for quite small batches of pilgrims, and accepted as payment the ordinary return tickets which are valid only during the season. Having no regular sailings down the Red Sea to the Far East, Messrs. Nemazee were perhaps not in a position to be equally generous, but that did not justify their agents in refusing to do anything whatever for refugees holding Nemazee return tickets. However, under pressure, they sent away the holders of such tickets by steamers of other lines.

The fault of Messrs. Nemazee lies, not with the steamers, which are good, nor with the captains, who are usually quite up to the average, but with the incompetence of the management in Hong Kong and India, which is not equal to the task they attempt, viz., with a small fleet to engage in the pilgrim trade, not only of Java and Malaya, but of India as well. This policy is possible for the outward voyages, as the Indians travel months later than the Far Eastern pilgrims, but it leads to much congestion after the Hajj, when all the pilgrims are wanting to leave at the same time.

#### *Egypt, Palestine, &c.*

The contract for the conveyance of the Mahmal and the "official" Egyptian pilgrims was secured by Messrs. Lazzerini, an Italian firm of Suez, who used for the purpose steamers belonging to the Italian lines they represent. The work was admirably done, and seemed all the better from the contrast it afforded to the neglect and lack of organisation shown by Schemeil and Co. in 1923.

The type of unscrupulous Syrian adventurer was, however, again in evidence as charterer of ships bringing pilgrims from Syria and Egypt. A fuller reference to this point will be found under the section on quarantine.

#### *Hedjaz Government Steamers.*

The steamship "Tawil" is now so slow that she takes eight or ten days from Jeddah to Akaba, and the "Rushdi" was in dock during the whole of the pilgrim season. The Hedjaz Government, however, bought two other steamers, viz.:

Steamship "Shushtar": British built (1897); previous owners, Persian Gulf Steam Navigation Company (Limited); price, 140,000 rupees; net tonnage, 1,718.

Steam yacht "Parnassos": British built (1894); previous owner, Greek; price, £6,000 plus Suez Canal dues; tonnage, gross 532, net 210.

These ships were renamed "Radhwa" and "Raghmatain" respectively.

The "Radhwa" carried Indian pilgrims for many years, and obtained a licence to carry 866 for the 1924 season. The "Raghmatain," however, was a most impractical purchase: she had been a yacht, and was fitted for the comfort of a few passengers rather than the reasonable accommodation of a large number.

As it happened, these ships were of great use, as the blocking of the ordinary routes to Medina compelled many pilgrims to travel via Akaba. They also made one or two trips to Egypt and the Sudan with pilgrims.

Some Indian pilgrims complained that on the "Raghmatain" they had only about a pint and a half of drinking water a day, instead of the gallon which the regulations prescribe. This complaint was brought to the notice of the Hedjaz Government; they made no reply, but they increased the supply of water.

The steamship "Tawil," carrying sixty Syrian pilgrims from Akaba, ran on a reef, but was towed off without any serious damage.

#### *Burning of the Steamship "Frangestan."*

The finest of the Nemazee steamers, the steamship "Frangestan," caught fire while steaming along the Red Sea to Jeddah with about 1,200 pilgrims on board. After trying vainly for over twelve hours to put out the fire the captain ordered the ship to be abandoned. All the passengers and crew were taken on board the steamship "Clan MacIver," which, warned by wireless, had been following close behind all day, and conveyed to Port Sudan, whence they were brought to Jeddah by another vessel of the same line, the steamship "Tangistan." There was no loss of life, but most of the deck passengers lost their kit, and the first and second class passengers their heavy luggage. Complaints that the Chinese crew of the "Tangistan" had stolen some of the kit saved from the fire were investigated on board by the British agent and the local police, but found to have very little foundation.

#### *4. Quarantine.*

##### *Jeddah.*

The farce of compelling pilgrims who had already undergone quarantine at Kamaran to spend a day on the islands at Jeddah was maintained, though it was waived on political grounds (as, e.g., in the case of the pilgrims rescued from the steamship "Frangestan") sufficiently often to show that it was a farce. The arrangement, which was due solely to King Hussein's spite at his exclusion from the management of the Kamaran station, may be considered to have come to an end with his reign. It is hoped that whatever Government is in power in future will make a corresponding reduction in the charges payable on arrival at Jeddah.

##### *Egypt and the Sudan.*

Thanks to the intervention of His Majesty's representative in Egypt, a serious defect in the Quarantine Board's regulations, of which complaint was made in my last report, was remedied just in time for the return pilgrim season. The regulations in force in 1923 stated that no foreign pilgrim could land in Egypt unless he had a ticket to some place beyond, and this had the ridiculous result of making it impossible for a foreign pilgrim, who was unable to book through to his destination from Jeddah, to land in Egypt in order to get his ticket, or, rather, it made it impossible for him to buy a ticket for Egypt from a reputable company in Jeddah. This has been set right by a circular from the Quarantine Board to the shipping agencies in Egypt authorising them to issue tickets to Suez to any pilgrim who "is obliged to land in Egypt," provided that he gets an embarkation permit from his consulate.

It is to the Resident at Cairo that we are indebted also for a useful change in the Sudan quarantine regulations. In Egypt the pilgrim season is officially announced to be closed when nearly all the pilgrims are known to have left the Hedjaz, but this has not hitherto been held to apply to the Sudan; consequently any ship carrying to the Sudan from the Hedjaz, at any time, persons suspected of being pilgrims, unless the number of deck passengers was below one for every 100 tons, had to be disinfected. As this process cost £50, in addition to the loss resulting from the delay, the Khedivial Company, which provides the only regular means of communication with the Sudan, refused to carry Sudanese, Nigerians, &c., in numbers which might bring them within the scope of this onerous regulation. It has now been decided that, once the pilgrimage is declared in Egypt to be over, ships may take to Suakin from Jeddah any number of pilgrims, within the limits of their ordinary passenger certificate. The pilgrims will be put in quarantine, but the ship will be allowed to leave at once with a clean bill of health.

Several steamers carrying pilgrims northward were found at Tor to have more than the certificate number on board. One of these was under the British flag, the other Egyptian, but all were chartered by Syrians. The Quarantine Board seem to have contented themselves with warning the earlier boats, but later, finding a French boat carrying about 30 per cent. more than her proper number of pilgrims, they executed their threat to apply article 148 of the convention, and fined the captain £T. 5 for each pilgrim in excess. It appears that Thabit "Pasha," the Turk who was Director-General of Quarantine in the Hedjaz, gave the earlier ships permission to carry more pilgrims than the number fixed by the Quarantine Board at Alexandria. It is regrettable that the first boat breaking the regulation was not fined heavily. The regulation is clear enough, and no permission had been obtained from this agency, which is responsible for Egyptian as well as for British vessels. The men who charter vessels for one or two trips to Jeddah during the pilgrim season—most of them Syrians—are quite unscrupulous, and, having no regular business, have no sense of responsibility. They squeeze what they can out of the pilgrim season and then disappear for another year. Thabit has gone, but it is unlikely that the Hedjaz quarantine authorities will for some time to come be of such a status that the overloading of pilgrim steamers can be left to their discretion. The strict application of the law by the Quarantine Board and the other authorities concerned is the only remedy against such abuses. It is satisfactory to record that the fine on the steamship "Belgrano" was duly levied by the authorities at Beirut. It is true that their decision to levy the fine at the paper and not the gold rate reduced the penalty to a sum which left a large profit on the excess pilgrims, but the Quarantine Board have taken up this matter, and it is hoped that in future all fines on this account will be levied at the gold rate.



### Kamran.

The suggestion made in the Jeddah pilgrimage report for 1923, that when the pilgrimage is declared to be clean ships carrying pilgrims back to India and the Persian Gulf need not call at Kamran, was approved by the Government of India, and acted on.

Dr. W. Th. de Vogel, of the Netherlands East Indies Civil Health Service, visited Jeddah and Kamran on a mission from the Netherlands Colonial Office to study the arrangements for the return pilgrimage.

The Netherlands consul at Jeddah brought up several cases where he considered that the medical authorities at Kamran had interpreted the regulations in such a way as to cause unnecessary suffering or inconvenience to Javanese pilgrims. The Government of India are satisfied, after receiving the medical officer's explanation, that the complaints are unjustified. The Netherlands consul has withdrawn with apologies some of the complaints, which were founded on an ambiguous paragraph in the report furnished to him, but maintains the others. The correspondence is not yet finished. The Netherlands East Indies furnish more than half the pilgrims who pass through the Kamran quarantine station, and the Netherlands authorities are therefore not unreasonable in keeping a very critical eye on the administration there, the more so as before the war the station was controlled by an international board on which Holland was represented. To meet their views His Majesty's Government are proposing that a Dutch doctor should be appointed to serve in the quarantine station.

### Maan.

When King Hussein began to urge pilgrims from Syria and Palestine to travel to Medina by the Hedjaz Railway the authorities in Syria prohibited this route as giving no guarantee for sanitary supervision. Later the King decided to establish a quarantine station at Maan, and sent his director of quarantine there for the purpose, but he had only about £300 to spend, and little actually happened except that a place at Maan was called a quarantine station.

If this route is to be used, it seems certain that the sanitary control cannot be left in the hands of the Hedjaz authorities.

## 5. India and the Pilgrimage.

### Staff.

The pilgrimage officer, Mr. Muhammad Yasin Khan, again did valuable work. Fortunately he was still here when hostilities broke out and was able to go to Mecca to investigate the reports of looting and murder at Taif and to give advice to Indian pilgrims and residents.

Thanks to the generosity of the Government of India we have the services of a capable Indian clerk for the whole of the current year instead of for four months only. That this provision is not unnecessary is shown by the fact that, although it is more than six months since the Hajj, the clerk is still busy with deceased pilgrims' estates, and that, but for the hostilities between the Hedjaz and Nejd, a certain number of Indian pilgrims would now be arriving by each boat for the pilgrimage of 1925.

### The Deposit System.

The system recommended by this agency for several years, under which a deposit to cover the cost of the return journey would be taken from every Indian pilgrim before he left India for Jeddah, was brought into operation in time for the seasonal rush. As full reports have been sent to the Government of India it is not necessary to write much about the matter here. Possible improvements in the system are under discussion, but there is general agreement among the British officials and the shipping agents, both here and in India, that the system has been a success. In 1923, 1,049 Indian pilgrims were carried home by the shipping companies free, while 1,314 contributed an average of only a few rupees each towards the cost of repatriation, viz., 25 rupees a head, the balance being made up by contributions from the Government of India (35,300 rupees) and from the Central Hajj Committee (2,600 rupees). What this meant—apart from the cost in money—to His Majesty's Government, the Government of India, this agency and all the pilgrims, destitutes and others, was fully explained in Jeddah Pilgrimage Report for 1923. The contrast in 1924 was striking. Until the capture of Taif, not more than twenty Indians applied to the agency for free passages, and it is estimated that there would not have been more

than fifty or sixty for the whole season if the Wahabi attack had not frightened away from Mecca a considerable number of Indians who would probably have remained there, living on charitable funds or by begging, for years. It might perhaps be expected that but for the Wahabi menace there would have been no destitutes at all, but the deposit system did not affect people who came in previous years, or who, though they came for this pilgrimage, left India before the deposit system was introduced, or who travelled overland via Persia and Irak, or who came as stowaways. A few of the Indians who applied for repatriation as destitutes had passports, saying that they did not make deposits in India as they were not likely to return.

The effect of the deposit regulation was noticeable from the beginning of the season. Masters of pilgrim ships reported the almost complete disappearance of the type of pilgrim—so familiar in 1923—who was already penniless when he left India and had to beg for his food on the way to Jeddah.

The steady annual increase in the proportion of destitutes, under the encouragement of free and assisted repatriation, is shown strikingly in the following table:—

		Number of pilgrims sailing from Indian ports.	Number of Indian destitutes.	Percentage of destitute Indians to total number of pilgrims sailing from India.
1920	...	21,656	373	1.7
1921	...	12,065	500	4.1
1922	...	12,849	1,106	8.6
1923	...	24,459	2,765	11.3
1924	...	18,432	160	.9

The pilgrims who sail from India include "Bokharis," Afghans and other non-Indians. The percentages shown are therefore smaller than the proportion of destitute Indians to the total number of Indian pilgrims; but in showing a steady increase until 1923 and an enormous drop in 1924 they are probably not misleading, since the flow of non-Indian pilgrims sailing from Indian ports probably constitutes a fairly constant proportion of the total.

The percentage for 1924, small as it is (nine-tenths of 1 per cent.), is yet unjust to the deposit system, in that it represents, to the extent of perhaps two-thirds or more, refugees rather than pilgrims. Even then, the cost to the Government of India was only 5,119r. 8a. Given normal circumstances and a few years of the deposit system, the Indian destitute should be almost unknown.

It is depressing, after seeing the obvious advantages of the system at work, to learn that various Moslem bodies in India are strongly opposed, on religious grounds, to the Bill by which it is proposed to legalise the deposit system. It is to be hoped that if the Legislative Assembly throws out the Bill the Government of India will not agree to provide funds for the repatriation of destitutes; otherwise, we must be prepared for an increasing drain on the Indian Treasury and the increasing demoralisation of the Indian pilgrim.

### Deposits at Jeddah.

As one result of the deposit system adopted in India there was a large reduction in the number of deposits made by pilgrims at this agency. The figures were:—

1923: Number of depositors, 385; amount deposited, 89,714 rupees = £78.

1924: Number of depositors, 42; amount deposited, 26,647 rupees = £62.

Every pilgrim being easy in his mind about his return journey, almost the only persons who made deposits were those who had large sums which they did not want for their immediate expenses.

### Loans.

Thanks also to the deposit system, we had no call to make loans, as we did in 1922 and 1923 as an experiment, to Indian pilgrims who applied for financial assistance. It is doubtful whether we should have continued the rather rash practice in any case, as there are loans amounting to 265 rupees still outstanding. This sum, which will have to be written off, is larger than the agency charity fund can afford to lose.



### *Registration.*

It was originally proposed, as part of the deposit scheme, that all Indian pilgrims should be registered at this agency. After watching the pilgrimage work for two seasons and the registration of Malays for one, I have come to the conclusion that to register all Indians would require a much larger staff and, consequently, much heavier expenditure than I should be prepared to ask the Government of India to sanction.

### *The Kaif Robbery of 1923.*

This outrageous case, which was fully reported in 1923, led to a long correspondence with King Hussein. Finally, after a very strongly worded note from His Majesty's Government, he agreed to pay the compensation claimed—out of a suspense account dating from the days of the subsidy. This agency sent to the Government of India for payment to the claimants £E. 3,696, which is as nearly as we can calculate the amount taken from the British pilgrims in the caravan.

### *Stowaways.*

It rarely happens that an Indian pilgrim ship arrives at Jeddah without at least two or three stowaways on board. Often there are more, and one ship in 1924 had nineteen. These people are equally unwelcome to the shipping company, who lose the passage-money, and to this agency, which sees in them destitutes who will be among the most insolent in their demands for repatriation at Government expense.

In my opinion, stowaways should be taken back on the same ship if it is returning to India; otherwise they should be sent back on some other ship at the expense of the company on whose ship they came. The best way of discouraging such stowaways is to disappoint them of their intention to perform the Hajj at other people's expense.

When a stowaway is discovered the passengers sometimes subscribe the amount of his passage-money and hand it to the captain, and it is urged that religious feeling in India would be against refusing to allow the stowaway to land in such cases. If this view is accepted (though it seems absurd to consider as respectable the religious feelings of a man who begins a pilgrimage by trying to swindle a shipping company), then it should be laid down that the stowaway shall be allowed to land only if the passengers subscribe not only the cost of the passage to Jeddah, but the deposit money (60 rupees) too, and the captain deposits the latter with the British agency at Jeddah.

I understand that the shipping companies in India are inclined to accept this proposal, but they consider that they ought not to have to pay Kamaran quarantine dues on stowaways they repatriate. This is not unreasonable, since it would appear that the responsibility for seeing that stowaways do not get on board pilgrim ships leaving for Jeddah does not fall exclusively on the captain and other employees of the company, but is shared with the authorities at the port of embarkation.

### *Indian Wakfs in Mecca.*

It is believed that there are in Mecca a number of rest-houses which were built by charitable Indians for the benefit of Indian pilgrims, but have been diverted from their proper use—a fate which the lack of a registration system for wakfs or any other form of property and the extraordinary rapacity and corruption of the Mecca people make only too likely. In their instructions for 1924, the Government of India requested the Indian pilgrimage officer to examine this question, under the agency's directions, and see what could be done to get the property reserved for the use of pilgrims. There was no opportunity in 1924 for the examination of this question, which requires study on the spot. I have recommended that Mr. Yasin Khan, who knows Arabic and has had a legal training, should be sent to Mecca for the purpose before the forthcoming Hajj, so as to be able to return to Jeddah before the rush season begins. He took with him to India a list (supplied by the Hedjaz Government, and therefore probably incorrect) of properties said to be Indian wakfs, with the object of enquiring in India, if the Government of India should approve, into the terms of dedication.

### *6. British Malaya.*

#### *New Passport and Registration System.*

The authorities in British Malaya are of the opinion that it is not desirable to compel all British pilgrims from there to register at this agency, but they have

introduced a very satisfactory form of passport, and all pilgrims holding such passports are advised to register here. The pilgrim reports on arrival and deposits the counterfoil of his passport and his return ticket, and he takes back the latter when he wants to return home. The passport is granted on the express understanding that, if the return ticket is not claimed within two months from the date of sailing of the last pilgrim steamer from Jeddah to the Straits, the agency shall send the ticket to Singapore, and the money it represents shall be paid by the shipping company to the next-of-kin. This excellent rule has not been acted on this year, because it was supposed that some of the unclaimed tickets belonged to people who had at first decided to stay in Mecca, but might be induced by the difficulties resulting from the state of hostilities to change their mind, or who, having been disappointed in the hope to visit Medina before the Hajj, might try to visit it afterwards, and so outstay the period of two months fixed by the passport. In fact, many such people did apply for their tickets after the expiry of the two months.

The new system, which was worked very well by the Malay pilgrimage officer attached to this agency, Mr. Abdul Majid, with the assistance of one Malay clerk, would have been still more successful but for the refusal of King Hussein, at first, to instruct the pilgrim guides to co-operate with the agency. By the time his suspicions had been allayed, the pilgrims who arrived on the first few boats had already gone to Mecca.

An argument which will doubtless receive due attention, in favour of requiring all pilgrims who leave ports in British Malaya to provide themselves with passports, is that this would be of very great assistance in the detection of people engaged in the slave traffic.

### *Death Rate.*

This system of registration provided the only reliable statistics of the death rate among British pilgrims. Of the 3,317 Malay pilgrims covered by our records, 540 were definitely reported as having died in the Hedjaz—an appalling percentage of 17 per cent. for a period of about six months, and as some of the unclaimed tickets probably represent unreported deaths, the percentage may be even higher than that.

In nearly every case where the death was reported to the agency, the effects and the return ticket belonging to the deceased were handed over to relatives or friends for transmission to the next-of-kin.

### *Destitutes.*

A few Malays applied for assistance. In every case their need was due to the state of hostilities, which compelled them to leave their heavier belongings in Mecca and led to their being robbed on their way to Jeddah of such money as they had ventured to bring with them. Owing to the high reputation of the Malays and to their mutual helpfulness, very little assistance had to be given. We gave eighteen Malays 3 rupees each out of the charity fund, to provide them with food for a day or two, while they endeavoured to raise a loan from friends or compatriots; and we made loans of £5 to one person and £2 to each of six others on a guarantee by their pilgrim guide that if they did not repay the sums advanced he would.

### *The Mahmal.*

#### *7. Egypt and the Pilgrimage.*

The quarrel of 1923 was settled by the acceptance of the Egyptian terms, King Hussein being unable to face a second time the loss of the money and grain which accompany the Mahmal. With his usual political blindness, however, King Hussein caused another dispute; he either cut out or covered up the name of King Fuad, which was embroidered on the Kaabah cover. The Amir-al-Hajj protested violently, and left the country immediately with the Mahmal and its guard a month before the time fixed for his departure.

### *Shipping*

There was some accumulation of "official" Egyptian pilgrims towards the end of the season, and this led to violent scenes outside the agent's office. The fault lay, however, not with Messrs. Lazzerini, but with King Hussein. The early departure of the Mahmal dislocated the shipping programme, and the King's quarrel with the Bedouin closed the Medina road, so that many Egyptians who would ordinarily have gone to Medina after the Hajj desired to leave for Egypt immediately.



## 8. Other Territories.

*Nigeria.*

The Nigerian Repatriation Fund, to which reference was made last year, has been very valuable. By its aid 1,293 Nigerians have been sent over to Suakin, whence they can usually find their way home. Nearly all have been sent by dhow, at a cost of only a few shillings a head. Children under 6 were not charged for. The figures are:—

1923: Adults, 268; children under 6, 31; cost, £112 16s. 10d.

1924: Adults, 1,025; children under 6, 176; cost, £567 7s. 8d.

The large increase in 1924 is due to the state of hostilities existing in the Hedjaz. Owing to the stoppage of trade, hundreds of "Takrunis" who would ordinarily have worked here for a year or two to earn the money to take them home applied for repatriation. Moreover, the shortage of food and water in Jeddah and the news of what happened after the fall of Taif made it advisable to send away as soon as possible all British subjects who wished to go, so the usual plan of leaving applicants for a month or two in order that time might sift out those who were only pretending to be destitute had to be abandoned.

*Somaliland.*

The authorities of British Somaliland have informed this agency that district officers have been instructed to advise intending pilgrims to obtain certificates of identity and that it may be possible to obtain from the family or tribe of any British Somali assisted by this agency a refund of the expense incurred. They point out that persons claiming to be natives of that territory may quite possibly be Italian or French Somalis or even natives of Abyssinia or Aden.

No expenditure, however, was incurred on behalf of British Somali pilgrims in 1924. Seven destitute Somalis were sent away at the instance of this agency, but they were given free passages to Aden on a British pilgrim ship touching there on her way to India, and from Aden they seem to have found their way home somehow.

*South Africa.*

A considerable number of Malays from South Africa applied to this agency in 1924 for one reason or another. Usually the agency sees little of them.

A group of seven Malay students from South Africa, wishing to escape the difficulties resulting from the state of war, applied to the agency for repatriation. The Government of South Africa sanctioned an advance of £100 for the purpose, and the students were sent home via India.

*Palestine and Syria.*

The suggestions made in the 1923 report, that visas should be worded so as to cover the return journey via Egypt, and should be for a period long enough to cover the ordinary pilgrimage season, were acted upon. The agency had no trouble in this respect.

Pilgrims who took direct passages to Palestine and Syria again paid, in the form of enhanced fares, a concealed tax of £1 a head. The authorities wished to levy a similar tax on all pilgrims returning to Egypt (except those travelling under the auspices of the Egyptian Government), but dropped the project because they did not dare to make it public by complying with the Khedivial agent's request that the instructions to collect the tax should be communicated to them in writing.

R. W. BULLARD.

[E 1781/10/91]

No. 43.

Consul Bullard to Mr. Austen Chamberlain. —(Received March 23.)

(No. 17. Secret.)

Sir,

Jeddah, February 28, 1925.

I HAVE the honour to enclose a report on the situation covering the period the 11th to the 28th February.

2. Copies of this despatch and of its enclosure are being sent to India, Egypt, Khartum (through Port Sudan), Jerusalem, Bagdad, Beirut (for Damascus), Aden, Singapore, Bushire, Koweit, Bahrein and Muskat.

I have, &c.

R. W. BULLARD.

Enclosure in No. 43.

Report for the Period February 11 to 28, 1925.

(Secret.)

THERE is no military activity on the part of the Wahabis to report, except the continued shelling of the town of Jeddah. With an occasional day's rest their guns fire for an hour or two every morning and evening. Not a single object of military importance has been hit. There are civilian casualties every day (about eighty persons in all have been killed and over 100 wounded), but so far as is known no foreign subject has been hurt. The quarter near the King's "palace," where the foreign representatives live, has had at least its fair share of the shelling. The agency buildings have been hit by three shells, and all the other consulates have been hit or narrowly missed, but no serious damage has been done so far.

2. The so-called armoured cars have fully established their futility. Three of the Russian mechanics were persuaded to take one of them out with a party of cavalry, who made an attempt (apparently unsuccessful) to put two enemy guns out of action. They tell me that the Wahabis did not seem in the least alarmed at the car, but fired at it with rifles at short range. Many bullets passed through the plating, and the Russian who was driving was severely wounded. One of his companions managed to take his place and to keep the engine running, an important consideration, as these cars can be started only by a crank worked from outside.

3. The third and last of the Russian aviators has left, and the mechanic who was wounded in the car has gone to Egypt with one of his compatriots. Thus there are only two Russians left—mechanics. The four Germans are still here. Two of them have been employed in training men to use some old flame-throwers, which were left in the Hedjaz by the Turks. One of the Germans claims to be an air pilot, and to be willing to fly if paid in advance, but he has not made a flight yet.

4. On about the 15th February a body of Palestinian soldiers, which gradually increased to some 150, refused to obey orders. They fired over the heads of the officers who tried to approach them, and said that they would do nothing until they received the two months' arrears of pay due to them. Finally, the King went out to them and promised them that they would be paid in five or six days. Similar promises had been made before, but the soldiers went back to work. To the general surprise, the promise was kept.

5. News has been received from a source usually reliable that the Hedjaz authorities have been recruiting men in some territory or territories near Aden, and propose to bring several hundred of them to Jeddah soon. Lest they should embarrass us by trying to sail from some port under our control, His Majesty's Government have been informed.

6. Five men accused of political agitation and/or correspondence with the Wahabis have been arrested and sent to Akaba. One of them has been openly pro-Wahabi ever since the war started, and there is probably good evidence against the others. Nevertheless, all five are being allowed to return. The whole population being indifferent, if not hostile, to the fate of the Hedjaz Government, Ali probably feels that there is no strong case for singling out five men for punishment.

7. Everyone here is astonished that the Hedjaz Government still stands, not least the Hedjaz Government itself. But the Wahabis let the occasion pass. When they first reached Jeddah, early in January, the Hedjaz troops were in such a state of demoralisation that capture by assault should have been easy. It was expected that a general attack would be made about the time of the last new moon, and that such an attack could not but be successful, but no serious attack was made. It is now past the new moon again, but the Wahabis do nothing but fire guns during the daytime and at night let off a few rifles to make the defence waste their ammunition. It would be interesting to know why the attack was never made. Possibly the wire seemed formidable to Badawin, who had never seen such an obstacle before, and who did not know the state of mind of the troops behind it. Be that as it may, their failure to attack has given the Hedjaz army a better opinion of itself, and if only it could be regularly paid it might now be willing to continue to defend Jeddah for some time. The Hedjaz authorities talk about an advance, but this is hardly possible if any resistance is to be expected. The army has no boots for a march, and hardly any horses or mules in a state to draw supply carts, let alone guns. Moreover, the moral of the Hedjaz troops is not strongly rooted enough to bear transplantation to the desert, where there is no protective wire. One of the shereefs, Shakir, has been sent to Yambo in the hope that he will be able to raise the tribes to attack the Wahabis at



Rabigh and even at Jeddah, but the Hedjaz Arabs are most unlikely to make any move unless they see the Wahabis beaten and in retreat. The struggle seems, then, to have become a war of material exhaustion, and in such a war the chances again appear to be in favour of Bin Saud. He has lost much in prestige by failing to make good his promises to open the Jeddah road in a few days, but he should be able to hold on for several months in sufficient strength to prevent the Hedjaz authorities from moving towards Mecca. It is true that the Badawin do not like long campaigns, but they maintained the siege of Hail (though Hail, it is true, is nearer home) for longer than should be sufficient to exhaust Ali's resources. He has only been saved from the disaster which the mutiny must have brought about (for many other Palestinians were ready to follow the 150) by the receipt of £10,000 from the ex-King Hussein. This is the first contribution to the expenses of the State that Hussein has made since he left. It has taken five months to get even this sum, which is already exhausted, and he is not believed to be disposed to pay any more. However, the Hedjaz can hang on until next pay-day (24th March), and then perhaps, by means of promises, for another month; and even then a small windfall may prolong the struggle still longer.

8. I learn from a good source that Ali plans to go to Yambo if he is forced to leave Jeddah, and to try to reach Medina and to begin the struggle again there. At present Medina remains entirely inactive. Bin Saud has not wished to complicate the situation by trying to seize Medina too, and the Hedjaz authorities are in control of the town to the extent of being able to bring away munitions from there.

9. The notorious French convert to Islam, Major "Ibrahim" Depui, returned to the Hedjaz in November and was in charge of the French consulate for some weeks. Though now relieved of this duty and, he declares, without any connection with the Jeddah consulate, he has remained in Jeddah. He states that he has been appointed by the French Government "head of the French pilgrims' resthouse in Mecca and charged with a mission in Arabia." He has just been ordered off to Jibuti, but states his intention to return in a few weeks in order to go to Mecca to take up his duties there. The appointment of a senior European officer as keeper of a doss-house is even more transparent than most of the manoeuvres with which Major Depui has been connected. Fortunately for us, the greater his activity the more he damages his own country, a fact already recognised and openly stated by his compatriot, the new French consul.

10. Dr. Naji-al-Asil tried a few weeks ago to get £400 from Messrs. Gellatly, Hankey and Co.'s London office, but the firm, warned by experience, consulted their Jeddah representative, and on the latter's advice refused. Soon after this Dr. Naji telegraphed to say that his health would not let him continue to represent the Hedjaz, but on receiving an acceptance of his resignation he wired that he was better. King Ali knows too well what a large share Dr. Naji had in King Hussein's intransigence to have any confidence in Dr. Naji, and but for his general policy of postponing all questions that are not urgent he would probably long ago have disowned Dr. Naji as well as the mountebank who represents the Hedjaz in the rest of Europe, "Prince" Habib Lutfallah.

R. W. BULLARD.

[E 1761/165/91]

No. 44,

*Consul Smart to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received March 23.)*

(No. 35. Secret.)

Sir,

*Damascus, February 26, 1925.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 31 of the 17th instant, enclosing copy of my despatch No. 22 of the same date to His Majesty's High Commissioner at Bagdad regarding Ibn Saud's demand for the submission of Nuri Shalaan, Chief of the Ruwala, I have the honour to report that the latter's grandson, Emir Fawwaz, who is in command of the Ruwala "beyrak" (tribal) force at Qurayyat-ul-Milh, called on me the day before yesterday. Our conversation was confined to an exchange of courtesies, owing mainly to the presence of a chance French visitor.

When I returned the Emir's visit yesterday, he said that he had called to talk business, but that he had been unable to do so, as I was not alone. He then discoursed at length on the imminent Wahabi menace to Qurayyat-ul-Milh. Eight Wahabi "beyraks," according to him, were within striking distance. Unless the British

helped the Ruwala with arms and money, Qurayyat-ul-Milh would fall into the hands of the Wahabis. This would entail the forced submission of many tribes of the Syrian desert to Ibn Saud, as they would starve without access to that region. Moreover, Qurayyat-ul-Milh was the gateway not only to Transjordan, but also to Syria. It was part of British mandated territory, and he and his tribe wished to serve the British faithfully. But, if support were not forthcoming, they would have to make other arrangements. He had spoken to Commandant Tommy Martin, the head of the French Bureau de Renseignements at Damascus, who had said that, if the Wahabis attacked Nuri within the limits of Syria, it would be for the French to take suitable action. Qurayyat-ul-Milh, however, and the southern Ruwala zone concerned the British.

During our conversation, his cousin, Emir Farhan, the "messenger" indicated in Sir Henry Dobbs's telegram of the 16th ultimo to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, joined us and dilated on the same topic. He said that he had been told to wait at Bagdad for the answer to telegrams sent to London by His Majesty's High Commissioners at Bagdad and Jerusalem. He had waited thirty-five days, and had finally been given to understand that we were too busy with the Mosul Commission to give him an answer for the present. He seemed to be very disappointed. Both the Emirs begged me to endeavour to hasten the eagerly awaited reply to their appeal. They were both leaving at once to visit Nuri Shalaan, who has returned to the Hammad. They hoped that on their return to Damascus ten days hence I would have some news for them.

I asked Emir Fawwaz why he had not unburdened himself to the chief British representative at Amman, in whose jurisdiction Qurayyat-ul-Milh lay. He replied that he had been ashamed to speak frankly of his fears to Colonel Cox. I said that the matter was outside my competence, and that I could only report what he had told me.

He also referred to another delicate affair, namely, the seizure by him at Qurayyat-ul-Milh of letters being brought by a messenger from Ibn Saud to Suleyman-bin-Musheiqih, the Sultan's representative at Damascus. Copies of these letters were communicated to me by the chief British representative at Amman, and I have the honour to enclose herewith copy of a despatch I addressed to Colonel Cox on the subject. Since the date of that despatch, the seizure of these letters has become a matter of public notoriety at Damascus. Suleyman fortunately has been absent at Beirut for over a week, but his retainers are much excited about the incident, and asked Mr. Teen, my second dragoman, whether we had any news on the subject. Mr. Teen replied in the negative. Suleyman, as soon as he returns from Beirut, will doubtless rush to the consulate and expect a sympathetic hearing from me. The awkwardness of my position is manifest. I can perhaps put him off this time by adopting a vague attitude of detachment, but it will not be so easy to continue this ambiguity indefinitely.

I venture, therefore, to request, for my guidance, early instructions as to the attitude I am to adopt locally between the Nejdians and the Ruwala. Hitherto my relations with both have been extremely amicable. In my despatch No. 124 of the 8th August last I reported how I was able, temporarily at any rate, to compose an acute dispute between Nuri Shalaan and Suleyman-bin-Musheiqih about the tolls exacted by the Ruwala from Nejdian caravans. Obviously, since then Ruwala-Nejdian differences have become more fundamental. The task of running with the hare and hunting with the hounds has—here, at any rate—become much more difficult. It seems that sooner or later we must make some sort of a choice between the Ruwala and the Nejdians.

In the last sentence of your telegram No. 9 of the 7th October last, Mr. Vaughan-Russell was instructed to continue to extend good offices to Nejdians, until a definite breach occurred between His Majesty's Government and Ibn Saud. I understand from Emir Fawwaz that Ibn Saud has demanded from the Ruwala the surrender of Qurayyat-ul-Milh, which is, I presume, regarded as Transjordan territory. We seem, therefore, very near the breach contemplated.

Needless to say, the abandon by us of our present paternal direction of the Nejdian agency at Damascus might have grave consequences. Suleyman cannot stand alone. If we reject him, he will no doubt turn to the French. I am unable to say what use they would make of this opportunity. Anyhow, we should be deprived of the information which we now receive of Nejdian activities here. On the other hand, the abandon of the Ruwala would appear to threaten even graver consequences for our mandated territories. We have frankly to face the fact, pregnant with

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varied menace, that a Ruwala surrender to Ibn Saud involves a Wahabi domination of the Syrian desert.

My horizon is too limited for me to venture to offer any considered opinion on the alternative. From the language of the Emirs Fawwaz and Farhan, I gathered that they are seriously frightened, and that, if they do not soon receive some assurances from us, they will be driven to come to terms with Ibn Saud, whom they can with difficulty resist unaided. I understand that His Majesty's High Commissioners at Bagdad and Jerusalem are strongly in favour of support being given to the Ruwala. If His Majesty's Government should decide on this course, I venture to suggest that, if possible, any abrupt breach with the Nejdian agency here be avoided. It would not, perhaps, be impossible for me to continue assisting Suleyman, temporarily at any rate, until we see how events shape, in various current affairs devoid of political tinge and unconnected with the Ruwala. Anomalies of this nature, though fantastic in a European atmosphere, are not so impossible on the shifting scene of the Arabian comedy. Nevertheless, if we decide to support the Ruwala generally, a certain partisanship of them here in Nejdian-Ruwala differences would be inevitable.

I venture to hope that, for my guidance in the present difficult situation, you will keep me fully informed of our Arabian policies as far as they affect me at Damascus.

I have presumed that I should continue to adopt an attitude of strict reserve regarding Ruwala-Nejdian affairs towards the French here, who are, of course, keenly interested in Wahabi developments. I should be grateful for warning of any approach to Anglo-French co-operation, such as suggested by Sir Henry Dobbs in his telegram above referred to, and of a nature to necessitate some modification of this reserve.

I have, &c.  
W. A. SMART.

Enclosure in No. 44.

*Consul Smart to Colonel Cox (Amman).*

(No. 21. Secret.)

Sir,

*Damascus, February 19, 1925.*

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge, with thanks, the receipt of your despatch of the 14th instant, with its enclosures.

I notice that, in the translation of Ibn Jalawi's letter, some passages of the original have been omitted, and one sentence has been mistranslated. These are, however, unimportant, with the exception of the following passage omitted:—

"As for El Sayed Hussein, the Deputy of the Haram (Naib-ul-Haram), he has arrived here, and we sent him with a message of ours to the Imam. Your news about that reached us."

Presumably the "Haram" is the "Haram-as-Sherif" of Jerusalem. As this passage may be of interest to His Majesty's High Commissioner, I have ventured to draw attention to the omission in case the original text should escape notice at Jerusalem.

I would also draw attention to a very delicate aspect of this affair. There are references in these letters to letters written for Suleyman-bin-Musheiqih by my dragoman, who, as you know, assists the Nejdian agency in its clerical work. A peculiarly awkward instance is the cypher, which was evidently sent in response to a letter written by my dragoman for Suleyman, asking that he be furnished with a cypher.

Suleyman, on the whole, has been exceedingly amenable to my direction. The dependence of the Nejdian agency on this consulate is of considerable value. Should it transpire that Nejdian correspondence has been intercepted, by whatever means, and subsequently come into our possession, it is obvious that the present intimate relations between the Nejdian agency and this consulate will suffer a severe shock, which will probably result in my losing my control over the agency. I trust that these considerations will be carefully borne in mind.

I have, &c.  
W. A. SMART.

[E 1922/10/91]

No. 45.

*Consul Bullard to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received March 30.)*

(No. 21. Secret.)

Sir,

*Jeddah, March 11, 1925.*

I HAVE the honour to enclose a report on the situation covering the period the 1st-11th March.

2. Copies of this despatch and of its enclosure are being sent to India, Egypt, Khartum (through Port Sudan), Jerusalem, Bagdad, Beirut (for Damascus), Aden, Singapore, Bushire, Koweit, Bahrein and Muscat.

I have, &c.  
R. W. BULLARD.

Enclosure in No. 45.

*Report for the Period March 1-11, 1925.*

(Secret.)

THE Wahabi "bombardment" has diminished to a few shells soon after sunrise and before sunset. The Hedjaz Government profess to have kept account of the shells fired into the town and to know that the stock they left behind at Mecca must be nearly exhausted. Ibn Saud is still at his headquarters a few miles from Jeddah, but there is no sign of an attack.

Reports received during the last two or three days speak of Wahabi activity towards Yambo. The capture of Yambo would not cut the Hedjaz Government's communications with Medina, as only the railway route via Maan and Akaba is being used, but it would deprive them of an alternative route and of a town which Ali is believed to favour as a base in case of retirement from Jeddah. Moreover, it would finally quench the hope which the Hedjaz Government cherish, that the Shereef Shakir can raise the Yambo tribes against the Wahabis.

2. The Hedjaz Government have suddenly become confident of a speedy and successful end to the war. This confidence is due mainly to the arrival of war material. On the 8th March an Italian steamer, the "Fausto Casulich," from Trieste, put in at Jeddah. She flew no flag, and professed, even to a petty officer from an Italian gunboat who was sent on board to make enquiries, to have only timber to discharge. She did land timber, but she also landed two armoured cars, 1,000 rifles and 694 boxes of small-arms ammunition. The Hedjaz Government were disappointed at getting only 1,000 rifles; they were expecting 2,000.

Two or three days before the British steamship "Keneh" brought from Suez 200 cases of small-arms ammunition. I learn from the agent of the shipping company that this ammunition was ordered in Antwerp and shipped by the British Indian steamship "Margha." The freight was paid in London (? by Sir Foster Newland). Some machine guns or machine-gun parts arrived with the ammunition.

This material adds greatly to the strength of the Hedjaz army. The five or six different patterns of rifle, for some of which there is little ammunition, can be replaced to a large extent by a uniform pattern with plenty of ammunition. But it is on the cars in particular that the Government are relying. They are not fakes, like the five received from Germany recently. They are small, but they look very useful—quick, light, and each armed with three machine guns, two behind and one in front. They were made by the Lancia Works (George Ansaldo), at Genoa. My Italian colleague has known for some time that the Hedjaz Government were expecting two cars from Trieste, but he believed—or said he did—that they were not of Italian make. The rifles are of Austrian manufacture (Steyr), and some specimens of the cartridges which I secured were pronounced by the commanding officer of the "Clematis" to be Austrian too.

Three drivers, who are believed to be Syrians, were recently brought from Egypt for these new armoured cars. The Russian mechanics have all left the country. The four Germans are still here, but they seem to do nothing except go out to every steamer that calls and treat it as a bar with an "on" and "off" licence.

3. Reports that Ibn Saud's men are dissatisfied and that many are returning home find ready credence in official circles in Jeddah. The belief in such reports has been greatly strengthened by a private letter addressed to Tahsin Pasha, the commander of



the Hedjaz army, by Ibn Saud. Ibn Saud asks his "brother" to come and discuss the matter with him and see who is right—Ibn Saud or Ali. Tahsin is not replying to this letter.

Another sign of weakness is detected in a proclamation to the Mahometan world published by Ibn Saud in his newspaper towards the end of February. While he speaks confidently about occupying Jeddah soon, he does not promise that it will be open for the pilgrimage, but invites pilgrims to come to Mecca via ports which are already in his hands, *e.g.*, Lith and Kufudah.

4. King Ali and the army officers are now talking even more confidently of marching out against the enemy in a few days, and all animals capable of being used for transport are being registered. The arrival of the new war material certainly makes the project less fantastic, but the main difficulty, to which I have before referred, *viz.*, lack of reliable troops, still exists. The mutiny which I reported last time was, I have since found, staved off without payment of all the arrears of pay; many of the men are still a month behind, and will therefore have a claim for two months' pay on the 24th March, when the Arabic month ends.

5. The two Arabs who obtained the war material from Trieste have been decorated by Ali, and one of them, a Syrian named Muhi-al-Din Shatila, has been appointed Hedjaz consul and commercial agent in Trieste. I do not know whether this appointment has been accepted by the Italian Government. I am inclined to believe that the war material was not smuggled out without their knowledge. It is perhaps not unreasonable to see a connection between the export of this material and the fact that, whereas the other foreign representatives, in view of the difficulty of the situation, avoid seeing the King unless it is absolutely necessary, the Italian consul has frequent interviews with him.

6. The Hedjaz Government have asked for visas for three men whom they wish to send to India to counter the Caliphate committee's propaganda against the Hedjaz. One of them, Saiyid Muhammad Tahir-al-Dabbagh, at present Minister of Finance, is said to be the only Hedjaz official who ever tried to live on his official pay. As the Hedjaz Government allowed the Indian delegation to come to Jeddah, I saw no harm in the proposal, but it seemed better to ask the Government of India whether they had any objection. The reply has not yet been received.

The Hedjaz Government are managing somehow to conduct propaganda. It is believed that they run two papers in Bombay, "Wahdah" and "Ghaibi-Gola," and one in Egypt, "Al Shuyukh."

7. According to reports made by Javanese pilgrims who have arrived from Mecca, the Senoussi reached Mecca on the 1st March, and was given an ostentatious reception.

Amin Ribani reports from Syria, on the authority of Turks of importance, with whom he is in touch there, that the Senoussi is charged with a mission from the Turks, and that it includes the establishment of close and friendly relations between Ibn Saud and the Imam.

8. It is difficult to find out what conditions in Mecca are now, as very few pilgrims are coming down to Jeddah. Such reports as have been received lately show that prices are not nearly so high as they were at first, and that considerable stocks of food-stuffs come by caravan from Nejd and from the blockaded ports on the Red Sea. But the low prices are believed to be due largely to the lack of demand resulting from—

1. The absence of pilgrims;
2. The departure of many of the inhabitants; and
3. The poverty of such of the inhabitants as have remained behind.

Any persons who are inclined to accept Ibn Saud's invitation (see paragraph 3) to go to Mecca via Lith or some other minor port would do well to consider whether the necessary organisation for landing, housing and feeding large bodies of foreigners is likely to exist at such ports, and whether such supplies as reach Mecca are likely to suffice if there is a large influx of visitors.

9. On the 9th March the (Mahometan) anniversary of the Arab revolt against the Turks was celebrated. The consular corps were invited to call on King Ali. The call was paid in plain clothes, as Ali has never been officially recognised.

Certain Syrians who hold positions of authority in the Hedjaz, *viz.*, Tahsin Pasha, who is Minister for War and Army Commander, the Minister of Marine, and the Chief Medical Officer, seized the opportunity to hold a political meeting. According to people who were present, they spoke much about the unity of Syria (including Palestine and Transjordan), the unity of the Arabs in general, the wickedness of the French,

and the fine qualities of the Syrians. The few Bagdadi officers who remain here detest the Syrians and speak of them as incapable braggarts who came into the Arab movement at the eleventh hour and now claim all the credit. One of them, in the presence of two others, told me that if he could be sure he would not be shot at sight by some ignorant Wahabi, he would desert to Ibn Saud and show him how easy it would be to circumvent the clumsy defence plans of Tahsin Pasha.

So much for the unity of the Arabs.

R. W. BULLARD,  
*Agent and Consul.*

[E 1923/890/91]

No. 46.

*Consul-General Satow to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received March 30.)*

(No. 32. Confidential.)

Sir,

*Beirut, March 13, 1925.*

WITH reference to my telegram No. 3 of to-day's date, I have the honour to report that Mahmoud Nedim Bey, who was accompanied by his aide-de-camp, arrived at Beirut on or about the 16th February. On the 18th he paid a courtesy visit to General Sarraill, to whom he does not appear to have made any special request. He informed the general that he intended to pass through Beirut again in about three months on his return from Angora, whither he was proceeding. While in Beirut he stayed at the Hôtel Matham Arabi, which is the rendezvous of the pro-Turks and pro-Kemalists. On his arrival he received the visits of Sheikh Abdul Basit Ounsi, proprietor of the pro-Turkish "Ikbal" newspaper, and of a certain Sheikh Mohamed Moharrem, a Turkish sympathiser. These two persons visited him daily, or even oftener, during his stay. Mahmoud Nedim Bey also called on the Governor of the Great Lebanon and on Prince Selim, son of Sultan Abdul Hamid, and on the other refugee Turkish princes who are now here. He was also visited several times by Amin Rihany, the Lebanese journalist and writer, who had travelled by the same ship. Rihany was, as you know, recently at Jeddah endeavouring to intervene between Ibn Saud and King Aly. The Amir Said Jazaerly came over from Damascus to see him, but missed him.

Mahmoud Nedim Bey stated while here that he was proceeding to Angora on an invitation from Mustafa Kemal Pasha with a view to negotiating on behalf of the Imam Yahya the recognition of the independence of the Yemen under Turkish suzerainty on lines which would reconcile the interests of both parties. There seems to be also reason to believe that he may attempt to obtain munitions from the Turks to be used against the Idrisi.

Mahmoud Nedim stayed here about a week, after which he proceeded to Tripoli, where he stayed for some time with a certain Mustafa Pasha Inja. From Tripoli he was to proceed via Homs and Hama to Aleppo and thence to Angora.

I recently had a talk with Commandant Dentz, the chief of the French Intelligence Service, who had, when Mahmoud Nedim Bey was here, mentioned to me that he had failed to see him. He told me that his arrival had coincided with that of a Turkish officer, whom, however, he had not seen, who had come from Ibn Saud. Commandant Dentz believes that the Turks are taking an increased interest in the Arab countries, and that these visits are symptomatic of that interest. He referred in this connection to the journey of Ahmed Senussi to join Ibn Saud, and said that, while he did not believe the Turks had actually sent him on a mission, it seemed likely that they were killing two birds with one stone in that they were able to get rid of a tiresome guest and at the same time to use him for liaison purposes with Ibn Saud.

I have, &c.

H. E. SATOW.



[E 2025/10/91]

No. 47.

*Note Communicated by the Marquess della Toretta, March 31.*  
(Translation.)

THE Legation of the Hedjaz at Rome have addressed to the Italian Embassy for Foreign Affairs a note in which they demand the recognition by the Italian Government of the blockade of the coast from Rabig to Confeda and El Leit proclaimed by the Hashimite Government. The Legation state that the blockade must be considered effective since the Hedjaz have equipped, for that purpose, three steamships of large tonnage and ten other vessels of smaller size. According to the said Legation the effectiveness of the blockade has been proved by recent captures of Eritrean sambuks.

The Italian Embassy would be glad to learn (1) whether the British Government intend to persist in the non-recognition of the blockade despite the measures which the Hashimite Government have taken to render it effective; (2) how the British Government propose to regard the steamships employed by the Hedjaz, which, as it appears, are manned by native crews.

*Italian Embassy, London,  
March 31, 1925.*

No. 48.

*Consul Bullard to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received April 6.)*

(No. 50.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Jeddah (via Port Sudan), April 4, 1925.*

HEDJAZ troops getting desperate for lack of pay; several deserters to the enemy lately. Unless Government can obtain large sum within a very few weeks they must admit defeat.

Road to Medina from Yanbo cut, and Yanbo threatened by Wahabis, otherwise military situation unchanged.

(Sent to India, Jerusalem, Bagdad and Bushire.)

[E 2105/10/91]

No. 49.

*Consul Bullard to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received April 7.)*

(No. 24. Secret.)

Sir,

*Jeddah, March 19, 1925.*

1 HAVE the honour to enclose a report on the situation covering the period the 12th to 19th March.

2. Copies of this despatch and of its enclosure are being sent to India, Egypt, Khartum (through Port Sudan), Jerusalem, Bagdad, Beirut (for Damascus), Aden, Singapore, Bushire, Koweit, Bahrein and Muskat.

I have, &c.

R. W. BULLARD.

Enclosure in No 49.

*Report for the Period March 12 to 19, 1925.*

(Secret.)

THE Hedjaz war command consists principally of three persons: Tahsin Pasha, the Syrian, who is Minister of War and Army Commander; a Bagdadi, General Jamil Pasha, who is attached to the King; and the King himself. As it seems no Bagdadi ever agrees with any Syrian, and as the King ticks from one side to the other with the speed and regularity of the pendulum of a clock, there is a certain lack of unity and purpose in the campaign. However, at last the die was cast for a sortie, and an attempt to occupy the Wahabis's positions and capture or destroy their guns. On the

No. 49A.

*Consul Bullard to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received April 6.)*

(No. 49.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Jeddah, April 4, 1925.*

YOUR despatch No. 14 of the 23rd February: Hedjaz Treaty.

Naji holds out to Ali hope of favourable reply from you in order to obtain money. Ali distrusts Naji, and asks whether there is real hope that His Majesty's Government will answer in the sense of second paragraph of letter to India Office enclosed in above-mentioned despatch.

I venture to think unequivocal reply should be given.



13th March the garrison kept up a fairly heavy bombardment of the Wahabis' positions for most of the day. In this they had the assistance of four heavier guns (4-5-inch) which had just arrived from Medina via Maan and Akaba. On the 14th, at 10 A.M. the Hedjaz forces moved out towards the north and north-east in four separate bodies on a front of almost 2 miles. The main attacks were against a village on the left wing and trenches in the plain on the right. The operation was a complete failure. The Wahabis had four or five machine guns in various parts of the front, and with these and rifle fire they inflicted casualties amounting in all to nearly 200 on the Hedjaz forces. The Wahabis fought, by all reports, with the greatest ferocity, and, so far as could be seen from the roofs of the town, with a good deal of science. The Hedjaz troops appeared to have no heart for the work, and this is borne out by the fact that a high proportion of the wounds received are in the discreet rather than the valiant portions of the body, viz., the back and buttocks. The heaviest casualties were suffered by the remnants of King Hussein's regular army, which consist of "Hedjazis" (cultivators from the country between Mecca and Taif) and "Yemenis" (men of Yemen stock, though mostly born in the Hedjaz; they came under machine-gun fire from the village. The Palestinians, who were supported by armoured cars, behaved very warily. A few days before the battle a few hundred "scallywags" from the bazaar were recruited at £2 a month, and given old rifles. A large proportion of them were boys of 14 and under. These troops took no prominent part in the battle.

The two new Italian armoured cars were hardly more successful than the protected lorries obtained from Germany. One never got far beyond the wire, though whether the breakdown was in the machinery or in the German who was driving it has not been discovered. The other went out at a good pace, but came back as quickly with several holes in the armour, the driver wounded in the neck, and the officer commanding armoured cars with a piece of the plating in a bullet wound in his leg.

This failure, which was anticipated by everyone else, was a heavy blow to the war command, who now appear to realise that they would need more and better men to drive the Wahabis back. But, as they are desperate and as they can always leave for a safer place in case of disaster, there may be something in the rumour that they propose to make another attack. The attack of the 14th has done nothing but dishearten the defence and (doubtless) strengthen Ibn Saud's determination to hold on until Jeddah surrenders.

2. All the news from Yambo is, from the point of view of the Hedjaz Government, bad. There are considerable Wahabi forces near the town, and they seem to have been successful in a skirmish of some importance; the Governor is clamouring for reinforcements from Jeddah; and the Sharif Shakir is afraid (probably with good reason) to distribute rifles to the Bedouin, who profess to be anxious to support him against the Wahabis.

There are stories that Medina too is in a bad way. I cannot confirm them, but they are reasonable, and the King is certainly anxious about Medina. They are to the effect that the army, being months in arrear with its pay (this is a fact), is entirely unreliable, and that the population, knowing this, want Aly to withdraw the army, so that its futile resistance may not anger the Wahabis.

3. Failing another windfall, such as King Hussein's contribution of £10,000, the Hedjaz treasury will be empty in a few days, when pay-day comes. The authorities are now requisitioning goods which they propose to sell to obtain money for their most urgent requirements. They have included foreigners in their demand (most of them Indians and Persians), but, on being warned by the consular corps, have refrained from the use of force against our nationals. They are now arguing the point, with the assistance of an Arabic book on international law which they have just obtained from Egypt. Unfortunately for them the book does not say anything about countries which, like the Hedjaz, are still subject to "Capitulations." Nor is there any well-known parallel to the political situation here, where the population has long been opposed to further resistance, and the Government relies on an army which is composed mainly of foreigners. This latter argument cannot be used against the Hedjaz Government, but it strengthens our resolve to use all legitimate means to protect our nationals from requisitions by a Government which it seems must cease to exist very soon.

R. W. BULLARD, Agent and Consul.



No. 50.

*Mr. Austen Chamberlain to Consul Bullard (Jeddah).*

(No. 21.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, April 7, 1925.*

YOUR telegram No. 49 of 4th April: Anglo-Hashimite Treaty negotiations.

You may inform Emir Ali that so long as present unsettled conditions in the Hedjaz continue, there can be no question whatever of His Majesty's Government reopening negotiations for a treaty with the Hedjaz.

[E 2219/2219/91]

No. 51.

*Consul Bullard to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received April 15.)*

(No. 25.)

Sir,

*Jeddah, March 27, 1925.*

I HAVE the honour to send herewith copies of correspondence between the Hedjaz Government and the foreign representatives in Jeddah, on the subject of a forced loan to which the Hedjaz Government desire foreigners as well as local subjects to subscribe.

2. About a week before the Foreign Secretary's letter of the 21st March was written, I heard that the British-Indian commercial community had been summoned by a Hedjaz official and told that they were expected to hand over about 1,500 bags of food-stuffs to the Government, and that they had been threatened with vague penalties to be applied in case of refusal. I consulted my colleagues, several of whom had received similar reports about their own nationals, and at the request of the Consular Corps I saw the Foreign Secretary and said that, in our opinion, such levies could not be applied to foreigners in the Hedjaz. He said that there was no question of compulsion; foreigners were being "invited" to subscribe to the loan the Government wished to raise. A few days later, Sheikh Fuad told me that great pressure was being brought to bear on him to allow goods to be requisitioned from foreigners, and that he was writing the Consular Corps a letter which had quieted the extremists for the moment. He told me confidentially—not for my colleagues' information—that it would make his position much easier if we would couple with the refusal which it would doubtless be necessary for us to send, a promise to transmit the Hedjaz Government's request to our respective Governments.

2. The reply to the Secretary for Foreign Affairs, of which a copy is attached, was drafted by me and approved by all my colleagues except the Soviet agent. M. Khakimov explained that he could not plead the Capitulations, as the Soviet Government had agreed to their abolition in all other countries, and that he proposed to reply that he was telegraphing to his Government for instructions. He added that even if there were no Capitulations, the Hedjaz Government's demand was unacceptable—an opinion which the rest of the corps were not prepared to endorse without further examination.

3. If you approve the contention that the Capitulations protect British subjects from war levies, an awkward situation will be avoided. If there were no Capitulations and the Hedjaz Government requisitioned a few thousand bags of food-stuffs from foreigners against a written promise to pay for the goods within a short period, we should perhaps not have a strong legal ground for objecting, though, as the import trade has stopped, we should be justified in asking that the drafts should be good against the general revenues of the country. But the—probably unprecedented—conditions prevailing here make it desirable to resist the proposed levy by all reasonable means. Repayment obviously depends on King Ali's victory; the Hedjaz Government has no regular revenue at present and will not have any again unless it defeats the Wahabis and recovers at least Mecca. If Ibn Saud wins, the Hedjaz Government ceases to exist. Moreover, the people who are pressing for the levy are mainly the Syrian adventurers, who, with their foreign troops, are masters here, and who can and probably will, decamp when the merchants here have been squeezed of all the cash and goods that can be got out of them and the Wahabis have been infuriated against the population of Jeddah by the long resistance.

4. A copy of this letter is being sent to the Government of India.

I have, &amp;c.

R. W. BULLARD.

Enclosure 1 in No. 51.

*Translation of a Circular Letter addressed by the Hedjaz Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Foreign Representatives in Jeddah, on Sha'ban 25, 1343 (March 21, 1925).*

I HAVE the honour to inform your Excellency that the commission charged with the task of levying the temporary internal loan for the military needs of the country has again [*sic*] drawn my attention to the fact that certain (foreign) subjects, who have been resident in the Hedjaz for a long time, are hesitating to assist the country from which they have profited, in the belief that this loan does not legally apply to them. I have, therefore, thought it necessary to explain to you, before taking any action, the view the Hedjaz Government takes in this respect:—

1. The British and American theories agree that the neutral has certain obligations towards the belligerent country which harbours him and in which he has his interests, so long as he does not choose to leave it. Germany asked, at the second Hague Conference, that the enrolment of neutrals in armed forces should be forbidden, but even this demand was rejected, and it was decided that the military obligations relating to foreigners should be regulated by special treaties.

2. There is nothing in international law to prevent the levying of all kinds of taxes on neutrals (in the same way) as they are levied on (local) subjects who are exempted from military service; for the right to levy taxes does not necessarily postulate a bond of loyalty between the individuals and the State levying (the tax): it is a right based on the connection between the property and the State, or on the fact that the owner is established in the country in question. This was the reason underlying the refusal of the German demand at the second Hague Conference that the levying of war taxes on the subjects of neutral States should be prohibited.

This is the legal view of the question of defence and taxes. Nevertheless, the commission charged with the levying of this temporary internal loan desired to be conciliatory, and decided, in exercise of the Government's legal right, that a temporary loan and not a definite tax or troops for defence should be asked for, and that both natives of the country and other residents should participate in it, on the following grounds:—

- (a.) There is no legal objection to the employment of the method of a loan—even of a forced loan—by a belligerent.
- (b.) It is impossible to raise objections against a belligerent for refusing to exempt neutral foreigners unless there exists a treaty providing for such exemption.
- (c.) Such a loan is legal if it is just in its incidence and no distinction is made between local and foreign subjects.

Your Excellency will see from this that the attitude of the Hedjaz Government in this respect is incontestably correct in law; but, in view of the state of friendship existing between them and the Great Powers, who have under their protection subjects residing in the Hedjaz, the Hedjaz authorities have contented themselves with using some of the obvious rights they have in this respect, and the duty of the commission, which is animated with the utmost generosity and benevolence, has been limited as follows:—

- (1.) Payment by the neutral of an amount fixed according to his commercial position. Payment to be made in food-stuffs he may have in stock, at the current market price, or in cash.
- (2.) Acceptance (by the neutral) of a draft for that amount on the Department (lit. Ministry) of Taxes.
- (3.) *Gradual* repayment of the amount (to begin one month later) by means of remission of customs dues on his goods.

If your Excellency will observe two points in regard to these requisitions: first, that they are so small that the Government cannot possibly be unable to settle them at the appointed time, and, secondly, that the term is short, since payment is to be made, *gradually*, after one month; and if you will take into account what the exigencies of war permit and the definite promise of a suitable settlement, you will see that the action (proposed) is permissible according to international law. It was on that that America and Great Britain based their action in 1918, in a far greater



and more important matter, in the incident of the neutral ships the two Powers seized.

This is why the Hedjaz Government considered it necessary to place its views before you.

It is not necessary for me to point out to your Excellency how painful an impression a negative attitude on the part of the said (foreign) subjects would cause on the local subjects with whom they have lived and done business for so many years if the latter saw the foreigners in question refusing to lend their aid to so small an extent at a time so difficult—the more so as the demand is perfectly legal and legitimate.

(Compliments.)

FUAD-AL-KHATIB,  
Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Enclosure 2 in No. 51.

*Draft of Identic Letter (in Arabic) sent to the Hedjaz Minister for Foreign Affairs by the British, French, Italian, Netherlands and Persian Representatives.*

(The Russian Representative answered in a different sense.)

Minister for Foreign Affairs, Jeddah.

(After respects.)

Jeddah, March 23, 1925.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge receipt of your Excellency's letter dated the 25th Sha'ban, in which you claim for the Hedjaz Government the right to compel foreign subjects residing in the Hedjaz to contribute, either in goods or in money, to a forced loan which the Hedjaz Government proposes to raise.

I beg to inform your Excellency that it is not necessary, in my opinion, to argue the general question, as your Excellency has done, since foreign subjects in the Hedjaz are protected by the Capitulations from liability to contribute to forced loans, requisitions, &c.

In view of the importance which your Excellency appears to attach to the matter, I am forwarding to my Government a translation of your letter. I must ask your Excellency to take the necessary steps, in the meanwhile, to see that British subjects are not only not required to contribute to the forced loan, but are left in undisturbed enjoyment of all the rights and privileges to which they are entitled under the capitulatory régime now in force.

(Compliments.)

R. W. BULLARD.

[E 2352/10/91]

No. 52.

*Mr. Lindsay to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received April 20.)*

(No. 296.)

Sir,

Constantinople, April 13, 1925.

I HAVE the honour to report that Shereef Ali Haidar sent word to me through his son, Shereef Mohammed Emin, who was educated at St. Andrews University, that he wished to make a communication to me, and I received Mohammed Emin to-day. Ali Haidar's view of the situation in Arabia was that things had now come to a deadlock between Ibn Saud and Ali and that Great Britain was being blamed for the consequences. Ibn Saud had made his mistakes; he might in the early stages of his campaign have cleared up the whole situation by a vigorous attack on Jeddah immediately after the fall of Mecca, but he had not done so; now his position was becoming increasingly difficult and there was some risk that the task might be beyond his strength. Though he had in the past crushed Ibn Rashid, the latter's tribes still existed and though held down by force might take an opportunity to rise. A disappearance of Ibn Saud would remove the stable element in Arab politics and increase the welter of confusion. Ali Haidar considered that his own appearance on the scene would turn the scales in favour of Ibn Saud with whom he always had been and still was on good terms. He had already been talked of as a possible Shereef of Mecca in the future, and when Ibn Saud had occupied the

Holy Places of Islam he had stated that he would hold them not for himself, but for those to whom they should belong. Ali Haidar suggested that if he now put himself actively forward in conjunction with Ibn Saud he might receive British help, the form of which, however, was not defined. His suggestion was made, as Mohammed Emin frankly admitted, in his own interests, but still more in the interests of his race and of his religion. It was not less to the interest of Great Britain, with her numerous Moslem subjects, to see the situation in Arabia cleared up quickly, which could now best be done in the manner he proposed.

2. I replied that His Majesty's Government were often unjustly accused of intervention in Moslem affairs and always blamed, also unjustly, whatever it was that went wrong. They had decided that, though they desired on behalf of their Moslem subjects that the Holy Places should be opened to pilgrims, the best course they could take was to remain completely outside all struggles in progress and they had adopted an attitude of the most complete non-intervention in the whole question. It seemed to me the wisest policy they could adopt and I saw no chance of their departing from it in the future. I begged Mohammed Emin to present my compliments to his father, but could give no other answer than the above to his suggestion.

3. It is impossible to help speculating whether Ali Haidar's present action is taken at the instigation or with the cognisance of the Turkish authorities, but I have no justification for suggesting that it was or was not. Mohammed Emin told me that his elder brother, Shereef Abdul Mejid, lives now at Beirut and is deeply immersed in Arab politics.

4. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's High Commissioner for Egypt and to His Majesty's consul-general at Beirut.

I have, &c.

R. C. LINDSAY.

[E 2219/2219/91]

No. 53

*Foreign Office to Consul Bullard (Jeddah).*

(No. 50.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, April 22, 1925.

WITH reference to your despatch No. 25 of the 27th March, relative to the proposal of the Hedjaz Government to levy a forced loan from the subjects of foreign Powers resident in the Hedjaz, I am directed by Mr. Secretary Chamberlain to inform you that he approves the action taken by you in this matter, and considers it desirable in existing circumstances to resist the attempt of the Hedjaz Government to impose a forced loan upon British subjects, since the British claim to the existence of the Capitulations affords a sufficiently strong ground for adopting this attitude.

2. Mr. Chamberlain is advised that if British subjects did not enjoy capitulatory rights in the Hedjaz, the claim of the Hashimite Government could not be resisted in the absence of any treaty provisions on the subject, since it cannot be disputed that foreigners who do not enjoy such a treaty right are not exempt from requisitions or forced loans made in the country where they are resident.

3. In these circumstances, you should continue to resist any attempts by the Hashimite Government to compel British subjects to subscribe to a loan.

I am, &c.

LANCELOT OLIPHANT.

No. 54.

*Consul Bullard to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received April 23.)*

(No. 59.)

(Telegraphic.)

Jeddah, April 22, 1925.

SOVIET representative just visited Mecca with consent of both sides nominally as a private person and pilgrim. Native vice-consul of Dutch Government there at the same time assisting Dutch pilgrims. There is some ground for believing Khakimov tried to enlist [? Ibn Saud's] sympathy with Bolshevik Eastern policy, but failed completely.

Dutch consul has information that at Mecca Khakimov engaged publicly in violent propaganda, partly against Dutch Government, but mainly against His

[13651]



Majesty's Government. My colleague, though by no means alarmist, regards news as most serious. He is writing to his Government. He cannot give me full information, as it was obtained confidentially. He tells me strictly confidentially that he is urging his Government to communicate information to His Majesty's Government.

No. 55.

*Consul Bullard to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received April 24.)*

(No. 60.)

(Telegraphic.)

Jeddah, April 23, 1925.

THROUGH secret channel I have received letter from Ibn Saud, in which he states, for the information of His Majesty's Government, that he has never closed the door against peace. This is ostensibly prompted by recent visit of Soviet, Persian and Netherlands representatives, who all, he says, referred privately to question of peace. Minister for Foreign Affairs told me in confidence that he has received most conciliatory letter from Ibn Saud, who asks to see him, saying that he wants certain explanations and to know what guarantees of peace could be given; latter, of course, means how could King Hussein be chained and muzzled.

Interview is to take place shortly.

(Repeated to India.)

[E 2315/10/91]

No. 56.

*Mr. Austen Chamberlain to the Marquess della Torretta.*

Your Excellency,

Foreign Office, April 24, 1925.

IN reply to your note of the 31st March, relative to a request of the Hedjaz Legation at Rome for the recognition by the Italian Government of a blockade of a certain portion of the Red Sea coasts, which is stated to have been proclaimed by the Hashimite Government, I have the honour to inform your Excellency that His Majesty's Government have decided to adhere to the non-recognition of this "blockade" on the ground that it is not effective.

2. The information which I have just received from Jeddah shows that at no period have more than two Hashimite steamers been employed on blockading duties, and that for long periods those steamers have either remained at Jeddah or have been engaged on other business. The armed dhows employed by the Hashimite Government are believed to number no more than three or four.

3. In these circumstances His Majesty's Government propose not to recognise the blockade and to ignore the activities of the Hashimite steamships so long as they are not directed against ships or dhows flying the British flag.

I have, &c.

AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN.

[E 2434/10/91]

No. 57.

*Consul Bullard to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received April 27.)*

(No. 31. Secret.)

Sir,

Jeddah, April 11, 1925.

I HAVE the honour to enclose a report on the situation covering the period the 20th March to the 11th April.

2. Copies of this despatch and of its enclosure are being sent to India, Egypt, Khartum (through Port Sudan), Jerusalem, Bagdad, Beirut (for Damascus), Aden, Singapore, Bushire, Koweit, Bahrein and Muskat.

I have, &c.

R. W. BULLARD.

Enclosure in No. 57.

*Report for the Period March 20-April 11, 1925.*

(Secret.)

RAMADAN has confirmed the lull in hostilities. A few shells are fired morning and evening, and that is all. The Wahabis' shelling is reduced to a few shots daily at the Hedjaz guns and barracks. Occasionally a shell falls into the town, but that is now very rare. The Hedjaz troops are free to fast and many of the men are taking advantage of the permission. It is believed that all the Wahabis are fasting.

On the 23rd March the two Italian cars were sent out and for several hours there was much machine-gun and rifle fire. The Hedjaz Government report at least 300 enemy casualties at a cost of six wounded on this side. Why a performance so simple and so effective is not repeated several times a day is not explained. Perhaps it is realised that such operations are governed by the law of diminishing returns.

One of these cars has since had a Wahabi shell through it and all the crew wounded except one, who was killed. This was in a fierce attack they made on five Javanese pilgrims, whom they took for Wahabis. They fired many rounds at the pilgrims from their machine guns, but without hitting any of them.

The soldiers who were recruited at Amman are protesting so loudly at being kept over two months in arrear with their pay that the Government are becoming seriously alarmed. They have been obliged to allow thirty-five Egyptians and Palestinians to leave for home. This will encourage all the other foreign recruits to demand their release. Most of them seem prepared to cut their losses if they can only get away.

Private individuals can pass between Yambo and Medina, but the road is cut against the Hedjaz Government. Yambo might fall into the Wahabis' hands at any time.

2. The Italian consul says he has received orders from M. Mussolini to assure all his colleagues that he is much annoyed to hear that munitions have been landed at Jeddah from an Italian steamer and that if the munitions are Italian they must have been smuggled out of Italy. The Italian consul states that the captain must have made false declarations: the ship's papers gave the cargo as timber only.

The three Germans are still here, though, as they are being paid in drafts on a person in Egypt who is unlikely to honour them, they may not be here much longer. Willi Beirsdorff of Berlin is adviser on fortifications and teaches the use of flame-throwers; Karl Schultz is artillery expert; and Fritz Bensener [?], an Australian-born German, has been driver of the King's car and of one of the Italian armoured cars since the Palestinian who formerly drove them was wounded in the attack of the 14th March.

I ought to have corrected before this the report I mentioned some time ago, that the flame-throwers which were being used here were among the stocks of munitions left behind by the Turks. The flame-throwers (forty in number) came from Germany with the protected lorries. They are, however, at present useless, because the necessary oxygen was not sent with them.

3. The Hedjaz steamer "Rushdi" recently seized three dhows which were flying the Italian flag and brought them to Jeddah, where the authorities discharged the cargo. It seems that the goods, which were the property of Jeddah merchants, were being taken from Kufudah to Lith, whence they were to go to Mecca by land. The Italian consul secured the immediate release of the dhows, and, on instructions from his Government, the return of the goods also.

The manner in which the capture was effected only serves to show how ineffective the blockade is. The Director of Customs, who was recently given a visa for Massaua, learned on his arrival there of the approaching departure of the three dhows and telegraphed the news to the Government here in cypher, and the "Rushdi," which would otherwise have been wandering about ineffectively, was sent down with the certainty of catching them.

4. The cutting of the cable by the Wahabis, which was reported some weeks ago, has hampered communications badly. The agency has been able to send and receive telegrams through H.M.S. "Clematis," but the local authorities, who were dependent on their own wireless, have had great difficulties. Stimulated by the King's complaints, the quarantine doctor went out and fished up the cable at a point some two or three miles from the shore, and an office communicating with Port Sudan has been established in a dhow. For this service the doctor has been



made a major-general, and it is confidently supposed that if he completes his triumph by connecting the cable with the town he will find a marshal's baton in his pill boxes.

For several weeks it has seemed probable that there would be some warning before any serious change in the situation occurred, and H.M.S. "Clematis" might have left but for the possibility that we might be cut off from all communication with the outside world at a critical moment if dependent entirely on the unreliable local wireless. The repair of the cable releases the sloop by re-establishing quick and accurate communication with Port Sudan.

5. The few supporters Ali has have been spreading tales of the speedy conclusion of a Hedjaz loan—in Italy, in England or in Egypt, secured on the customs revenue, on Ali's property in Egypt, or on his wife's castles in Spain. Ali has an ingenuous mind in business matters, and the knave who represents the Hedjaz in Cairo seems to have been deceiving him with absurd promises. Ali has told various people that Hussein is doing his best to send money. Perhaps the gold which Hussein recently hired a British steamer to take from Akaba to Suez, for deposit in a bank, was simply wrongly addressed.

The loan story has thinned down to a proposal, made to Messrs. Gellatly, Hankey and Co.'s agent in Jeddah by the new major-general, that that firm should establish a bank in Jeddah with a capital of £20,000 or more. The essence of the proposal is that the capital of the bank should be at the Hedjaz Government's disposal. The security would be the customs and quarantine dues, which, of course, cannot bring in any revenue to speak of until the war is over.

6. The Javanese pilgrims in Mecca having written to the Netherlands consul in Jeddah to say that they wished to leave the country, the consul wrote to Ibn Saud, with the grudging permission of the Hedjaz Government, asking him to send them down. After a few days' delay, during which he was making the necessary arrangements, Ibn Saud replied that he would send them down in batches of a hundred. The first two batches have arrived.

According to our records there must be in Mecca (or Medina, for some are believed to have gone there) over 100 pilgrims from British Malaya. Most of these stated last year that they intended to remain for several years and wished the value of the return half of their tickets to be refunded to their next of kin; a few asked that their tickets should be kept until after the 1925 pilgrimage, when they proposed to return home. No news has been received from Mecca lately about these pilgrims. Some twenty Malays have arrived here within the last few weeks, mainly from Medina. Of these only three or four are registered at this agency, and only one or two want to go home. The rest propose to stay until after the pilgrimage, though they have no money except what they obtain by begging in the streets.

7. The chief points in the reports about Mecca made by the Javanese pilgrims are these: Food is scarce and very dear. Order is pretty well maintained, though there are only a few score Wahabis in Mecca. The Senussi lives very quietly and offers no opinion on the situation; he refers all inquirers to Allah, the All-wise and All-knowing. There is nothing in his action at present to support the story current in Egypt that Ibn Saud has made him or intends to make him ruler of Mecca.

Some of the pilgrims have brought with them coins—half and quarter piastres—struck by Ibn Saud—presumably in the mint of which Hussein was so proud. They appear to be old coins which have been covered with a thin coating of some white metal and re-struck. On one side is Ibn Saud's name; on the other: "Minted in Umm-al-Kura" (i.e., Mecca).

8. There is some hope that we have heard the last of Major "Ibrahim" Depui. But for his former chief's mistaken idea of loyalty he would probably have been withdrawn long ago for corruption and other offences. The new French consul acted very promptly. He secured Major Depui's withdrawal to Jibuti for embarrassing him by spending all day prowling about the Hedjaz defences, and hopes to secure himself against Depui's return by reporting on his general reputation here and by pointing out to the French Government that the journey to Mecca, for which Depui has always charged them £40, costs £4 or £5.

9. Dr. Naji-al-Asil continues to try to coax money out of Ali on the ground that there is a good chance of getting the Anglo-Hedjaz Treaty through. A recent telegram of his, which the King has shown me, says: "I beg your Majesty to send me what you can. The political fate of the country is in your Majesty's hands." He ought not to be quite penniless, for King Hussein gave him altogether £15,000, and, expensive as his tastes are, that should last him more than three years.

The other Hedjaz diplomat, "Prince" Habib Lutfallah, seems to have gone to America (without the knowledge of the Government he is supposed to represent), and there to have effected a most suitable marriage with the press. The first of the offspring, an article in the "New York Times," is worthy of its parents. The subject is Arab unity, which, it is stated, would be perfect but for the interference of European Powers. The article refers to the Phœnicians, the Arabs in Spain, the Princes of Antioch, whom Habib has adopted as his ancestors, and other characters of mythology, but does not refer to the Wahabis.

Both Naji and Habib must look to their laurels. A Hedjaz merchant, Abbas Fakih, who helped in the purchase of munitions in Italy, has been trying to dabble in international negotiations. He approached one of my employees with proposals for an Anglo-Hedjaz treaty. The terms were simple: His Majesty's Government would help the Hedjaz in exchange for concessions; and the Hedjaz Government would abolish slavery within five years by purchasing the slaves—with money provided by His Majesty's Government. It is supposed that Abbas Fakih's thoughts have been turned towards diplomacy by pride in his social accomplishments: one of these, which a colleague of mine saw him practising in the first-class dining saloon of a steamer, is to show how a Turkish pasha eructates after meals. His imitation is said even to surpass the original.

10. M. Khakimov, the Soviet agent in Jeddah, is paying a visit to Mecca, nominally in the private capacity of a Moslem desirous of performing the minor pilgrimage. As he scoffs openly at the Moslem religion, one may suppose that his visit is not prompted by piety alone. He is taking with him a young Persian, the son of a merchant, who is at present in charge of Persian interests. This boy is completely in M. Khakimov's pocket, and repeats all the Bolshevik cant about Persia having been saved by the noble Soviet Government from the imperialistic claws of Great Britain. They had some little difficulty in getting permission from the Hedjaz Government, but Ibn Saud replied to their application in a few hours, giving them permission to go to Mecca.

April 11.—The post being delayed it is possible to add a few more items of news.

The Netherlands consul has sent his Javanese vice-consul to Mecca to expedite the departure of pilgrims.

With the Javanese pilgrims from Mecca have appeared forty or fifty pilgrims who say they are from British Malaya. Only about eight have passports. Some of the others have return tickets, some have not even a ticket. Most of them are penniless. Many are students who have been living on charity for years.

My Netherlands colleague tells me in confidence that seven aeroplanes and some tanks (real tanks, not armoured cars) are awaiting shipment for Jeddah at Hamburg. They would have been shipped on a Dutch steamer but for my colleague's intervention. The shipping company acceded to the Netherlands Government's request and refused to carry the goods.

I understand that three airmen are being engaged. They are believed to be Germans.

I have now seen one of the coins struck by Ibn Saud in Mecca. It is significant enough that he should strike coins in Mecca in his own name, and the significance is not diminished by the nature of the design on them. His name is worked up in imitation of the tughra (cypher) which the Turkish sultans used to employ. The tughra is formed of the name "Abdul Aziz-bin-Abdul Rahman," and at the side, where "Reshad" or "Abdul Hamid" or whatever the Sultan's name was used to stand, is "Al Faisal-al-Sa'ud."

King Ali has applied to the French consul for a loan of £300,000 from France. Though he knows the proposal is absurd the consul was obliged to pass it on to his Government. As arguments for the loan the Foreign Secretary told fantastic tales of British ambitions in Arabia and the Middle East generally.

A certain Major Steffen, of the firm of Steffen and Haymann, which seems to have supplied the flame-throwers and the protected lorries, has come to Jeddah. He has been appointed by King Ali inspector and instructor in the technical services. It is not known whether this is a permanent appointment. He speaks of leaving in a fortnight. It is possible that his business is simply to report on the technical services—and to book orders for such munitions as he reports to be necessary.

R. W. BULLARD.



No. 58.

*Consul Bullard to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received April 30.)*

(No. 63.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Jeddah, April 28, 1925.*

CONVERSATIONS have been held between Ibn Saud and Hedjaz Minister for Foreign Affairs, but broke down completely. Former insists on retirement of Ali. This destroys hope of settlement before pilgrimage. Circular all addresses.

No. 59.

*Consul Bullard to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received May 9.)*

(No. 69.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Jeddah, May 8, 1925.*

GOVERNMENT of India telegram No. 489 S.

Of the four points, viz., the two holy cities and their natural ports, Ali holds Medina, Yenbo and Jeddah; Ibn Saud has hitherto ignored Medina; Ali is weak at Yenbo, while at Jeddah he is now, with fresh munitions, pretty strong for defence.

I am most sceptical about his plan to recover [? Rabigh], but, in warfare on this scale and largely tribal, one cannot be certain. At least twice unexpected assistance has revived Ali's cause, first, arrival of recruits from Akaba, later, receipt of money from King Hussein. Two more Germans arrived 5th May, making five, besides one gone to Germany on Hedjaz business, and if war material waiting at Hamburg, consisting of aeroplanes and, it is believed, tanks, could be shipped to Jeddah, this might have some effect on the army of Ibn Saud, which is not large. Then there are munitions of war at Suez, believed to be thousand rifles and million rounds, which only a hitch at last moment prevented from being shipped here 1st May. Ibn Saud cannot, I believe, replenish his stock of arms and ammunition. I do not think Hedjaz will get Yemen soldiers they hope for, but if they did that would be an important factor. Nearly 300 recruits arrived at Akaba 26th April. On the other hand, many here believe that, when Nejd pilgrims come to Mecca, as they will probably do in large numbers, they will force Ibn Saud to rush Jeddah whatever the cost.

I believe that in spite of advantage Ali enjoys in being able to get foreign experts and munitions of war, Ibn Saud will win if the war is left to take its course.

There are many Arab officers in Hedjaz army who would never admit that presence of pilgrims debars them from trying to recover territory they consider essential to Arab cause. Fact that pilgrims were Indian would confirm them in their attitude, since they believe Ibn Saud to have been encouraged by Indians and resent claim of certain Indian Moslems to interfere with government of Hedjaz. King would incline to non-interference, but, as that would mean certain defeat, he might well be influenced by subordinates. He is easily led. For this reason, and also to prevent, as far as possible, indirect hindrance of measures we might consider necessary, e.g., to obtain dhows, His Majesty's Government should, I venture to think, tell Ali distinctly if they adopt Rabigh project that they cannot allow him to, even if his power to do so seems slight.

Ali would be lost if he did nothing, as his enemy foresaw when he issued his ingenious invitation. Pilgrimage, besides enhancing Ibn Saud's reputation, would fill his treasury; while Hedjaz remained without revenue Ali would have to take some desperate action or give in.

Soviet representative states that his Government abandons intention of sending pilgrims. He attributes this to conditions here. Attitude of Governments of Java and Egypt is known to His Majesty's Government.

(Sent to Simla.)

No. 60.

*Consul Bullard to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received May 14.)*

(No. 74.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Jeddah, May 14, 1925.*

HAVING come to the conclusion that blockade of Kunfudah has failed, Hedjaz Government has been considering whether they should not try to retake and hold it; this is perhaps beyond their powers, but they attribute [? delay] to non-arrival of munitions of war from Suez. The Government received telegram 13th May stating that pilgrims are leaving Bombay 16th May for Kunfudah, Lith or Rabigh; they have also seen telegram from protector of pilgrimage, referred to in my immediately preceding telegram, as it was *en clair*. Minister for Foreign Affairs asked what would be attitude of His Majesty's Government if his Government tried to carry out above-mentioned or similar plan and British subjects were hurt incidentally. I said that I could not say anything which might be taken as binding His Majesty's Government. Hedjaz must interpret its rights as combatant, His Majesty's Government theirs as neutral. Minister for Foreign Affairs took this, I think, as a warning. I gather that cleavage of opinion foreshadowed in my telegram No. 69 is already apparent.

(Sent to India.)

[E 2879/10/91]

No. 61.

*Consul Bullard to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received May 18.)*

(No. 39. Secret.)

Sir,

*Jeddah, April 30, 1925.*

I HAVE the honour to enclose a report on the situation covering the period the 12th to 30th April.

2. Copies of this despatch and of its enclosure are being sent to India, Egypt, Khartum (through Port Sudan), Jerusalem, Bagdad, Beirut (for Damascus), Aden, Singapore, Bushire, Koweit, Bahrein and Muskat.

I have, &amp;c.

R. W. BULLARD.

Enclosure in No. 61

*Report for the Period April 12-30, 1925.*

(Secret.)

SHEIKH FUAD, the Hedjaz Foreign Secretary, has paid a visit to Ibn Saud to talk about peace, and has returned unsuccessful. The suggestion for the meeting probably came from Sheikh Fuad, though the Hedjaz Government attribute it publicly to Ibn Saud. All hope of agreement was wrecked on the old rock: Ibn Saud wants to secure himself against the Hussein family so far as the Hedjaz is concerned, and he therefore still insists on Ali's retirement. The King and Sheikh Fuad are disappointed, but the Syrian adventurers, who are disguised as generals and what not, profess to be pleased, and to be longing for battle; they have talked valiantly all through Ramadan of the attack they would make after the feast. It is supposed that Ibn Saud feels quite strong enough to contain the Hedjaz force until the end of June, when the hordes of Nejd will come to the pilgrimage for the first time for some years and enough men could perhaps be found to attempt an assault on Jeddah.

It seems almost certain that there can be no decision, either by agreement or by battle, in time for pilgrims to go to Mecca through Jeddah for this pilgrimage.

2. Yambo is as it was—not safe, but still under the Hedjaz Government. Wejh seems to have been lost, or at least all the country round has gone. Possibly all that has happened is that the local tribe, the Billi, have gone over to Ibn Saud, and that no considerable body of Wahabis has reached Wejh, but the information received here is scanty.

3. The German, Steffen, is still here, but proposes to leave soon. He is enquiring unobtrusively about ways of getting to Hodeidah—doubtless hoping to sell arms to the Imam. He told me after his inspection of the Hedjaz war material that if the Hedjaz Government spent some £200,000 on aeroplanes, tanks, &c., they might do

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something, but—alas!—they had not the money. Before he formed the plan to go to Hodeidah he was thinking of paying a visit to Hussein at Akaba—not because Hussein holds the purse-strings, but out of pure admiration for the character of that grand old maniac. M. Steffen called on me to impart many pieces of information, especially the news that the export of arms from Germany is absolutely impossible. M. Steffen is a keen business man, but as a liar much too eager. To the knowledge of most people here he has already exported from Germany to this country flame-throwers and machine guns and ammunition, and has bombing aeroplanes and other war material awaiting shipment to Jeddah at Hamburg.

4. The departure of over thirty Palestinian and Egyptian soldiers stimulated many others to demand their release. Fearing that they would lose the backbone of their army, the military authorities caused several men whom they detected visiting this agency to be beaten and sent to Yambo and Wejh. In answer to private remonstrances at this method of dealing with legitimate grievances, Ali assures me that the beating was inflicted without his knowledge, and that he has issued strict orders against the beating of soldiers in such cases in future. What effect this treatment by itself would have had cannot be judged, for at that moment a contribution of £20,000 arrived from Hussein, and the troops were made tolerably happy by the issue of a month's pay.

The detention as soldiers of foreigners who have no written contract and who wish to leave because their pay is several months in arrears has made it necessary to apply to His Majesty's Government again for instructions. The letter had hardly been posted when a batch of over 200 more recruits arrived from Akaba—most of them Palestinians.

There is reason to believe that the rumour reported some time ago, that the Hedjaz Government were trying to recruit men from territories near Aden, was well founded. The recruiting agent seems to have been one Ahmad Sakka, who went to Aden with several thousand pounds for the purpose. The Foreign Secretary complained to one of my colleagues that they could have secured thousands of Hadhrami recruits if His Majesty's Government had not interfered.

5. No staple food-stuffs have been imported into Jeddah for some months, merchants having been discouraged by the requisitioning of considerable quantities, without any security for payment, for the army. It is calculated that the existing stocks of flour will last only about a month. There will still remain large stocks of rice, but the local people are not used to a diet of rice and will not take to it gladly.

6. The Foreign Secretary professes to hope that troops may now be obtained from the Yemen. He boasts that the Imam has written Ali a most friendly letter offering an alliance. He has shown me a letter which is certainly sealed with the Imam's seal, but the only part I was allowed to read was a non-committal statement about excluding foreign influence and "European education," and applying the Shara' Law. The Imam's motive is probably to allay any suspicions Ali may have while the Idrisi is being dealt with.

7. Permission to enter India having been received from the Government of India, the three men whom the Hedjaz Government had selected as a deputation left for Aden on the 18th April on their way to Bombay. They are:—

Sayyid Tahir Dabbagh, formerly clerk in the Finance Department. He became Minister of Finance on Hussein's fall, but resigned on his departure for India.

Ahmad Ghazzawi, chief clerk to the Prime Minister.

Al Taib-al-Sasi, who in Hussein's time was assistant editor of the "Kibla."

It is understood that they are not going as an official delegation; their object is rather secret, or at any rate unobtrusive, propaganda. They have with them £6,000—ostensibly for the purchase of food-stuffs for the Hedjaz army.

8. The seizure of a Kamaran dhow at Hali by Hedjaz armed craft raised the question of the status of Kamaran. The Hedjaz Government have placed the dhow and the cargo at the disposal of this agency, and a member of the crew, who all decamped at the time of seizure, is on the way to Jeddah to take delivery of them. Meanwhile, His Majesty's Government have agreed that for the purposes of the blockade Kamaran dhows should be regarded as though they were British.

9. The Soviet and Persian representatives returned after spending five or six days in Mecca. With M. Khakimov the reaction after this prolonged period of piety was very severe; he drank steadily for twenty-four hours and was more or less unconscious for forty-eight. He does not seem to have been very successful with Ibn Saud.

The Netherlands vice-consul, Sheikh Pravira, was allowed to move about freely in Mecca, but M. Khakimov and Ahmad Lari, the acting Persian consul, were given Wahabi attendants without whom they were not supposed to go anywhere; they evaded the attendants on one occasion and paid a secret visit to the Senussi, to the great indignation of Ibn Saud's representative in Mecca.

In Ibn Saud's camp M. Khakimov was taken at his own valuation as a private person and addressed by Ibn Saud and others as Sheikh Kerim. He does not seem to have commanded respect, for one of Ibn Saud's chief men, Damluji, asked Sheikh Pravira in full assembly, and so loudly that M. Khakimov could not fail to hear, how he could bring himself to travel with "this miner who pretended to be a consul-general." As to his politics: At a dinner given to the three consular representatives Ibn Saud went out of his way to say very emphatically that for himself he had no quarrel whatever with the European Powers, from whom, indeed, he thought there was much to be learned.

There is good reason to believe that M. Khakimov publicly engaged in violent propaganda against the "imperialistic" Powers, especially His Majesty's Government.

10. There are many matters concerning British subjects in Mecca that need attention, and I am hoping to be able to send a capable Indian clerk to Mecca in a few days to deal with them. It is a little difficult to satisfy the wants of all those who look to His Majesty's Government for protection. Many British Malays are coming to Jeddah because they cannot bear life in Mecca any longer and want to go home, but when, with some difficulty, I obtained permission for fifteen Malays who had drifted down via Medina to return to Mecca to fetch their luggage and return tickets, all but two or three decided to stay there. Several Indian merchants have returned to Mecca via Mazawwa, and several others have applied to me to get them permission to go to Mecca through the opposing lines. At the same time I receive a letter signed by several Indians in Mecca demanding free passages for themselves and their families from Mecca to India, immediately; one of the signatories is a prosperous merchant who was in Jeddah last autumn as a refugee from Taif, and insisted on returning to Mecca just before the road was cut, while another is a professional beggar who has frequently tried to get a free passage home though quite able to pay for it himself. It is suggestive that this letter, which is peremptory in tone, was brought to Jeddah by M. Khakimov.

It has been found possible to send to Mecca a draft for the payment of certain Malay and other pensioners who draw their money through this agency.

11. Ibn Saud's proclamation (referred to in Jeddah despatch No. 21, dated the 11th March) inviting pilgrims to come to Mecca via Kunfidah and other small ports, was probably meant to throw into relief Ali's policy of blocking the main route rather than as a serious proposal, but it seems to have been taken seriously in India, and the Moslem press is demanding that it should be acted on. But the matter cannot be settled by simply deciding whether pilgrim ships may land their passengers at Kunfidah, Rabigh or Lith instead of Jeddah. To handle a large number of pilgrims in a short time requires an elaborate organisation, and a breakdown or even a slight hitch or inadequacy in this organisation may mean great hardship and even death to many pilgrims.

12. For the 1926 pilgrim season there should be two measures in force which should make things easier for British pilgrims and more difficult for the parasites who prey on them. The scheme requiring all Indian pilgrims to deposit in India the cost of their return journey has been sanctioned by law; and for pilgrims from the Straits Settlements passports are to be compulsory. The obligation on people leaving Malayan ports for Jeddah to take out a passport will not only help the ordinary pilgrim, but will discourage such people as try—sometimes, it appears, with success—to export Chinese and other women through Singapore under the guise of pilgrims, for sale as slaves in the Hedjaz.

13. In one respect Ibn Saud has proved himself to be more enlightened than Hussein. At the request of the Netherlands vice-consul he had a Javanese girl released who had been kept as a slave in Mecca for several years. Hussein promised most solemnly, a year ago, to have her set free, but connived at her re-enslavement. Ibn Saud showed that he was in favour of slavery as an institution, but agreed that, according to the Shara', a girl born a Moslem could not legally be held in slavery.

14. The Egyptian who was promoted to lieutenant-general (and Pasha) for fishing up the cable can hardly express his indignation at the dishonesty of his predecessor in the office of Director of Quarantine, the Turk, Thabit, who has retired



to Egypt with a very pretty fortune. His own methods are very different; he is the one honest servant the King has. "Of course," he explained recently to two Europeans when in his cups, "I take my percentage on the quarantine dues; mais ça, ce n'est pas voler." It is not surprising, then, to learn that, while he agrees that pilgrims who have been quarantined at Kamaran should not go through the farce of quarantine at Jeddah, he thinks that the dues should not be reduced; the money not required to maintain the Jeddah station for emergencies would be used to establish hospitals. The larger the basis of calculation the larger the proceeds of that little percentage.

R. W. BULLARD.

[E 2672/181/91]

No. 62.

*Mr. Austen Chamberlain to M. de Fleuriau.*

Your Excellency,

*Foreign Office, May 18, 1925.*

YOUR Excellency is no doubt aware of the correspondence which I exchanged with M. de Saint-Aulaire regarding the ex-Turkish lighthouses in the Red Sea (ending with your predecessor's note of the 19th November last).

2. I understand that the French Government are anxious to arrive at an understanding with His Majesty's Government regarding the future of these lighthouses, and I desire to assure you that a friendly solution of this question, enabling the Ottoman Lighthouse Administration to resume the task of maintaining and exhibiting the lights, would give His Majesty's Government great satisfaction. With this object in view, unofficial conversations have been in progress during the last few months between the competent Departments of His Majesty's Government and representatives of the Ottoman Lighthouse Administration, which give rise to the hope that a solution satisfactory to all parties is attainable. I am, however, advised that owing to the indeterminate status of the three islands of Abu Ail, Jebel Zubeir and Jebel Teir, there are certain difficulties in the way of concluding an arrangement between His Majesty's Government and the Ottoman Lighthouse Administration on the basis proposed. The nature of these difficulties is explained in the accompanying memorandum.

3. The situation which would be produced by a strict application of the Concessions Protocol of the Treaty of Lausanne, in the manner indicated in the memorandum, is so unsatisfactory as to render essential a friendly solution of the problem by some arrangement between the French Government and His Majesty's Government. Failure to reach such an agreement would be detrimental to the interests of all parties, particularly to those of the Ottoman Lighthouse Administration, who at present are precluded from the exploitation of their concession.

4. It is to the general advantage that the lights should be maintained and exhibited with the fullest efficiency for the benefit of the shipping of all nations, but no permanent and satisfactory agreement can be reached between His Majesty's Government and the Lighthouse Administration so long as His Majesty's Government are merely in occupation of the three islands and the sovereignty remains indeterminate.

5. The most satisfactory solution would, in my opinion, be an arrangement between His Majesty's Government and the French Government, to which other interested Powers would be invited to become parties, by which the sovereignty of the islands would be vested in His Britannic Majesty, the upkeep of the lights would be vested in the Lighthouse Administration on reasonable terms for the duration of their concession, and light dues would be levied on shipping which benefits by the lights.

6. As regards the Mocha Light, the position is, of course, different, that lighthouse being situated within the territory of the Imam of the Yemen. His Majesty's Government will, however, undertake to use every endeavour to arrange with that ruler for the re-exhibition of the light by the Ottoman Lighthouse Administration.

7. I am confident that the French Government will realise how greatly it is to the interest of all parties that the present anomalous situation should be terminated at an early date; and I hope therefore to learn from your Excellency that the above proposals meet with their acceptance.

I have, &c.

AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN.

Enclosure in No. 62.

*Memorandum on Red Sea Lighthouses.*

UNDER article 16 of the Treaty of Lausanne, Turkey renounced the sovereignty over the territories and islands situated outside the frontiers laid down in the treaty, the future of these territories and islands being settled, or to be settled, by the parties concerned. The three islands in the Red Sea, on which these lighthouses were erected, are covered by this clause. Turkish sovereignty has been renounced, but no arrangement has been come to between the parties concerned as regards their future.

2. The three lighthouses in the Red Sea were erected as the result of the agreement between the Turkish Government and the Ottoman Lighthouse Administration of the 8th May, 1899. Under that agreement the lighthouses were built for and at the expense of the Turkish Government, and, therefore, became the property of that Government and so remained up till the moment of the ratification by Turkey of the Treaty of Lausanne.

3. Under article 60 of the treaty, Turkish Government property in detached territory passes without payment to the State in favour of which the territory was or is detached. Under this article, before Turkish State property situated in detached territory can pass, there must be a State to which the sovereignty of the detached territory passes. Consequently, until some arrangement is arrived at between "the parties concerned" in regard to the sovereignty over these three islands of Abu Ail, Jebel Zubeir and Jebel Teir, article 60 of the Treaty of Lausanne does not apply. The lighthouses, therefore, until such arrangement is made regarding the sovereignty of the islands, remain Turkish state property; but Turkey, having bound herself by article 60, cannot transfer or deal with the ownership of the lighthouses in any manner which would exclude the automatic passage of the property in the lighthouses the moment that the sovereignty of the islands is determined. It is, therefore, difficult to discover any legal basis for a permanent arrangement on the part of His Majesty's Government with the Ottoman Lighthouse Administration for the working of these lights until such time as the sovereignty over the three islands is by some appropriate act vested in His Britannic Majesty. It is true that at the present moment the islands are subject to British occupation and possession, and in virtue of such occupation His Majesty's Government would be entitled to enter into an arrangement with the Ottoman Lighthouse Administration for the duration of the occupation; but such an arrangement, which in any case could not achieve all that is desired both by His Majesty's Government and the Ottoman Lighthouse Administration, would of necessity be provisional in character and would terminate as soon as the future sovereignty of the islands is settled between the parties concerned and full effect can be given to article 60.

4. From the moment when the sovereignty of these islands is by some appropriate transaction vested in His Britannic Majesty, the property in the lighthouses will pass from the Turkish Government to the British Government. At the same moment the Concessions Protocol will come into operation, as His Majesty's Government do not maintain that the agreement between the Turkish Government and the Ottoman Lighthouse Administration of the 8th May, 1899, was not a concessionary contract. That agreement provides for the maintenance and lighting of the three lights in question. The application of the Concessions Protocol, however, in this particular case is of great difficulty and produces most unexpected results.

5. Under article 9 of that protocol His Majesty's Government would acquire the rights and obligations of Turkey as from the 8th October, 1918. The effect of article 10 of the protocol is that this subrogation will have to be regulated by the application of articles 1, 4 and 5. Article 3 would not apply, because His Majesty's Government have not made use of the property or the services of the Ottoman Lighthouse Administration.

6. Under article 1 of the Concessions Protocol concessions are to be "maintained." His Majesty's Government understand this to mean that all the provisions of the convention of 1899 will stand unaltered, except in so far as under article 4 changes must be made to suit new economic conditions, and under article 9 rights and obligations incumbent on Turkey as the territorial sovereign become incumbent upon His Majesty's Government as the territorial sovereign. To determine what changes in the concession must for these reasons be made depends on the convention of 1899 and the arrangements in force between the Turkish Government and the Ottoman Lighthouse Administration.



7. The Lighthouse Administration, by virtue of arrangements which do not affect the present question at all, was engaged in maintaining, on behalf of the Turkish Government, certain lighthouses in the Mediterranean from which both the Lighthouse Administration and the Turkish Government were deriving a substantial income. So far as Turkey was concerned, she received 50 per cent. of the light dues which the company was receiving for its Mediterranean service. By the 1899 arrangement in regard to the Red Sea lights, the money required for the construction and maintenance of the lights on behalf of the Turkish Government was obtained by the Lighthouse Administration out of the Turkish share of the Mediterranean light dues. Consequently, before Turkey was entitled to receive from the Lighthouse Administration the Turkish share of the Mediterranean light dues, the company was entitled to repay to itself the sums which it had advanced in respect of the Red Sea lights. The Lighthouse Administration had also made certain loans to the Turkish Government, and was engaged in repaying to itself the interest and the capital of these loans by withholding from the Turkish Government the Turkish share of the Mediterranean light dues. The net result, therefore, of the British occupation of the Red Sea lighthouses was that the Turkish share of the Mediterranean light dues ceased to bear the expense of maintaining the Red Sea lights. In consequence, the rapidity with which the Turkish share of the Mediterranean light dues would repay sums owing by the Turkish Government to the Ottoman Lighthouse Administration must have been increased. Nothing in the financial arrangements of this 1899 convention respecting the Red Sea lights constituted an obligation incumbent upon Turkey as the territorial sovereign of the islands where the lighthouses were situated. There would thus appear to be nothing in these financial arrangements in respect of which His Majesty's Government, if and when the sovereignty of the islands passes to His Britannic Majesty, will be subrogated to the Turkish obligations. On the other hand, the obligation of the Lighthouse Administration under the concession to maintain the lights will subsist. The net result, therefore, of the strict application of articles 1 and 9 of the Concessions Protocol will be that His Majesty's Government will be entitled as against the Lighthouse Administration to have the lights maintained by the administration, who must continue to pay themselves out of the Turkish share of the Mediterranean light dues.

8. The readaptation of the concession under article 4 only relates to new economic conditions. It would not enable the Lighthouse Administration to claim that the change in the political conditions entitled them to look to Great Britain to pay for the upkeep of the lighthouses instead of defraying the cost out of the Turkish share of the Mediterranean light dues. As the lights were, under the convention of 1899, to be maintained for the account of the Turkish Government, no adaptation would appear to be required, as the increased cost of wages and material would merely increase the amount which the company recovered from Turkish funds in their hands.

## No. 63.

*Mr. Austen Chamberlain to Consul Bullard (Jeddah).*

(No. 28.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, May 19, 1925.*

GOVERNMENT of India telegram No. 520 of 13th May.

Government of India still desire to secure information regarding conditions at the three ports, and suggest that you may be able to send some trustworthy unofficial person to obtain this information.

If such a person is available, please instruct him to proceed to the three ports and obtain the necessary information. Possibly the Indian doctor mentioned in your telegram No. 75 may be able to execute this mission.

Please endeavour also to communicate to Ibn Saud the message contained in Government of India's telegram No. 475 S of 5th May to India Office.

## No. 64.

*Mr. Lindsay to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received May 21.)*

(No. 75.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Constantinople, May 20, 1925.*

YOUR telegram No. 73.

Soviet now propose to send pilgrimage to Hedjaz via Beirut, Damascus-Hedjaz Railway through Transjordan. French are willing to grant transit visas for Syria provided that His Majesty's Government grant transit visas through Transjordan.

In view of last sentence of your telegram No. 73 I presume I should also refuse these facilities. I should be glad, however, to learn what reasons I should give for such refusal in the event of an explanation being requested.

## No. 65.

*Consul Bullard to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received May 21.)*

(No. 80.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Jeddah, May 20, 1925.*

I PRESUME instructions conveyed in your telegram No. 28 obsolete in view of later messages, which show that steamers are sailing for Rabigh. In any case, investigation would take far too long to be of any use.

## No. 66.

*Mr. Austen Chamberlain to Mr. Lindsay (Constantinople.)*

(No. 86.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, May 26, 1925.*

YOUR telegram No. 75 of 20th May: Soviet pilgrims to the Hedjaz.

Colonial Office are consulting Jerusalem. In the meantime, you should do nothing to facilitate the object in view.

## No. 67.

*Mr. Austen Chamberlain to Consul Bullard (Jeddah).*

(No. 35.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

*Foreign Office, May 27, 1925.*

YOUR telegrams No. 76 of 17th May and No. 79 of 20th May.

Following message should be despatched to Ibn Saud by earliest possible opportunity:—

"His Majesty's Government have received your Highness's intimation of your intention to despatch a force against Akaba. Your Highness will recollect that this town lies within the boundary within which you were informed in October last that any unprovoked aggression on your Highness's part would be regarded as an attack upon territory for which His Majesty's Government are responsible. His Majesty's Government cannot allow Akhwan forces to violate the frontier laid down, and, if Akhwan force attempts to enter Akaba, His Majesty's Government will inevitably be compelled to take such steps as are necessary to prevent or eject them.

"His Majesty's Government fully realise that your Highness would have a legitimate cause of complaint were territory within this boundary to be used as a base for Hedjaz operations against Nejd. They understand that your Highness believes this to be the case, and they realise that the continued presence of ex-King Hussein at Akaba lends colour to this view. They have therefore decided to invite him to proceed elsewhere. At the same time, they are taking steps to establish the authority of the Transjordan Administration in the whole area within the boundary communicated to you in October last. This will remove all possible danger of territory under their mandate being used as a base for operations against your Highness. They are ready and anxious to consult with you with a view to the actual delimitation of the frontier between Nejd and



Transjordan as well as the settlement of all outstanding questions between yourself and Transjordan and Irak, and are willing to initiate immediate negotiations with your Highness or with an accredited representative either in London or elsewhere. In the meantime, His Majesty's Government trust that you will despatch urgent instructions to secure the withdrawal of any Akhwan force which may have been despatched against Akaba."

(Repeated to Bagdad, No. 8; Jerusalem, No. 3; and Bushire, No. 3. Repeated at 2 P.M. to Officer Commanding H.M.S. "Cornflower," No. 3, in Government code.)

No. 68.

*Mr. Austen Chamberlain to Officer Commanding H.M.S. "Cornflower."*

(No. 1.)  
(Telegraphic.)

[Viâ Wireless.]

*Foreign Office, May 27, 1925.*

FOLLOWING message should be delivered at once to ex-King Hussein:—

"His Majesty's Government have been informed that his Highness the Sultan of Nejd has despatched a force to attack Akaba. They understand that his reason for taking this step is his conviction that your Majesty and the Hedjaz Government are engaged both at Maan and at Akaba in activities against him. As your Majesty is aware, His Majesty's Government have always regarded the territory of Transjordan, for which they are responsible under the mandate for Palestine, as including Maan and having access to the sea in the neighbourhood of Akaba. When your Majesty took refuge there they informed King Ali and the Emir Abdullah of this, and invited them to open negotiations for the delimitation of the frontier between Transjordan and the Hedjaz. It was not, however, found possible to conduct these negotiations in the unsettled state of affairs in the Hedjaz, and so long as it appeared unlikely that hostilities would extend to the neighbourhood of Transjordan His Majesty's Government were prepared to leave the question for future settlement. But matters have now reached a point where His Majesty's Government can no longer permit the present undefined state of affairs to continue. They are accordingly taking steps to establish the authority of the Transjordan Administration in the area for which they regard themselves as responsible to the League of Nations. This area includes both Maan and Akaba, and they have no alternative but to invite your Majesty to leave it before your presence there leads to difficulty between themselves and the Sultan of Nejd. In the event of a Wahabi attack, they may find themselves compelled to insist upon your immediate departure, and they cannot in any case contemplate your remaining at Akaba for more than another three weeks."

(Addressed to H.M.S. "Cornflower," No. 1, in Government code. Repeated, at 2 A.M., in R, to Jeddah, No. 33; Bagdad, No. 6; Jerusalem, No. 1; and Bushire, No. 1.)

No. 69.

*Mr. Austen Chamberlain to Consul Bullard (Jeddah).*

(No. 36.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

*Foreign Office, May 27, 1925*

MY telegrams Nos. 33, 34 and 35.

Only substance of message to King Hussein should be communicated to King Ali.

(Repeated at 2 P.M. to Officer Commanding H.M.S. "Cornflower," No. 4, in Government code. Repeated in R to Bagdad, No. 9; Jerusalem, No. 4; and Bushire, No. 4.)

No. 70.

*Mr. Austen Chamberlain to Officer Commanding H.M.S. "Cornflower."*

(No. 2.)

[Viâ Wireless.]

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, May 27, 1925.*

MY immediately preceding telegram, inviting King Hussein to leave.

If Wahabi attack materialises it is essential that ex-King Hussein should be got out of the way with the least possible delay, by invitation if possible, but if necessary by force. If, on the other hand, the Wahabis do not attack, His Majesty's Government are prepared to allow him to remain for a maximum of three weeks. But no time should be lost in conveying the message and reporting how it is received.

His Majesty's ship should in no circumstances take active measures against Ibn Saud's forces without further instructions, or before departure of ex-King.

(Repeated at 2 A.M. in R to Jeddah, No. 34; Bagdad, No. 7; Jerusalem, No. 2; and Bushire, No. 2.)

No. 71.

*Consul Bullard to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received May 31.)*

(No. 86.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

*Jeddah, May 30, 1925.*

YOUR telegram No. 36.

I communicated to Minister for Foreign Affairs substance of message to Hussein. Ali sent reply for communication to His Majesty's Government. Following is a summary:—

Hedjaz Government consider Maan and Akaba part of Hedjaz territory, and they have spent much money in administering them since they expelled Turks. Their loss would isolate Medina and would be disastrous to Hedjaz. Hedjaz not in a position to resist. Delimitation of boundary will not eliminate risk of attack, witness repeated attacks on Transjordan, &c.

Government convinced only way to solve difficulties is for His Majesty's Government to reassemble Koweit Conference, which was suspended. This is work of humanity consistent with neutrality. There was already intention that Hussein should leave Akaba, as climate bad for his family.

Hedjaz Government deprecate hasty decision.

I have pointed out to Minister for Foreign Affairs that Hedjaz would have had no legitimate grounds of complaint if Maan had been taken over by Transjordan six months ago.

No. 72.

*H.M.S. "Delhi" to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received May 31.)*

(Unnumbered.)

[Viâ Wireless.]

(Telegraphic.)

*May 31, 1925.*

FOLLOWING for Admiralty:—

"Hedjaz steamer, 'Radjah,' trading with shell and troops, expected to sail shortly. Have seen ex-King Hussein, who is sending further message to British Government. No indication of preparation for his departure.

"Abdullah arrived Akaba by motor."



## No. 73.

*Officer Commanding H.M.S. "Cornflower" to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—*  
(Received May 31.)

[By Wireless.]

(Telegraphic.)

May 30, 1925.

THE following is the translation of a further written statement in Arabic given to me for transmission:—

"To His Britannic Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, No. 501.

"I have answered the letter given to me by Commanding Officer, 'Cornflower,' and this is to supplement it. Since the letter was translated to me I have carefully considered it, and so far as I can see I have committed no offence against Great Britain justifying this treatment of me. You [?] used to communicate with me every week, asking me, as you [?] now have, to leave this village and five other districts near. There is no need for Great Britain to force me and treat me in this way, which is contrary to her law. I hope Great Britain will not be responsible for any future troubles between us and the Sultan of Nejd. Your order has told [?] me to leave Akaba within three weeks, and it is not necessary for you to give me an order like this, as you well know our other places have been occupied by the enemy and some of them burnt [?]. I ought to be revenged on my enemy, since I and my people have served the British with all our hearts. You think that I am making this for military district [?], but I consider that did you not send on [?] soldiers who come to me and ask to be allowed to defend Hedjaz against Ibn Saud. I think your request will only make me more respected by my own people, since you treat me like this, although I was friendly with yours. Death would be better than life; so far as British are concerned it would be better for me to die.—(Signed) KING HUSSEIN, dated 17th Deogiida."

## No. 74.

*Consul Bullard to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received June 1.)*

(No. 87.)

(Telegraphic.)

Jeddah, May 31, 1925.

TWO smallest Hedjaz steamers left for Rabigh 30th May with guns, machine guns and troops. I reminded Foreign Secretary that His Majesty's Government does not recognise blockade. He says intention is merely to engage enemy from sea and to capture or sink any Hedjaz dhows found there.

(Sent to India, Aden, and (so that warning may be given to agency doctor, if possible, and to masters of pilgrim ships) to Governor, Port Sudan.)

## No. 75.

*Consul Bullard to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received June 2.)*

(No. 88.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Jeddah, June 1, 1925.

IN a letter of 1st June, Minister for Foreign Affairs states: "Effective blockade of Rabigh has been instituted. Hedjaz steamship 'Tawil' will remain there continuously with some armed dhows, and when twelve days' notice expires any craft coming to Rabigh will be dealt with according to law of blockade. Rabigh is being bombarded from sea, and land operations also are in progress against it."

(Sent to India and Aden.)

## No. 76.

*Senior Naval Officer, Red Sea, to Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean.—(Received June 2, 1925.)*

(Telegraphic.)

[Viâ Rinella W/T.]

FOR Foreign Office.

Ex-King Hussein now [?] asks] where he is to go. Request that I may be informed if there is any objection to his residing [?] anywhere] except at Akaba [and] Maan.

## No. 77.

*Consul Bullard to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received June 2.)*

(No. 89.)

(Telegraphic.)

Jeddah, June 1, 1925.

MY telegram No. 88.

Threat of land operations probably bluff, but I believe Government seriously intend to keep armed dhows and steamer [?] at Rabigh] continuously. Town is 2 or 3 miles inland, but I understand steamer bombarded tent place 31st May near landing, but that no dhows were found.

It looks as though pilgrims would be able to land at Rabigh only if, firstly, His Majesty's Government refuse to recognise even this blockade (this does not apply to first ship), which should arrive before notice expires) and, secondly, masters disembark passengers in British dhows from, e.g., [?] group omitted] or Aden in ferry-boats.

(Sent to India and Aden. Port Sudan will be informed.)

## No. 78.

*Senior Naval Officer, Red Sea, to Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean.—(Received June 3, 1925.)*

(Telegraphic.)

FOR Foreign Office.

Ex-King Hussein would prefer British Government to decide the place for him to go. If he must decide he would like to be taken to Jeddah. If British will not permit this he would like to go to Irak, but not Basra, as it is very hot, and not suitable for his health.

## No. 79.

*Senior Naval Office, Red Sea, to Admiralty.—(Received June 3.)*

[Viâ Ipswich-Rinella W/T.]

(Telegraphic.)

June 3, 1925.

THE following message is transmitted for Foreign Office:—

"Conference was held on board H.M.S. 'Delhi' this afternoon, Monday, 1st June, at the request of ex-King Hussein, who was accompanied by King Abdullah. The result of two and a half hours' conversation was as follows:—

"King Hussein is prepared to accept orders contained in Foreign Office telegram No. 1 of 27th May, and will be ready to leave Akaba by the 18th June on following conditions:—

"1. That the British Government will select a place for him to live in suitable to his health and mode of life. To be accompanied by his family and retinue—about 100.

"He does not wish to live in Europe, Egypt, India or Turkey.

"2. He prays and petitions British Government to permit him to remain at Akaba until League of Nations has decided on question of Transjordanian boundaries.

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"This he holds firmly to, as he considers it affects his honour and prestige among his own people.

"I informed him my instructions from British Government would not permit of his remaining after 17th June. A further confidential message has since been received from King Hussein, and states that his desire is not to stay in Akaba for ever, but in order to settle his affairs. He then intends to go to London as a visitor, and also hopes to confer with British Government. Taking into consideration confidential manner in which this later message was conveyed to me, it appears probable that he desires, if possible, an invitation to London, which would enable him to leave Akaba without loss of prestige among his own people."

(Addressed Admiralty and Commander-in-chief, Mediterranean.)

No. 80.

*Consul Bullard to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received June 3.)*

(No. 90.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Jeddah, June 2, 1925.*

YOUR telegram No. 35.

Letter despatched 1st June. I hope it will reach Ibn Saud not later than 4th June; impossible send before.

(Sent to Jerusalem, Bagdad and Bushire.)

No. 81.

*Consul Bullard to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received June 3.)*

(No. 91.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Jeddah, June 2, 1925.*

LETTER warning Ibn Saud that pilgrims are coming via Rabigh can hardly, though it was sent by first opportunity, reach him before 3rd June, but he is bound to have had news through Aden or elsewhere.

(Sent to Simla.)

No. 82.

*Consul Bullard to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received June 8.)*

(No. 93.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Jeddah, June 7, 1925.*

I HAVE received from Ali message which ex-King wishes me to transmit to King and Prime Minister of England. Hussein accepts notice to leave Akaba, although it condemns what is left of his life, enquires where he is to go, specifying Egypt, Europe, Greece and Turkey as impossible, and hopes he will not again be moved on.

Above sent at Ali's urgent request.

(Sent to Jerusalem.)

No. 83.

*Sir W. Tyrrell (for the Secretary of State) to Consul Bullard (Jeddah).*

(No. 38.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

*Foreign Office, June 8, 1925.*

THE Government of India are anxious that everything practicable shall be done to ensure the safety of pilgrims who are already on their way from India or on the point of sailing. They suggest that the particular measures to be taken be settled direct between themselves and you, under my orders.

I am as anxious as the Government of India that the pilgrims should come to no harm, and I agree that the Government of India should deal with you direct. At the same time I leave you discretion if you feel in particular circumstances that, in

your opinion, the suggestions of the Government of India cannot, for local reasons, be complied with.

In general you should keep both the Government of India and the Resident at Aden informed of new developments in the situation in order that the necessary instructions may be sent to those in charge of the pilgrimage. In this matter the India Office have already requested the Government of India to communicate to you direct if they desire you to do anything further.

No. 84.

*Consul Bullard to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received June 9.)*

(No. 94.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Jeddah, June 9, 1925.*

GOVERNMENT of India telegram No. 686 S.

According to Minister for Foreign Affairs, Wahabis at Rabigh have one gun and Hedjaz steamer is obliged to keep out of its range.

It seems that there has been skirmish, probably quite insignificant, north of Badr, midway between Rabigh and Yambo. Indian clerk and doctor were unable to get to Rabigh from Port Sudan by dhow; they will proceed with first pilgrim vessel.

(Sent to Simla and Aden.)

No. 85.

*Sir W. Tyrrell (for the Secretary of State) to Sir R. Lindsay (Constantinople).*

(No. 94.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, June 10, 1925.*

MY telegram No. 86 of 26th May: Russian pilgrims to the Hedjaz.

If Soviet representative requests facilities for transit of pilgrims through Transjordan, you should inform him that His Majesty's Government do not consider the route suitable at present for large bodies of pilgrims, as the Hedjaz Railway is not running regularly and quarantine arrangements are not yet established.

No. 86.

*Consul Bullard to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received June 10.)*

(No. 95.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Jeddah, June 9, 1925.*

I LEARN from a reliable source that second Hedjaz steamship, which went to Rabigh few days ago, sank dhow and captured crew. Dhow had approached on instructions from Governor of Rabigh, who took vessel for a pilgrim ship.

This information conveyed to Port Sudan through shipping agent.

(Sent to Simla and Aden.)

No. 87.

*Consul Bullard to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received June 11.)*

(No. 96.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Jeddah, June 11, 1925.*

HEDJAZ Government announce officially that their forces occupied Badr midway between Yambo and Rabigh.



No. 88.

*Consul Bullard to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received June 12.)*

(No. 97.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Jeddah, June 11, 1925.*

I HEAR that pilgrims on board "Jehangir" are exasperated at sight of Hedjaz Government vessels taking coal and water at Port Sudan. One of them, "Radwa," has been there several days, and it is understood that she is going to Suez for repairs. As Hedjaz Government claim belligerent rights for their steamers, it is for consideration whether some limit should be placed on their stay or on facilities granted to them in neutral ports.

(Sent to India and District Commissioner, Port Sudan.)

No. 89.

*Senior Naval Officer, Red Sea, to Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean.—(Repeated to Admiralty; Received June 12.)*

[Via Rinella, by Wireless.]

(Telegraphic.)

*June 11, 1925.*

REFERENCE Foreign Office message No. 1440 of 27th May, addressed H.M.S. "Cornflower," and my No. 0931 of 3rd June.

Ex-King Hussein asks if a reply can now be made, as he is unable to complete his preparations for departure on 18th June until destination is known.

No. 90.

*Sir W. Tyrrell (for the Secretary of State) to Consul Bullard (Jeddah).*

(No. 42.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, June 14, 1925.*

MY telegram No. 39 of 9th June: Situation at Akaba.

You may now inform Ali that His Majesty's Government are notifying ex-King Hussein that they are prepared to offer him asylum in Cyprus on the understanding that he makes his own arrangements for accommodation there; that in the meanwhile the proprietors of the Hôtel Nicosia are being requested to endeavour to arrange accommodation for himself and a suite of 15 or 20 persons until he can make a more permanent arrangement; that they will afford him facilities to send a representative at once to Cyprus to make preliminary arrangements; and that about 18th June they will be pleased to afford him accommodation on board H.M.S. "Delhi" for the journey of himself with wife and personal limited suite to Cyprus.

Since above was drafted H.M.S. "Delhi" has explained in telegram dated 13th June that ex-King desires to sail in her, in company with Hedjaz steamer "Rugmatan," which will convey his household and property.

You should explain this also to Ali

(Repeated to H.M.S. "Delhi" and Cyprus.)

[E 3515/10/91]

No. 91.

*Consul Bullard to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received June 15.)*

(No. 41. Secret)

Sir,

*Jeddah, May 18, 1925.*

I HAVE the honour to report that, having had no reliable information about British subjects in Mecca for some months, I took advantage of the precedent afforded by the recent visit of Russian, Persian and Netherlands officials to Mecca, and obtained permission from both of the belligerents to send to Mecca a representative of this agency. I communicated to both a written list of his duties, and gave an undertaking that he would have nothing to do with matters affecting the present hostilities. I selected for the purpose an Indian employed in the agency, Munshi

Ihsanullah. This man, a British Indian, was a merchant in Medina before the war, with a good business and a high reputation for integrity; but the war having ruined his business prospects he has since worked for the agency. He is particularly well versed in pilgrim work, but he is also a valuable source of information, as he is in touch with all classes of people and knows everyone of importance in Mecca, Medina and Jeddah. I may add that so far as my judgment goes, he combines strong Mahometan beliefs with loyalty to His Majesty's Government as the best defence of the rights and interests of the Indian Moslem community.

2. Munshi Ihsanullah left Jeddah on the 1st May and returned on the 15th May. During his ten days in Mecca he accomplished a vast amount of useful work. He was given a free hand by the Sultan's representative in Mecca, and received much assistance from him.

Among the more important duties which he accomplished were these:—

- (a.) He saw all the leading British Indians, and made full lists of all those who wish to leave the country. There are about 200 who can pay their own expenses, and nearly 100 who could get to Jeddah somehow, but would have to be repatriated from here. (I am unable to decide what action to take about these people until it is known for certain whether Indian pilgrims are coming to Mecca or not this year.)
- (b.) He saw all the leading British Malay pilgrims and received from them letters and telegrams to be sent to their relatives, a complete list, for reference, of all British Malays still in Mecca, and a list made out by the Malays themselves of relatives in the Straits Settlements, &c., who should be asked to send them funds through the agency.
- (c.) He managed to wind up the estates of many deceased pilgrims, viz., 261 Indians, 49 Malays and 45 Egyptians. He did not, it is true, recover the money they had left, for the Wahabi authorities had used it for general purposes; but he secured from Ibn Saud's representative in Mecca a promise to pay the amount (some £200) "on demand," and recovered passports bearing deposit receipts and return tickets, which are worth some £1,500 to the next of kin. In contrast to this I may note that my Soviet colleague tells me the Mecca authorities refused to give him any facilities in connection with estates of deceased Soviet Union citizens.
- (d.) He managed, unofficially, to secure the release from prison of two Indian (Malabari) pilgrims. These two men, who had arrived at Mecca via Massawa not long before, had been imprisoned by the Wahabis for praying at Khadijah's tomb. The penalty was death or blood-money—1,000 dollars—and the men were penniless. After much intercession they were let off with a fine of 5 dollars each, which Munshi Ihsanullah paid. He carried out many other minor duties, either on instructions he had taken with him or on his own initiative. He also secured much information, the principal items of which are summarised in the following paragraphs.

3. Mecca is governed in civil matters by an Egyptian, Hafidh Wahbah, who is called Naib-al-Sultan (Vice-Sultan). He corresponds roughly to the Vali of Turkish times, while Khalid-al-Luwai exercises the functions of the Shereef, i.e., he is responsible for the relations with the tribes and for matters affecting religion, the pilgrimage, &c. The Civil Government is well run, and taxes are very light as compared with those levied in Hussein's time. Khalid, however, who it will be remembered is a relative of Hussein's, appears to combine all the dishonesty and tyranny of the Shereefs with the fanaticism of the Wahabism he has adopted. Hafidh Wahbah does what he can to restrain Khalid, but this is very little. The accounts previously received of the attitude of the more extreme of the Wahabis (especially the Ghuthghuth tribe) were correct. All the tombs of the saints, including that of Khadijah, Muhammad's first wife, and the building known as Mahomet's house, have been demolished. Smoking, reading "maulids" or lives of the Prophet, are forbidden, and infractions of the prohibition are punished with beating, fine or imprisonment. With the two Indians referred to in paragraph 2 (d) above were two Meccans imprisoned for a similar offence. Their friends were trying to collect the 2,000 dollars demanded for their release.

Ibn Saud admitted frankly to Munshi Ihsanullah, as he previously admitted to the Netherlands vice-consul, Sheikh Pravira, that he did not approve of this interference in harmless religious practices. He himself, for instance, did not believe



that Khadijah's remains really lay under the tomb which is called by her name, nor did he believe in praying at tombs; but he did not wish to interfere with pilgrims who differed from his on these points; only, he must defer for the present to his fighting tribes, who happen to be the most fanatical.

4. Public security is perfect, not only in Mecca, but everywhere else within the territory held by Ibn Saud. This has been established by punishing the least disorder with the most ruthless severity.

5. Owing to the stoppage of the pilgrim traffic the Mecca people are in a state of great poverty. They are living in the hope that at least the Indian pilgrims will come. Local produce, *e.g.*, meat, vegetables and ghi, is very cheap. Of imported food-stuffs the chief increases in price are in flour (50 per cent. to 100 per cent.), rice (70 per cent. to 100 per cent.) and tea (100 per cent.). That prices are no higher is attributed to the smallness of the demand, which is due to lack of money and to the absence of pilgrims and of very many of the inhabitants of Mecca.

The distress was being relieved to some extent by the Egyptian Takyah, where about 4,000 persons—most of them Javanese, Malays and Indians—were receiving a daily ration of soup. The distribution of bread had been stopped owing to the high price of flour. This agency was able to send up, by Munshi Ihsanullah, £E. 1,600 out of the Takyah funds deposited in Jeddah. Letters from the manager of the Takyah to the Ministry of Aukaf have been received, and are being sent to Cairo.

6. The Senoussi is living very quietly, and taking no part in public affairs. This is perhaps necessary as, in spite of his name and reputation, he was treated very roughly for going to say a prayer at Khadijah's tomb.

7. Ibn Saud gives as the cause of his delay in taking Jeddah his desire to keep on good terms with the European Powers. He says he is afraid that Ali would have some of the consuls killed and throw the blame on the Wahabis; but his leading men confess that he is really afraid that his tribesmen would get out of hand, and that not even he could prevent their treating Jeddah as Taif was treated if they captured it by force of arms. His plan now is to take Akaba so as to cut the communications of Jeddah with Medina and Ma'an (see despatch No. 42, dated the 18th May), and to secure Yambo.

8. The Governor of Eritrea has written to Ibn Saud in very pressing terms asking him to send representatives to Asmara to conclude a commercial treaty (see my despatch No. 43, dated the 18th May).

Ibn Saud also stated that the French had offered to help him, but produced no evidence to this effect.

The advances made by the Soviet agent have been reported elsewhere (my despatch No. 45, dated the 18th May).

9. Ibn Saud's main difficulty seems to be shortage of money. His tribes provide their own arms and ammunition, and sometimes even bring their own food; but there are certain inevitable expenses, and he has difficulty in meeting them, relatively small as they are. He admitted this lack of money to Munshi Ihsanullah and asked whether Messrs. Gellatly, Hankey and Co., in Jeddah, or some other firm, would not gamble on his winning, and lend him £100,000 or so at a high rate of interest on the security of the Jeddah customs revenues!

10. Ibn Saud appeared disappointed at first that Munshi Ihsanullah kept firmly to his rôle of a clerk with no right to talk politics. Finally, he accepted the position, but this did not prevent his talking politics himself for many hours. He went through the whole history of his relations with His Majesty's Government, complaining that unjustifiable reliance had been placed on Hussein, when he, Ibn Saud, would have done far more for half the money, and that he had been ringed round with enemies.

To all this Munshi Ihsanullah listened without comment. He considers that the essence of these long talks can be summed up in a few words: Ibn Saud would be glad of help (probably financial) from His Majesty's Government, and in return he would forget his hatred and distrust of Feisal and Abdullah; and in order to enhance his value in the eyes of His Majesty's Government, he perhaps tends to exaggerate the importance of the advances made by the Italian and possibly the French authorities.

11. I submit that Munshi Ihsanullah performed his task in difficult circumstances with great zeal, ability and discretion.

12. Copies of this despatch are being sent to India, Singapore and Cairo.

I have, &c.

R. W. BULLARD.

[E 3518/2442/91]

No. 92.

*Consul Bullard to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received June 15.)*

(No. 45. Secret.)

Sir,

Jeddah, May 18, 1925.

I HAVE the honour to refer to my despatch No. 89, dated the 18th August, 1924, and to report further on the Soviet representative in Jeddah and his staff. In regard to one or two details my earlier despatch needs correction.

2. The staff consists of the following five persons:—

*Agent and Consul-General:* Kerim Khakimov, a Tartar from Ufa. Very young for his post (about 31 or 32), but clever and an enthusiastic Communist. Says that he was not called up for military service in 1914 because he was known to be an agitator, but joined the army when Kerenski came into power—"but not to fight; to agitate." Was with Rothstein in Persia, mostly at Meshed. Knows Persian very well, besides Russian, Turkish and Turki; and is learning Arabic very rapidly and picking up French. He told me recently that he thought a year was quite long enough to stay in Jeddah, and that if the Government refused to transfer him soon he would get a post with the Communist party; the party and the Government were always competing for men.

*First Secretary:* Tuimetov, a Tartar from the Caucasus. Formerly a clerk in a cotton factory. Was in Persia with Rothstein. Knows Russian, Turkish, Turki and Persian. Enthusiastic Communist and much trusted by Khakimov.

*Second Secretary:* Naum Markovich Belkin, a Russian Jew. Says that before the war he was employed at Bagdad as an engineer on the Bagdad Railway. Besides Russian, he knows German very well and French very fairly. He is apparently not a very good Communist and is excluded from the inner councils of Khakimov and Tuimetov.

*Interpreter:* Ibrahim Amirkhanov, of Russian Tartar origin, but has lived much in Syria. Educated partly at the American College at Beirut and knows English and Arabic as well as Russian and Turki.

*Clerk:* Moses Axelrod, a young Russian Jew. Has a law degree, but seeing no career in the law, entered the Russian School of Oriental Studies. A keen Communist and much trusted by Khakimov.

It will be noticed that none of the five is Russian by race.

3. It will be remembered that M. Khakimov was received with open arms by King Hussein, and that Habib Lutfullah, the Hedjaz representative in Rome, had a spectacular reception in Leningrad. Very shortly afterwards, however, the Nejd-Hedjaz war began, and the power of the Hedjaz was so badly shaken that the Soviet Government might well decide to await developments before pursuing any active policy. M. Khakimov seems to have lived very quietly for some months. He, however, sent prodigiously long cypher telegrams to his Government, and twice he sent Belkin (the second time accompanied by Tuimetov) to Rome with despatches.

4. I have no evidence that M. Khakimov engaged in open propaganda at first. He professed (though not to me) to be deeply wounded at the suggestion made by the "Times," that there was some connection between his arrival and the flood of Bolshevik propaganda discovered in the Sudan, and talked of demanding a transfer to some place where his blameless character would not be exposed to such baseless attacks. He, however, made an enthusiastic, though not very important, recruit in a certain Ahmad Lari, a young Persian who, in the absence of his father, a merchant, is in charge of Persian affairs. This young man he has provided with all the cant phrases about the rescue of Persia by the devoted Soviet Union from the claws of British imperialism, and so on.

5. M. Khakimov told Sheikh Pravira, the Javanese who holds the post of Netherlands vice-consul in Jeddah, that it was one of the aims of the Soviet Government to set the Javanese free from their Dutch oppressors. This did not prevent his trying to flatter the Netherlands consul, M. Van der Plas, by praising the fatherly care the Dutch have for their Javanese subjects.

6. Recently, as I have stated elsewhere, M. Khakimov obtained permission from both the belligerents to visit Mecca "to perform the minor pilgrimage." He took

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Ahmad Lari with him. A day or two later Sheikh Pravira, the Netherlands vice-consul, went to Mecca to assist Netherlands pilgrims, of whom there were many hundreds. The three returned together.

7. The following items of information from Sheikh Pravira reached me through M. Van der Plas:—

Ibn Saud took M. Khakimov and Ahmad Lari at their word and treated them as private persons, referring to them always as Sheikh Kerim and Sheikh Ahmad. He had them surrounded by his people in Mecca and they were not allowed to go anywhere unaccompanied, though Sheikh Pravira was left free to go wherever he liked. On one occasion M. Khakimov and Ahmad Lari evaded their attendants and paid a secret visit to the Senoussi, to the indignation of the Wahabi authorities in Mecca.

8. The following remarks reported by Sheikh Pravira on his return gave some indication of Ibn Saud's attitude:—

- (1.) One of his chief officials said to Sheikh Pravira loudly, so that M. Khakimov, who was present, could not fail to hear: "I wonder how you can bear to travel with this miner who pretends to be a consul-general."
- (2.) At a dinner, at which the three representatives were all present, Ibn Saud went out of his way to say very firmly that he himself had no quarrel whatever with European Governments, but, on the contrary, thought there was much to be learned from them.
- (3.) Ibn Saud thanked Sheikh Pravira for "not coming under silly false pretences."

9. M. Van der Plas told me, and I reported to you, that he had information showing that M. Khakimov had indulged in violent propaganda to some extent against the Netherlands Government, but mainly against His Majesty's Government. He could not give me the details as the information had been obtained confidentially. I now suppose the information to be that which I have since obtained from a more direct source.

10. When I sent the agency employee, Mushi Ihsanullah, to Mecca to look after the interests of British subjects, I forbade him to speak about anything affecting the interests of the Hedjaz Government, but told him to pick up any information he could get about M. Khakimov's activities. He stayed a night at Ibn Saud's camp both on his way to Mecca and on his way back. On each occasion Ibn Saud talked to him for several hours, and each time he spontaneously spoke about M. Khakimov.

It is not necessary to go into great detail. According to Ibn Saud, M. Khakimov tried to enlist him in the Soviet Union's scheme for a great revolt of the East against the "imperialistic" and "colonising" Powers, especially England. Ibn Saud claims to have resisted all M. Khakimov's blandishments, putting forward many arguments as, e.g., the remoteness of Russia and the nearness of India, Bahrein, &c., the primitive condition of his people and their unsuitability for republican institutions, and so on.

Ibn Saud said that M. Khakimov finally had recourse to vague threats, saying that if Ibn Saud would not join the movement Ali would receive help.

Later, Ibn Saud stated, Ahmad Lari urged him to join a great Eastern Union against the imperialistic Powers: Persia and Afghanistan were already united, Russia was with them, and so on. This part of Ibn Saud's statement is borne out by the anxiety which Ahmad Lari has shown since Ihsanullah's return and his repeated attempts to find out whether Ibn Saud or his Minister, Damluji, spoke to Ihsanullah about him.

11. M. Khakimov was too closely watched in Mecca to be able to indulge freely in propaganda, but according to information given to Munshi Ihsanullah there he lost no opportunity of speaking against His Majesty's Government and preaching the mission of the Soviet Union to liberate the East.

12. I think that the evidence is good enough to show that M. Khakimov's main business here is propaganda. There is certainly not enough work in his agency to keep five "Europeans" busy; they have no trade, no shipping, no passport work and very few Soviet Union nationals. Having lost his potential supporter, King Hussein, and being doubtful about Ali's power to retake Mecca, M. Khakimov would naturally wish to see where he stood with Ibn Saud. It remains to be seen whether, having

failed to secure Ibn Saud's support, he will think it worth while to give any active assistance to Ali.

13. Copies of this despatch are being sent to India, Singapore, Egypt and Khartum.

I have, &c.

R. W. BULLARD.

[E 3519/10/91]

No. 93.

*Consul Bullard to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received June 15.)*

(No. 47. Secret.)

Jeddah, May 21, 1925.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to enclose a report on the situation covering the period the 1st-21st May.

Copies of this despatch and of its enclosure are being sent to India, Egypt, Khartum (through Port Sudan), Jerusalem, Bagdad, Beirut (for Damascus), Aden, Singapore, Bushire, Koweit, Bahrein and Muskat.

I have, &c.

R. W. BULLARD.

Enclosure in No. 93.

*Report for the Period May 1 to 21, 1925.*

(Secret.)

AN Indian clerk attached to this agency has just paid a ten-days' visit to Mecca, with the consent of both sides, to advise and assist people for whom this agency is responsible. Besides winding up the estates of several hundred deceased pilgrims and accomplishing other useful tasks, he picked up much information, the principal items of which are embodied in this report.

2. Mecca is governed in civil matters by an Egyptian, Hafidh Wahbah, who is called Naib-el-Sultan (Vice-Sultan). He corresponds roughly to the Vali of Turkish times, while Khalid-el-Luwai exercises the functions of the Shereef, i.e., he is responsible for the relations with the tribes and for matters affecting religion, the pilgrimage, &c. The civil government is well run, and taxes are very light as compared with those levied in Hussein's time. Khalid, however, who, it will be remembered, is a relative of Hussein's, appears to combine all the dishonesty and tyranny of the Shereefs with the fanaticism of the Wahabism he has adopted. Hafidh Wahbah does what he can to restrain Khalid, but this is very little. The accounts previously received of the attitude of the more extreme of the Wahabis (especially the Ghuthghuth tribe) were correct. All the tombs of the saints, including that of Khadijah, Mahomet's first wife, and the building known as Mahomet's house, have been demolished. Smoking, reading "maulids," or lives of the Prophet, are forbidden, and infractions of the prohibition are punished with beating, fine or imprisonment. Our clerk found that there were in prison four men (two penniless Indian pilgrims and two Meccans) who had been condemned to death or payment of blood-money (1,000 dollars each) for praying at Khadijah's tomb. By private appeals he succeeded in getting the Indians off for a nominal fine of 5 dollars each, but when he left the Meccans were still in prison and their friends were trying to raise the 2,000 dollars.

Ibn Saud admitted frankly to Munshi Ihsanullah, as he had previously admitted to the Netherlands vice-consul, Sheikh Pravira, that he did not approve of this interference in harmless religious practices; he himself, for instance, did not believe that Khadijah's remains really lay under the tomb which is called by her name, nor did he believe in praying at tombs, but he did not wish to interfere with pilgrims who differed from him on these points; only, he must defer for the present to his fighting tribes, who happen to be the most fanatical.

Ibn Saud has just issued a proclamation appealing for toleration. He urges Moslems not to call other Moslems by such names as infidel and polytheist (common Wahabi epithets for non-Wahabis), and says that while it is right to try to persuade those who are mistaken, the persuasion must not be violent.

3. Public security is perfect not only in Mecca, but everywhere else within the territory held by Ibn Saud. This has been established by punishing the least disorder with the most ruthless severity.

[13651]



4. Owing to the stoppage of the pilgrim traffic the Mecca people are in a state of great poverty. They are living in the hope that at least the Indian pilgrims will come. Local produce, *e.g.*, meat, vegetables and ghi, is very cheap. Of imported food-stuffs the chief increases in price are in flour (50 per cent. to 100 per cent.), rice (70 per cent. to 100 per cent.), and tea (100 per cent.). That prices are no higher is attributed to the smallness of the demand, which is due to lack of money and to the absence of pilgrims and of very many of the inhabitants of Mecca.

The distress was being relieved to some extent by the Egyptian Takyah, where about 4,000 persons—most of them Javanese, Malays and Indians—were receiving a daily ration of soup. The distribution of bread had been stopped owing to the high price of flour.

5. The Senoussi is living very quietly and taking no part in public affairs. This is perhaps necessary as, in spite of his name and reputation, he was treated very roughly for going to say a prayer at Khadijah's tomb.

6. Ibn Saud gives as the cause of his delay in taking Jeddah his desire to keep on good terms with the European Powers. He says he is afraid that Ali would have some of the consuls killed and throw the blame on the Wahabis, but his leading men confess that he is really afraid that his tribesmen would get out of hand and that not even he could prevent their treating Jeddah as Taif was treated if they captured it by force of arms. There is reason to believe that, as an alternative, he now plans to take Akaba, so as to cut the communications of Jeddah with Medina and Ma'an, and to secure Yambo.

7. The Governor of Eritrea has written to Ibn Saud in very pressing terms asking him to send representatives to Asmara to conclude a commercial treaty. The letter was shown to the agency clerk by Ibn Saud.

Ibn Saud also stated that French had offered to help him, but produced no evidence to this effect.

Ibn Saud confirmed very fully the information previously received, that the Soviet agent and the acting Persian consul had tried to enlist him in the movement against the "imperialistic" Powers, especially England.

8. Ibn Saud's main difficulty seems to be shortage of money. His tribes provide their own arms and ammunition, and sometimes even bring their own food, but there are certain inevitable expenses and he has difficulty in meeting them, relatively small as they are. He admitted this lack of money to Munshi Ihsanullah, and asked whether Messrs. Gellatly, Hankey and Co., in Jeddah, or some other firm, would not gamble on his winning and lend him £100,000 or so at a high rate of interest, on the security of the Jeddah customs revenues!

9. The German, Steffen, has left for Akaba. He hopes to persuade Hussein to disgorge some money for tanks, &c. Two Germans, Johannes Modler, a pilot, and D. Gerth, an observer, arrived on the 5th May. Modler left on the 10th, after smashing the best aeroplane by running into a wall and earning Steffen the suspicion of having engineered the accident in order to book an order for more aeroplanes. Gerth has now been appointed to the command of the reserve battalion. Two or three Russian refugee pilots from Paris, with whom the Hedjaz Government were negotiating, got as far as Rome, but as Lutfullah was not there to pay for their passages to Jeddah they went back again. Another Russian refugee, Colonel Fellatiev, was engaged in Egypt for the work (as he believed) of armoured car commander, but when he arrived the Hedjaz authorities explained that they did not want anyone to teach them the tactics of armoured car warfare; they had plenty of Arab officers who knew all about that; they wanted a chauffeur, and they paid him a month's pay to go away again.

Steffen's munitions are still at Suez. According to the Egyptian press the Government or Egypt have prohibited their export to the Hedjaz. It is stated that Steffen had another consignment of munitions (from Trieste) on the way, and had to stop it before it reached Egypt.

10. The Hedjaz Treasury has again been empty for some little time, but it seemed to Ali and the authorities as good as full because Habib Lutfullah was known to be on the way. He arrived on the 15th May, but if he possesses the Midas touch he has not made use of it. He has some remarkable schemes for concessions, all to be granted to a company which is mainly Lutfullah. But the measure which was really to save the Hedjaz was the establishment of a bank with a capital of £200,000 (to be collected from the almost bankrupt remnant of the population of Jeddah), which was to live mainly by making advances to the Hedjaz Government, though in its spare time it would encourage agriculture—situated at present 50 to

100 miles within the enemy's lines. The Hedjaz Government have had the sense to reject these proposals.

This money-sodden mountebank, Lutfullah, is leaving again for Rome. He has just had time to come and tell the British, French and Italian representatives what a close friend he is of Mr. Chamberlain, M. Briand and Signor Mussolini.

11. It appears that Indian pilgrims are coming on the "Hajj," via Rabigh. Ibn Saud has stated at the last moment that Rabigh is not ready for the reception of pilgrims and he urges them to come via Lith, but both Lith and Kunfudah are dangerous to navigation, whereas the approach to Rabigh is fairly good, and, moreover, being on one of the main routes to Medina, Rabigh has at least shelter from the sun.

The communiqués of the Government of India, and the delay due to uncertainty, appear to have reduced the possible number of Indian pilgrims to manageable proportions—some 3,000 to 4,000 instead of the 10,000 or more it was feared would come.

12. So far as Kunfudah and Lith are concerned, the Hedjaz blockade is dead. The civil authorities have always been against it as likely to give more trouble than it was worth, and the truth of this has been brought home to the military by several cases where they have had to give satisfaction for foreign dhows and/or goods wrongfully seized. In all cases but one, only Italian interests were involved; the remaining case concerned a Kamaran dhow which was seized at Hali five or six weeks ago. The nakhuda has now reached Jeddah; the dhow has been restored by the Hedjaz Government and a sum paid which should cover the value of the goods (sold in Jeddah by the Hedjaz Government) and all other claims in connection with the capture.

In order to stop the trade with Mecca without falling foul of foreign Governments, the Hedjaz Government have been planning an expedition to seize Kunfudah, but they have postponed it on the ground that they have not munitions enough until the Suez consignment arrives. It is unlikely that the expeditionary force would survive long, if it ever managed to land. Ibn Saud's tribes would be happy to find a force they could get at, and the people of Kunfudah would naturally be hostile to anyone who tried to interrupt their unusually prosperous trade.

13. Prices in Jeddah are rising rapidly, as the merchants, seeing their goods being requisitioned without hope of payment, are importing no more. The condenser broke down recently and water was very short for a fortnight, but it has been patched up again.

14. Mr. Lethem, the resident of Bornu, Nigeria, spent a few days in Jeddah investigating various questions relating to "Takruni" pilgrims. When studying the slavery question he came independently to the conclusion put forward by this agency in the last pilgrimage report, viz., that people leaving for the pilgrimage should be restrained from taking with them children or young persons under a certain age.

15. The Hedjaz Government were much surprised to see in Reuter a statement that Dr. Naji-el-Asil was appealing to the League of Nations and that he was proposing to return to Jeddah to use his personal influence to put an end to the present hostilities, and, meanwhile, was telegraphing to Ali asking him to arrange an armistice. They have since published a communiqué saying that they did not instruct Dr. Naji to take such a step and that it must, therefore, be considered a personal move on his part.

The fact seems to be that Dr. Naji is out of funds and wants to return to collect some more, and not liking to give this as a reason for his departure (it is unthinkable that he should leave London without megaphoning a reason of some kind to the waiting world), he invented the appeal to the League of Nations. He has never telegraphed to Jeddah about the armistice, having at least sense enough for that. One phrase he used has been seized upon eagerly here: he "hoped he would not have to return to Jeddah with empty hands." The Jeddah people believe him to be coming from the League of Nations with sacks of gold.

It would be interesting to see this mincing boulevardier using his personal influence with Ibn Saud's tribes:—

"Ghuthghuth, Ghuthghuth!—O word of fear,  
Unpleasing to a humbug's ear!"

R. W. BULLARD.



[E 3520/10/91]

No. 94.

*Consul Bullard to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received June 15.)*

(No. 51. Secret.)

Sir,

Jeddah, May 29, 1925.

I HAVE the honour to enclose a report on the situation covering the period the 22nd-29th May.

2. Copies of this despatch and of its enclosure are being sent to India, Egypt, Khartum (through Port Sudan), Jerusalem, Bagdad, Beirut (for Damascus), Aden, Singapore, Bushire, Koweit, Bahrein and Muskat.

I have, &amp;c.

R. W. BULLARD.

Enclosure in No. 94.

*Report for the Period May 22-29, 1925.*

(Secret.)

KAIMAKAM SALIH BEY ABDUL RAHMAN, who has been appointed vice-consul for Egypt in Jeddah, arrived on the 26th May. He will relieve this agency of one of its most thankless tasks—applying to the Egyptian authorities for permission for Hedjazis, penniless students, Russian refugees, &c., to go to Egypt.

The Egyptian Government gave the Hedjaz Government no intimation—official or unofficial—of their intention to establish a consular post at Jeddah, nor did they authorise their representative to enter into official relations with the authorities here. The Hedjaz Government heard privately of his approaching arrival and made special arrangements to greet him fittingly, but he made some excuse and the band and the guard of honour had to be taken away before he landed. Salih Bey is now waiting for instructions from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in Cairo as to whether he may accept the invitation of King Ali to pay him a visit.

I hear that Habib Lutfullah took with him to Egypt a letter from Ali to King Fuad, expressing the hope that the misunderstandings engendered in King Hussein's reign had been removed, relations in the future would be cordial and so on.

2. The latest number of Ibn Saud's newspaper, "Umm-al-Kura" (No. 20), to reach Jeddah contains a long account of the recent peace move, in which Sheikh Fuad was concerned. It states that certain of the consular representatives who went to Mecca for the "umrah" spoke about peace, in their private capacity, and said that Sheikh Fuad wanted to know whether Ibn Saud would receive him. (Two of them—the Russian and the Persian—have denied this; the third is on leave.) Ibn Saud said he was ready to see anyone. Then follow copies of correspondence between Sheikh Fuad and Ibn Saud, from which it would appear that the initiative came from Sheikh Fuad. What is not clear is why Ibn Saud should have taken the trouble to send this agency, just at that moment, a secret letter stating, for the information of His Majesty's Government, that he had never closed the door against peace.

The "Umm-al-Kura" then produces what purports to be the minutes of a meeting of amirs, which Ibn Saud summoned to decide whether he should receive Sheikh Fuad or not; the amirs are represented as immovably opposed to Hussein and his sons. Finally there follows an alleged summary of the conversations between Ibn Saud and Sheikh Fuad. It is a good deal more skilfully put together than Hussein's propaganda used to be, and Sheikh Fuad admits that it is correct in the main, though he says that Ibn Saud promised not to publish anything that was said in the course of their interviews. Sheikh Fuad is represented as admitting that there is little to be said for Hussein, Feisal and Abdullah, but maintaining that Ali is a man of a better stamp. Ibn Saud makes the most of Hussein's continued residence at Akaba and of the reinforcements which have reached Jeddah from Abdullah. He successfully establishes Sheikh Fuad's unimportance by reminding him that—according to the Hedjaz archives left behind at Mecca—letters were sometimes issued from Mecca purporting to be signed by him, but really without his having seen them. Finally, Ibn Saud disclaims all responsibility for the outcome of the war; he waited long—to his own detriment, since it gave Ali time to fortify Jeddah—to give the Moslem world time to reply to his invitation, but no answer came except from the Indian Caliphate Committee, and their delegation returned from Jeddah without his seeing them.

3. The "Umm-al-Kura" emphatically contradicts the rumour that there is a treaty between Nejd and the Imam. Ibn Saud, it says, is on very good terms with the Imam, but so he is with the Idrisi; he is absolutely neutral in the present struggle between them.

4. In addition to the British victims of the Taif massacre, whose names were given in the Jeddah reports at the time, it now seems certain that a member of the Bombay family of Khandwani was killed—Haji Abdulla Miyan Ahmad Miyan Khandwani.

Ibn Saud apparently attributes to the Hedjaz Government the blame for the killing and looting at Taif, though it is difficult to see why, unless he considers it blameworthy that they should have made any attempt at all to defend Taif. The most probable explanation of the massacre and looting, which were committed in cold blood, is that the attackers had not expected to take Taif and that there was consequently no one present to keep them in order.

5. The announcement that Indians are coming on the pilgrimage, via Rabigh, has caused great anger and consternation among Ali's supporters. The military authorities would gladly seize Rabigh if they had the power, and they talk of bombarding it from the sea. This action is within their rights, but whether it is politic is another matter. The King seems to be against any such action, and there has been nothing more violent than a threat to boycott Messrs. Turner Morrison of Bombay for carrying pilgrims to Rabigh.

The determination of Indian pilgrims to go to Mecca in spite of the war has brought out in sharp contrast the two opposing views about the Hedjaz: one, that it is a matter of international Moslem interest, from which territorial ambitions should be excluded; the other, that the Hedjaz is an Arab country, whose fate must be decided on ordinary territorial and national lines. The Indians and the Syrians are respectively the extreme holders of these views. To the Syrians here, who find their political aims hampered in Syria and Palestine and even, latterly, in Transjordan, the Hedjaz seems essential as a base of operations. But there are Syrians with Ibn Saud, too; they may well think that there is more hope of the Arab empire if it is based on Nejd rather than on this swamp of greed and iniquity, the Hedjaz.

On instructions from His Majesty's Government, I visited King Ali and asked for facilities for the pilgrimage. This is a summary of his reply:—

He has been wantonly attacked by Ibn Saud. Although in the right, he has always been willing to make peace. He allowed Philby, Rihani, Sayyid Talib and Sheikh Fuad all to try to mediate, and he was prepared to welcome any attempt His Majesty's Government might like to make to secure peace. But to give facilities for the pilgrimage would be to play his enemy's game and to admit defeat. If dhows were allowed to go to Rabigh to land pilgrims, the crews would carry news to the enemy; even to allow a messenger from this agency to pass through the lines to tell Ibn Saud that Indian pilgrims were coming to Rabigh would encourage Ibn Saud to believe that he had outside support; and if he (Ali) were required to let food-stuffs pass through Jeddah to Mecca the whole work of the last five or six months would be undone and he might just as well evacuate the country at once. It was noteworthy that only Indians were coming on the pilgrimage, just as only Indians answered Ibn Saud's invitation to a conference at Mecca. The Indian pilgrimage this year was not religious, but political, and was promoted by the Caliphate Committee from political motives which were perfectly well known. This being the case, and his conscience being clear, he was quite indifferent to anything that Indians might think or say.

The King spoke with deep emotion. I think that the arrival of pilgrimage time with Ibn Saud still in Mecca has suddenly made him realise (though he still hardly dares to admit it, even to himself) that his cause is lost. Moreover, the subject of the Indian Mahometans is a sore one with him; as it appears to him, his throne is merely a pawn in the Caliphate Committee's game against His Majesty's Government.

6. The Indian doctor attached to this agency, with his compounder and an Indian clerk, have been sent to Port Sudan, whence they should be able to get to Rabigh by dhow several days before the arrival of the first pilgrim ship, the "Jehangir," which can hardly arrive there before about the 6th June. The Indian pilgrimage officer should be on board the "Jehangir." This staff should be quite equal to dealing with the two, or at most three, shiploads of pilgrims, which is all that will be able to reach Rabigh in time for the Hajj.

It has been impossible to inform Ibn Saud from here that pilgrim ships are making for Rabigh, but there is no doubt that he will have heard from Aden, Massawa, Port Sudan or elsewhere.



7. The Foreign Secretary recently showed me a telegram from the Amir Abdullah to his brother Ali, saying he had been advised (by some person or persons unspecified) that Ali could secure the intervention of His Majesty's Government in the Nejd-Hedjaz war in exchange for promises, to be put into execution after the war:—

- (1.) To hand the Ma'an district and its railway over to Transjordan;
  - (2.) To extend the Hedjaz Railway to Mecca and Jeddah;
  - (3.) To introduce reforms.

Although the neutrality of His Majesty's Government has been stated clearly and frequently enough, and although Ma'an belongs to Transjordan in any case, the extension of the Hedjaz Railway is not a matter of prime importance, and promises to introduce reforms are, according to the character of the person who makes them, either worthless or superfluous. Ali is so simple-minded that he expected this agency to telegraph proposals to His Majesty's Government on these lines. However, he is now trying to find out from Abdullah whether it was an official or unofficial personage who offered this surprising advice.

The fact is that no straw is too flimsy for Ali to catch at. All talk of counter-attacks, occupying Kufudah or Rabigh, &c., is dying away, and Ali seems resigned to waiting at Jeddah on the defensive, in the hope that his money will last until Ibn Saud's resources give out or someone intervenes. His latest idea is to sign the Treaty of Versailles and apply for membership of the League of Nations, so that the League may intervene.

8. In saying, in the last report, that Lutfullah's proposals had been rejected by the Hedjaz Government, I was attributing to the latter more sense than they possess. They eventually agreed to the bank scheme in some form or other. Lutfullah says he has "founded a bank"; what has really happened, it seems, is that he has obtained a concession for a "National Bank of the Hedjaz," which he proposes to peddle round Egypt. What any concession granted in the present circumstances can be worth it is hard to see, but Ali seems to expect large sums to accrue. Ali is of course well aware of Lutfullah's imbecility, but he hopes that in some way a creature who is so rich may be able to produce money for the Hedjaz.

9. Dr. Naji-al-Asil has resigned his position as Hedjaz representative in London, and the resignation has been accepted. His ostensible reason is the snub the Hedjaz Government gave him in disclaiming responsibility for his peace flourish, but his failure to get any money out of the Hedjaz since Hussein went must have weighed with him. Ali's point of view seems to have been that, while there was not much likelihood of Naji's being any use in London, there was no harm in his going on living there so long as the money he had got out of Hussein lasted, but that his efforts were not worth any fresh expenditure.

I do not think Dr. Naji can be acquitted of having been a very bad servant to the Hedjaz Government. He seems to have done much to increase Hussein's megalomania, in the first instance. Hussein actually despatched Ali and Sheikh Fuad to Jeddah to sign the Anglo-Hedjaz Treaty left behind by Colonel Lawrence, but when they reached the half-way halt they were called to the telephone to speak to Hussein; he told them they were not to sign the treaty, after all, as he had received a wonderful telegram from London, from Naji. When they got back to Mecca they were shown the telegram. Naji urged Hussein not to sign, as by holding out he would get all he wanted—rule over all the Arab countries and everything. These assurances may have been due to mere conceit on Naji's part, but only dishonesty can have prompted him to tell Hussein (it was this that was responsible for the famous proclamation at Mecca in the spring of 1923) that he had assurances from the Foreign Office that the Balfour Declaration meant nothing and would soon be abrogated. Since then he has tried to maintain his position by holding out hopes every now and then that the treaty would be signed. To such an extent did he mislead Ali recently that Ali had to ask this agency to ascertain from London whether it was really true that there was a chance the treaty might be signed. The answer being "No," his advice ceased to have such slight value as Ali had previously attached to it.

R. W. BULLARD.

No. 95.

*H.M.S. "Delhi" to Admiralty.—(Received June 16.)*

(Unnumbered.)  
(Telegraphic.)

[Via "Rinella" W/T.]

June 16, 1925.

SUBSTANCE of Foreign Office telegram No. 42 communicated to ex-King Hussein. He protested at going to Cyprus, reason given that Arabs and Turks consider it place of exile, and wished to go to Jeddah.

Later Emir Abdullah handed me two letters for transmission. Letters identical in substance, but one addressed Secretary of State for His Majesty the King:—

"From His Majesty King Hussein to Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

"I have been informed by Commanding Officer, H.M.S. 'Delhi,' that it has been chosen by British Government that I should go to Cyprus with my family in the same ship. I would ask His Majesty to allow me to proceed to Jaffa or Haifa, but if His Majesty will not permit me to go to either of these places I will accept His Majesty's orders and go to Cyprus with my family, and I wish to proceed from there to London to see His Majesty."

(Repeated Commander-in-chief, Mediterranean.)

No. 96.

*Sir W. Tyrrell (for the Secretary of State) to Consul Bullard (Jeddah).*

(No. 43.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Foreign Office, June 17, 1925.

MY telegram No. 42 of 14th June: Situation at Akaba.

Hussein replied to message therein by a telegram to the King asking whether he might not be allowed to proceed to Jaffa or Haifa in preference to Cyprus. An answer has been sent to Hussein to-day to the effect that His Majesty's Government desire to show him every consideration possible, but regret that it is not possible to arrange for his reception at Jaffa or Haifa; they therefore hope that he will accept their offer and proceed with his family in H.M.S. "Delhi" to Cyprus on 18th June.

You should inform Ali of the above.

(Repeated to Cairo, No. 151.)

No. 97.

*Admiralty to H.M.S. "Delhi."*

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, June 17, 1925.

REFERENCE your No. 2030 of 15th June.

Reply to ex-King Hussein:—

"His Majesty's Government, whilst they are desirous of showing every possible consideration to ex-King Hussein, regret that they do not find it possible to arrange for his reception at Jaffa or Haifa. They are glad that he is prepared, if Jaffa or Haifa are not possible, to accept their offer to convey him and his family to Cyprus in one of His Majesty's ships, and they hope he will regard this arrangement as acceptable and proceed to Cyprus in H.M.S. 'Delhi' on 18th June."

(Repeated to Commander-in-chief, Mediterranean, No. 265.)



No. 98.

*Consul Bullard to Government of India (Foreign Department).—(Repeated to Foreign Office; Received June 18.)*

(No. 98.)

(Telegraphic.)

Jeddah, June 17, 1925.

YOUR telegram No. 741 S.

I am confident that report is reliable.

Provided it is not mentioned that release of the two Malabari pilgrims was due to intervention of representative of agency, I think news might be allowed to become known gradually and unofficially. I did not record the men's names, &c., and clerk has left for Rabigh.

No. 99.

*H.M.S. "Delhi" to Admiralty.—(Received June 20.)*

(Unnumbered.)

[Via Rinella W/T.]

(Telegraphic.)

June 20, 1925.

H.M.S. "Delhi" with ex-King of Hedjaz sailed from Suez.

(Addressed to Admiralty; Intelligence Staff Officer, Malta; and Commander-in-chief, Mediterranean. Repeated to "Cornflower.")

No. 100.

*Mr. Henderson to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received June 20.)*

(No. 227.)

(Telegraphic.)

Cairo, June 19, 1925.

FOLLOWING from Acting Governor-General of Sudan:—

"I am informed that 'Gorgistan,' another pilgrim ship, is under orders of owners to leave Kamaran for Port Sudan. I have telegraphed to India asking for her and similar ships to be held at Kamaran pending instructions from His Majesty's Government.

"While ready to assist Government of India, I would like to emphasise undesirability of overcrowding Port Sudan until situation is clearer."

No. 101.

*Consul Bullard to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received June 21.)*

(No. 102.)

(Telegraphic.)

Jeddah, June 20, 1925.

NEWS from "Cornflower" and Indian doctor at Rabigh is that landing of pilgrims from first two steamers nearly completed by evening of 19th June. First caravan due to leave for Mecca 20th June. No interference from blockading vessel.

(Sent to India.)

No. 102.

*Consul Bullard to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received June 21.)*

(No. 101.)

(Telegraphic.)

Jeddah, June 20, 1925.

FOREIGN Secretary said on 19th June that he had heard two British steamers and a British man-of-war were at Rabigh, and asked me whether pilgrims were being landed under protection of His Majesty's Government: I refused to give him a lead by answering this question.

I judge from description of Rabigh harbour given by commanding officer of sloop that entrance, which is very narrow, could be adequately watched by one

steamer on permanent guard, and that if blockading vessel had seized pilgrim ships it would have been hardly possible to argue that blockade was ineffective and illegal.

It is characteristic of Ali that he incurs all odium of hindering pilgrimage, but declined to take one step which would have made his interference effective.

Later.—Hedjaz Government are giving out that fear of man-of-war prevented their stopping pilgrim ships.

(Sent to India.)

[E 3679/1780/91]

No. 103.

*Consul Bullard to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received June 22.)*

(No. 54.)

Sir,

Jeddah, June 9, 1925.

I HAVE the honour to enclose a note on slavery in the Hedjaz.

Copies of this despatch and of the note are being sent to Nigeria, Singapore, Khartum, Cairo and the Senior Naval Officer, Red Sea Patrol.

I have, &amp;c

R. W. BULLARD.

Enclosure in No. 103.

*A Note on Slavery in the Hedjaz, with Suggestions for checking it.*

THE Hedjaz is probably as keen a market for slaves as ever it was. There is no sign that the practice of keeping slaves is dying out. In the towns, free servants working for wages are relatively rare; nearly all families which can afford it keep slaves, both male and female. Slave-owning is common among the tribes also. So general is slavery in the Hedjaz that even some British Indians were found, a year ago, to have been in the habit of keeping slaves. Domiciled Indians, Javanese and other elements of foreign origin follow the general practice. The seal of official and social approval is set on the horrible traffic by the exclusive use of slave eunuchs as guardians of the shrine at Mecca.

2. Not infrequently natives of the Yemen are found as slaves in the Hedjaz. There are also a few women from the Far East, and in rare cases Indians have been stolen by Bedouin. But the enormous majority of the slaves are Africans. They are classed as Abyssinians, Sudanese and Takrunis. "Abyssinian" covers all persons belonging to races which mainly inhabit Abyssinia, even though they may be from Italian or other adjacent territory; "Sudanese," natives of either Anglo-Egyptian or French Sudan; and "Takruni" (more correctly Takruri), all West Africans, whether they are from Nigeria, the Congo, the Cameroons, French West Africa or elsewhere.

3. The enslavement of Yemenis, who are natives of the Arabian peninsula and are often kept in slavery in their own country, stands on a different footing, from our point of view, from that of the enslavement of persons from overseas. To stop it would require measures which it is useless to hope for at present. It is therefore excluded from the scope of this memorandum.

4. It appears to have become rather the thing in the Hedjaz, among rich people, to have girls and women from the Far East as slave-concubines. They are rarer than Africans, and in consequence they fetch high prices—as much as £200 being paid, it is said, for a girl or a young woman, as against £60 or £70 for an Abyssinian. All these slaves are called "Javanese" in popular language, though there is reason to believe that some of them are Chinese. The Netherlands consulate has had several cases during the past year. Two young Javanese girls were handed over by other Javanese to a member of the Shaibi family, the hereditary keepers of the key of the Ka'bah, nominally for religious instruction, but really as concubines. A woman, a native of Mecca, brought back with her after a visit to Java a young Javanese girl whom she was supposed to instruct in religion; she kept her as a slave, and had her brought back by police when she tried to escape; and there have been other cases. Such evidence as there is goes to show that these Far Eastern slaves are brought here as pilgrims, via Singapore, where the difficulties of control are great, owing to the immense traffic with the neighbouring islands. People connected with the Far Eastern pilgrimage traffic have told a European doctor here that it is quite easy to smuggle Javanese or Chinese girls to the Hedjaz, via Singapore, to be sold as slaves.

[13651]

N 2



5. The supply of African slaves is maintained in two ways. The first is the more spectacular one of slave-raiding. This applies almost exclusively to Abyssinia and to such neighbouring territories as can be reached by raids from Abyssinia. The gangs of captives are marched to the African coast and shipped by dhow, usually to the Yemen or Asir. They are more rarely brought up to the Hedjaz by dhow. The common procedure is to sell the slaves at Midi, in Asir. Those intended for the Hedjaz are then marched up by land.

Such evidence as is available here shows that the majority of the slaves are shipped from near Tajura, in French Somaliland.

6. There is another method of supply which I believe is responsible for by far the larger number of cases of slavery, viz., the enslavement of Africans who have come or been brought to the Hedjaz for some religious purpose, usually the pilgrimage. I give a few typical cases, drawn from the experience of the last two years:—

A party of Africans making their way on foot from Medina to Jeddah is attacked by Bedouin. One man is killed, the wife and brother of another are carried off into slavery.

The headman of a village in the Sudan is coming on the pilgrimage. He persuades several people to let their young sons go with him; this will enhance his importance, and in return the boys will perform the pilgrimage at his expense. Arrived in Mecca he sells the boys.

A child comes on the pilgrimage with its father or mother. The parent dies, and the child is then sold by anyone who can get hold of it.

A man of learning in Nigeria offers to take a young boy with him to Mecca to put him to school. In Mecca he sells the boy.

A Nigerian marries a widow with a young daughter. They come on the pilgrimage and he sells the daughter.

The headmen of the various African communities in Jeddah and elsewhere in the Hedjaz take an active part in this knavery and share in the proceeds.

7. Instructions against slave-trading and slavery were issued by the Sublime Porte (always under stimulus from the Powers and especially from His Majesty's Government) at various times during the latter half of the 19th century, and under the Ottoman Constitution of 1908 the status of slavery ceased to exist in the Ottoman Empire. These measures were not very effective in the Hedjaz, where slave-owning was so firmly rooted and the source of supply so near, and where the Ottoman Government was obliged to compromise with local opinion on many points; but there was one provision which was of value, viz., that which provided for the manumission of African slaves. This was in accordance with Chapter IV of the General Act of the Brussels Conference, of which Turkey was a signatory. Article 71 of the Act provided that "diplomatic and consular agents . . . of contracting Powers shall . . . give their assistance to the local authorities, in order to assist in repressing the slave trade." What happened in practice was that slaves would take refuge with one of the foreign consuls at Jeddah or elsewhere (at Jeddah it was usually the British, sometimes the French consul), and the consul would then apply to the local authorities and see that the applicant was duly freed. But for this foreign intervention few if any slaves could have hoped for freedom. At one time, I learn from a French consul who was at Jeddah before the war, as many as thirty or forty slaves a month were being freed through the instrumentality of the British and French consulates. The Turkish authorities grew alarmed at the discontent which this aroused among the people of Jeddah, and tried to restrain the efforts of His Britannic Majesty's consul by telling him that if he continued to show such activity in the liberation of slaves, they would not be answerable for his safety, except within the city walls. His Britannic Majesty's consul continued both to free slaves and to take rides and walks on the desert, with no untoward results.

8. The practice of manumission at the instance of the British representative in Jeddah seems to have fallen into abeyance during the war—no doubt because the British military mission was otherwise engaged, and it seems not to have been until about 1921 or 1922, when the Jeddah agency began to settle down to a more normal life, that the slavery question arose again. It was then found that the new king proposed to chastise slaves with scorpions. He took up an uncompromising attitude, and, in spite of remonstrances from His Majesty's Government, maintained it until the end of his reign. It was this: Slavery is legal according to the Koran, and he, therefore, could not prevent it in his territory; all slaves come from or

through territories controlled by European Powers, and these Powers had only to stop potential slaves from reaching the Hedjaz. He once freed a Sudanese, but only because the slave had been sold into slavery by other Sudanese and he wanted to convince the British agency that it was our people who were responsible. During my sixteen months' service in Jeddah before the abdication of King Hussein, only one slave—a Sudanese woman with a small child—applied to this agency for assistance. Several slaves have stated since that they were so much afraid of King Hussein that they did not dare to run away while he was king. The case of the Sudanese woman had to be taken up very strongly. She had actually been sold in the presence of the Governor of Jeddah after evidence had been given that she had recently come from the Sudan, and the Governor took great credit to himself for insisting on the woman's child being sold with the mother and not to a different master. King Hussein showed the greatest ill-will in the matter, and it was only after the strongest protests from this agency that the woman was sent away to the Sudan. In at least two cases in which my Netherlands colleague was concerned, King Hussein practised the meanest deceit. The Netherlands consul demanded the release of certain Javanese girls who had been sold into slavery, and King Hussein professed to be much shocked at the facts. In the presence of the Netherlands vice-consul (a Javanese) he handed over the charge of the girls to a disinterested third person and promised that they should be sent to Jeddah, but he profited by the departure of the Netherlands consul on leave shortly afterwards to allow them all to be taken back into slavery.

9. The outrageous attitude of King Hussein drove the Jeddah representatives of Great Britain, France, Italy and the Netherlands to draw up, as a *pis aller*, a scheme which it was hoped would tend to check at least the grosser abuses. The essence of it was that the four Powers should make joint representations to King Hussein, in which, while not admitting that the detention in slavery of any human being is legitimate, they should confine themselves to the suppression in the Hedjaz of the enslavement or detention in slavery of persons subjects of or protected by the four Powers. They hoped that King Hussein would at least give written assurances on this point, and that the Powers could perhaps then induce or compel him to promise at least to instruct his officials to inform the consul concerned whenever it came to their notice that a foreign subject was being held in slavery in the Hedjaz.

This was in August 1924. Early in September the war with Nejd began, and the scheme was not proceeded with. Probably it was too optimistic in any case, and King Hussein's fanaticism, obstinacy, and resentment at what might appear foreign interference, would have been too strong for the Powers.

10. Soon after King Hussein's withdrawal from Jeddah to Akaba, African slaves began to take refuge at this agency. In theory they might just as well have gone to any other foreign representative, but, except for a very few Abyssinians who went to the Italian consulate, all the runaways seem to have come to the British agency. This unequal distribution is perhaps partly due to a belief that His Majesty's Government are more in earnest than other Powers in the matter of the slave trade, but it is due partly to the fact that all Sudanese and all "Takrunis" are considered vaguely as British subjects.

The question threatened to become embarrassing. The flood began just when it seemed likely that Ibn Saud would capture Jeddah, and when, consequently, the agency might at any moment need all its time and all its space for British refugees. Then there was the political aspect. The new King, Ali, is, in theory, very liberal-minded on the question of slavery. He declares that "after the war" the importation of human beings for the purpose of slavery, and even the sale of slaves within the Hedjaz, will be forbidden and suppressed, and that something (undefined) will be done to secure the liberation of persons already in slavery. Only at present his power is limited. This weakness makes him, on the one hand, unable to resist any reasonable demand this agency may make, and, on the other, very anxious not to alienate public opinion, which sees no moral harm whatever and much profit in the institution of slavery. It was not possible for this agency to deny the right of asylum altogether in exchange for promises which, in my opinion, Ali will never be strong enough to fulfil; on the other hand, it was undesirable, by pushing the slavery question too hard, to create serious political troubles for the Hedjaz Government at the present time. Another reason for not carrying the matter with too high a hand is that we do not know what attitude Ibn Saud would adopt if he took Jeddah; if he proved difficult, the stronger the position taken up in Ali's time the more humiliating to His Majesty's Government it would be to have to recede



from it. Finally, a compromise was made. Slaves are allowed to take refuge in this agency, but in limited numbers. So far as possible the number kept to be sent away by the next steamer is limited to two or three; subsequent applicants are advised to return home quietly and wait for another boat, unless there is reason to believe that the slave's intention to escape has become known and that he will be ill-treated. A list of the slaves and their masters is sent privately to the Foreign Secretary. Unless he has some cause to show to the contrary (as *e.g.*, where the slave is accused of having stolen money from his master) the slaves are then sent away by a convenient steamer. Under even this restricted scheme the agency has sent away nearly forty slaves during the last few months. Most of them were sent to the Sudan, but four Abyssinians who took refuge in this agency were given free passages to Massawa on an Italian boat at the instance of the Italian consul.

11. There is no doubt that the measures taken by the European Powers outside the Hedjaz exercise a check on the importation of African slaves. The mere fact of the naval patrol discourages the slaver to some extent, and the capture of a slave dhow by H.M.S. "Cornflower" in 1922, the release of about thirty slaves, and the condemnation of the slavers at Aden is believed to have exercised a deterrent effect for some considerable time. Another check was administered about a year ago, when, as the result of information obtained from the Italian consulate in Jeddah, a slaver was captured at Aden and he and several of his accomplices were tried and condemned to imprisonment and fines by a native court in Jibuti. Such measures, however, are not sufficient by themselves to stop the lucrative trade in Abyssinian slaves, and they do not touch the other half of the problem—the enslavement of Africans who come or are brought to the Hedjaz in connection with the pilgrimage or some other religious duty.

12. I do not think that any serious advance towards the suppression of slavery—or even of the enslavement of our own people—in the Hedjaz can be hoped for without the adoption of the following measures:—

- (1.) Control, through the passport system or by other means, at the place of origin and/or the port of final departure. An essential part of this control would be—
- (2.) Some restriction on the taking of children or young persons to the Hedjaz.
- (3.) The revival of the practice of manumission at the instance of any of the European representatives in Jeddah. This should be associated with—
- (4.) A scheme whereby the slaves can be sent out of the country (if they wish to go) immediately after manumission.

*Control at the Place of Origin and/or the Port of Final Departure.*

13. This applies to the Far East and to Africa.

- (1.) It has just been decided to compel all persons sailing for the Hedjaz from Singapore or Penang to provide themselves with passports. This should check, if not quite abolish, the trade in Javanese and Chinese girls and women which, it is believed, has begun to spring up.
- (2.) The Nigerian Government decided some time ago that for many reasons the flow of Nigerians eastwards needed stricter observation, if not control. Mr. G. J. Lethem, the Resident of Bornu, has recently visited the Sudan and Jeddah to investigate this and other questions.

*Some Restriction on the taking of Children or Young Persons on the Pilgrimage.*

14.—(1.) The application of such a measure at Singapore and Penang would encounter obvious difficulties. Few Far Eastern pilgrims come to the Hedjaz for less than four or five months, and many stay for a second pilgrimage, or even for several years, and many of them bring their children with them. Probably a restriction of this kind is unnecessary in the Far East; there is no evidence of more than sporadic cases of the enslavement of children from Java and other Far Eastern territories.

(2.) It is essential, I think, to apply some such restriction in Nigeria and the Sudan. A suggestion to this effect was made in the Jeddah Pilgrimage Report for 1924, and Mr. Lethem, before he reached Jeddah, had arrived independently at a similar conclusion. The typical cases I have quoted in paragraph 6 explain the necessity for it. Of the cases with which I have been directly concerned or of which I have information, eight or nine out of ten relate to slaves who were brought to this country when they were very young and sold either by the person who brought them

or by someone into whose hands they happened to fall. An adult can make some attempt to resist being captured or sold, and, in any case, has a clear memory of his country and his language, and will not easily abandon hope of flight; but a child, unless it happens to be in Jeddah, has no chance of escape while it is small, and by the time it has grown big enough to try to escape it has very likely forgotten its language, and even the names of its parents and its native place.

*The Revival of the practice of Manumission at the instance of any of the European Representatives in Jeddah.*

15. It is intolerable that slaves, nearly all of whom are of foreign birth, should be worse off in the Hedjaz now than when the country was under the Turks. His Majesty's Government have a peculiar right to insist on this, since they were the chief instrument in the liberation of the Hedjaz, while, on the other hand, many, if not most, of the slaves are from territories for which they are responsible.

Besides this very strong moral argument, there is a practical argument in favour of the old manumission policy as against a more limited scheme such as that put forward in August 1924, under which each Power would have claimed freedom only for natives of its own territories. In the first place, "Abyssinians" would benefit, although there is no Abyssinian consul in Jeddah. Again, it is in practice always difficult, and in many cases impossible, to determine the exact place of origin of an African slave. Political frontiers in Africa do not coincide with racial and linguistic limits. A race of which the main body is in Abyssinia may overflow into Italian or other territory; Fallatah-speaking "Takrunis" are to be found, I understand, in Nigeria, the Cameroons and French West Africa; and there is often no racial distinction (though tribal face-marks may serve as a guide) between natives of Anglo-Egyptian and French Sudan. Moreover, many slaves were stolen so young as to have forgotten their native tongue, and even where they were born. The only practical policy is to insist on the old right to manumission of any African slave who takes refuge with the representative in Jeddah of any Power signatory of the Brussels Convention.

*Provision for the Repatriation to Africa of every Manumitted Slave who wishes to leave the Hedjaz.*

16. This I consider to be an essential part of the scheme. There is reason to believe that a considerable proportion of the slaves who were manumitted before the war at the instance of foreign consuls were re-enslaved, and that was in the time of the Turks, when there was a foreign Government not entirely dependent on local favour. Even where an owner frees a slave voluntarily, in order to gain the approval of Heaven, which the Koran promises, he frequently retains the certificate of manumission and keeps the slave in his house on terms very little different from those of slavery, thus purchasing the approval of Heaven at the cheapest rate, and, even if the owner keeps to the bond, he may die, and a relative can (and not infrequently does) sell the freed slave. It is common for mutawwifs (pilgrim guides) to persuade wealthy Javanese pilgrims to buy slaves and set them free as an act of charity, and there is good reason to believe that the same slave serves this purpose over and over again, like flowers at charity bazaars. It is to be expected, then, that masters forcibly deprived of their slaves would not acquiesce cheerfully in the loss. The certificate granted to the slave could easily be stolen from him and destroyed, and a very small bribe would secure the destruction of the corresponding record in the Jeddah Shara' Court. It is true that the ex-slave would be registered at the consulate at the instance of which he was freed, but if he were, *e.g.*, sold to the Bedouin, it would be impossible for the consul to disprove an allegation that he had died or left the country. I have frequently asked slaves whether they wished to be freed and to remain in the country, and not one thought the offer worth considering; they all felt that so long as they remained in the Hedjaz nothing could protect them from their masters and the police.

Since the above paragraph was drafted I have found support for my contention in a circular sent to the Valis of the Ottoman Empire by the Minister of the Interior on the 6th January, 1891. It is to be found in Young's "Corps de Droit ottoman," volume II, p. 184. According to this circular, the British Embassy at Constantinople had stated that not only were African slaves being introduced into the Ottoman Empire in spite of the prohibition of the traffic, but sometimes those who had been set free and provided with certificates of manumission were sent away into the provinces, where they naturally fell back into slavery.



17. If the manumission-repatriation scheme were approved, the details of repatriation could be worked out later. It must be decided where the freed slaves are to be sent, and how the fund to provide for them until they are freed and to pay for their passages is to be raised and maintained. The expenses of the last few months have fallen on the charity fund of this agency, except that the Italian consul obtained free passages to Musawwa for four Abyssinians, but this arrangement cannot go on long; the fund will not stand it. All the slaves whom this agency has been instrumental in sending away, except five Abyssinians, have been sent to the Sudan, with the kind permission of the Governor, Red Sea Province, who readily agreed to take any freed African slaves (except Abyssinians, for whom I proposed to make other arrangements) that were sent to him from Jeddah.

I may perhaps venture to make here a proposal which I have already made privately to the Governor, Red Sea Province. It is that there should be in the Sudan an institution—under the control, perhaps, of some anti-slavery society or some missionary organisation—to which slaves would be sent as a matter of course. The Sudan authorities may not have difficulty in dealing with the two or three at a time whom we are sending at present, but the adoption of a scheme such as I have suggested would probably produce a flood of freed slaves with which it would be unreasonable to expect the Sudan Government to deal. There would be old and sick people who could not work, women with young children, young boys not yet of age to start life by themselves, and so on. A charitable society devoting itself to the work could give each case individual treatment. Moreover, to such a society Jeddah could perhaps send *all* slaves, whatever their origin—Abyssinian as well as Sudanese and Takrunis and even, if necessary, an occasional slave from the Far East. The foreign representatives here, especially the British, would have enough to do to secure manumission, and to be able to ship all freed slaves to the Sudan would simplify the work, the more so as the Sudan is the only territory near by to which there is a regular and fairly frequent service of steamers, and these steamers are British.

18. The suggestions I have made have this to recommend them: they require nothing of the Hedjaz authorities except recognition of the manumission procedure which was in force under the Turks and for which there is much more to be said now. Once that recognition was obtained we should be independent of the attitude of the Hedjaz people and of any particular Hedjaz ruler. If the ruler happened (a most improbable hypothesis) to be both opposed to slavery and able to enforce his views, so much the better; but he is more likely to be like Hussein, fanatical and reactionary, or like Ali, amiable but far too weak to take an unpopular line. Ibn Saud, who is as strong and statesmanlike a ruler as Arabia is ever likely to have, have had to allow an illiberal religious policy which he himself disapproves to be followed in Mecca, because he cannot afford to alienate his more fanatical followers. Still less would any ordinary Arab ruler be prepared to oppose his people in the matter of slavery, in which their prejudices and their interests would be all against him. For it must be admitted that no help in securing the abolition or limitation of slavery is to be expected from the people of the Hedjaz. Many decent people in England found arguments for slavery little more than a century ago, and in the United States much later. It is not to be wondered at, then, that the Hedjazi, who—thanks mainly to the parasitical life he leads—is one of the basest creatures on earth, finds much to be said in favour of a system which provides him not only with cheap labour but also with as many concubines as he can afford to buy.

R. W. BULLARD.

No. 104.

*Consul Bullard to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received June 22.)*

(No. 103.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Jeddah, June 22, 1925.

WAHABI withdrawal from neighbourhood of Jeddah.

Ibn Saud written to foreign representatives saying that although military considerations necessitate changes in disposition of army, siege of Jeddah by no means abandoned, and that he guarantees the safety of pilgrim routes.

He has probably withdrawn to some place on the Mecca road which can be held by small force while bulk of Wahabis perform pilgrimage.

(Sent to India.)

No. 105.

*Consul Bullard to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received June 23.)*

(No. 104.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Jeddah, June 23, 1925.

MECCA newspaper of 20th June contains an interview in which Ibn Saud says he has despatched orders that forces sent against Akaba and Maan should not attack, giving as reason that King Hussein is leaving Akaba and that Transjordan will send no more troops or munitions of war that way.

(Sent to Jerusalem, Bagdad and Cairo.)

[E 3515/10/91]

No. 106.

*Foreign Office to Consul Bullard (Jeddah).*

(No. 79.)

Sir,

*Foreign Office, June 23, 1925.*

I AM directed by Mr. Secretary Chamberlain to acknowledge the receipt of your despatch No. 41, Secret, of the 18th May, describing the recent visit to Mecca of a representative of His Majesty's agency.

2. Mr. Chamberlain has read your report with interest and desires that you will convey in a formal manner to Munshi Ihsanullah an expression of his great appreciation of the zeal, ability and discretion which the munshi showed in performing in difficult circumstances much valuable work on behalf of British interests in the course of his visit to Mecca.

3. I am to add that Mr. Chamberlain considers that you exercised commendable discretion in despatching the munshi on this mission.

I am, &c.

LANCELOT OLIPHANT.

[E 3771/10/91]

No. 107.

*Question asked in the House of Commons, June 24, 1925.*

#### THE HEDJAZ.

Mr. Ponsonby asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether the seaport of Akaba, in the Hedjaz, has been abandoned by King Hussein; and into whose hands it has now fallen?

*Answer.*

Mr. Amery: I have been asked to reply to this question. His Majesty's Government have never regarded the town of Akaba as falling within the limits of the Hedjaz, nor has its occupation by the Hedjaz ever had their formal consent. Ex-King Hussein, who retired thither from Jeddah after his abdication, has now left it at the request of His Majesty's Government and has transferred his residence to Cyprus. The Government of Transjordan is taking steps to assert its authority over Akaba.

Captain Wedgwood Benn: Was Transjordan to be delimited under the mandate?

Mr. Amery: No. I will answer a question of the hon. and gallant Member later on that subject.



No. 108.

*Consul Bullard to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received June 25.)*

(No. 105.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Jeddah, June 24, 1925.*

PILGRIMS from all three steamers landed at Rabigh without interference; caravan arrangements appear to be quite satisfactory.

(Sent to India.)

No. 109.

*Consul Bullard to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received June 27.)*

(No. 106.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

*Jeddah, June 27, 1925.*

ALI received from Abdullah request for transfer of railway in Maan district. He begs me to telegraph to His Majesty's Government asking if this question cannot be left open for the present to safeguard him from accusation of giving up Wakf property as well as Hedjaz territory. He is prepared to hand over railway later.

Minister for Foreign Affairs says that it is not intended to use Maan-Akaba route for munitions of war, and that in any case British control presumably sufficient to prevent that.

I transmit request because of Ali's insistence, not because I think it reasonable.

(Sent to India and Jerusalem.)

No. 110.

*Consul Bullard to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received June 27.)*

(No. 107.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

*Jeddah, June 27, 1925.*

ABOUT 250 British pilgrims had drifted to Jeddah by various routes. Some 80 were Indian, 150 Nigerian.

At my request, Ali yesterday allowed them to pass through lines in order to proceed to Mecca.

(Sent to India.)

No. 111.

*Mr. Austen Chamberlain to Consul Bullard (Jeddah).*

(No. 45.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

*Foreign Office, June 29, 1925.*

FOLLOWING message should be despatched to Ibn Saud, in continuation of that contained in my telegram No. 35 of the 27th May:—

"His Majesty's Government still await a reply from your Highness regarding their suggestion that negotiations should be opened immediately with a view to the settlement of all outstanding points between yourself and Transjordan and Irak. In accordance with the decision of His Majesty's Government, communicated to you in their previous message, ex-King Hussein has transferred his place of residence from Akaba to Cyprus, where he is now established. Steps have also been taken to re-establish the authority of the Transjordan Government in the Ma'an Vilayet and Akaba. Your Highness will thus observe that His Majesty's Government have thus removed any possible ground for the supposition that territory for which they are responsible is being or will be used as a base for Hedjaz operations against Nejd.

"In these circumstances, there can, in the opinion of His Majesty's Government, no longer be any obstacle to the opening of negotiations for a

comprehensive settlement of outstanding disputes. His Majesty's Government will be glad to learn that your Highness is willing to co-operate in the early initiation of the proposed negotiations, and to receive any suggestions that you may have to offer regarding the venue and the general conduct of the discussions."

(Repeated to Bagdad, No. 10; Jerusalem, No. 5; and Bushire, No. 5.)

No. 112.

*Consul Bullard to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received June 30.)*

(No. 108.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Jeddah, June 29, 1925.*

ALI has at last recognised that he is beaten. Last straw is final refusal of Palestine troops to serve any longer without pay. He has had to promise to repatriate them to Maan within about three weeks.

Other causes are: (1) Complete lack of money and probability that Hussein will send no more; (2) loss of Maan and Akaba, whereby communication with Medina cut; (3) fact that several thousand pilgrims reached Mecca from oversea (successful disembarkation of Indians, and especially stores, at Rabigh was a very severe blow); (4) defeat inflicted on Hedjaz forces which, emboldened by withdrawal of Wahabis from immediate neighbourhood, ventured out a few miles.

Ali is appealing to His Majesty's Government (my immediately following telegram to Foreign Office only), though I have not ceased to keep before him principle laid down by His Majesty's Government that only on application of both sides could they intervene.

Ali may hang on a few weeks (if not attacked) through sheer irresolution, but he has lost the illusions which sustained him, and cannot last long.

(Sent to Simla, Bushire, Bagdad and Jerusalem.)

No. 113.

*Consul Bullard to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received June 30.)*

(No. 109.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

*Jeddah, June 29, 1925.*

ALI urgently requests me to send His Majesty's Government message, of which following is a summary:—

"I am confident that His Majesty's Government, who took such an important part in securing independence of the Hedjaz, do not desire to see critical situation continue. [Group undecypherable] Maan and Akaba and lack of money necessitating demobilisation of Palestine troops compel me to appeal to them. Neutrality does not exclude friendship. Moreover, war now known to be personal and political and not religious.

"I need favour long shown to me and my country by British Government; they are aware of my friendship.

"I accepted the throne only under pressure from the Hedjaz people and because of barbarity of the enemy to which my honour would not let me expose them. Sincerely desirous of stopping bloodshed, I beg His Majesty's Government to take steps which appear to them most efficacious to ward off calamity. I should be glad to learn their views on this request, which I am confident will not be fruitless."



## CHAPTER III.—PALESTINE.

[E 11059/4300/65]

No. 114.

*Foreign Office to Colonial Office.*

Sir,

*Foreign Office, January 15, 1925.*

WITH reference to your letter of the 8th ultimo on the subject of ecclesiastical property in Palestine, I am directed by Mr. Secretary Chamberlain to inform you that he concurs in the terms of the proposed procedure, as outlined in paragraph 4 of the draft despatch to His Majesty's High Commissioner enclosed therein, for conducting the enquiry referred to in article 3 of the Order in Council of the 25th July, 1924.

2. The Secretary of State is, however, inclined to doubt whether it is desirable, as suggested in the fourth paragraph of your letter, to acquaint the Council of the League of Nations now with the procedure which it is proposed to adopt for dealing with the case of Russian ecclesiastical property and to seek the Council's approval thereof.

3. As a general rule, Mr. Chamberlain considers it neither right nor desirable that the mandatory Power should ask the Council for approval of some administrative action contemplated in mandated territory, before that action has actually been taken; for the mandatory has full authority to conduct the administration of the mandated territory in such manner as he thinks fit, subject to his general responsibility to the League and to his observance of the terms of the mandate, of which the Council assures itself by means of the annual reports submitted to it by the mandatory and scrutinised by the Permanent Mandates Commission. It is, moreover, known that the Council is reluctant either to sanction or to disapprove in advance any administrative action contemplated by the mandatory in the future, as may be seen from the minutes of the discussion at Geneva on the 25th September, regarding a proposed loan to the Administration of New Guinea.

4. The general arguments set forth above are not, however, strictly applicable to the problems which have arisen in Palestine in connection with the Holy Places and Russian ecclesiastical property. These problems stand on a somewhat different footing from purely local administrative questions in a mandated territory, which are dealt with in the mandatory's annual report and considered by the Permanent Mandates Commission; for pending the constitution of the Holy Places Commission under article 14 of the mandate, the responsibility for all decisions affecting the Holy Places and religious buildings or sites remains, under article 13 of the mandate, with the mandatory—i.e., His Britannic Majesty, not the Palestine Administration—who is responsible solely to the League of Nations, as represented by the Council.

5. In these circumstances it appears to Mr. Chamberlain that the special case now under consideration should be decided by His Majesty's Government on its merits as a matter of policy, and that the dominating element in that decision should be the question whether His Majesty's Government stand to lose or gain by the delay in the establishment of the Holy Places Commission, to which the attention of the Council would inevitably be called by a communication of the nature indicated in the last paragraph of your letter. This delay is solely due to the failure of the Council to agree on the constitution of that body; and the mere attempt to reach such agreement has given rise to unedifying political wrangles between the chief Roman Catholic States, in which it is clearly impossible for His Majesty's Government to intervene. Mr. Chamberlain is therefore of opinion that unless Sir H. Samuel considers it necessary from a local point of view to expedite the setting up of the commission, His Majesty's Government have nothing to gain by any action which might have that effect, and that it is preferable to allow the matter to rest as long as possible.

6. It is, on the other hand, arguable that if the Council were informed of the proposed procedure for dealing with cases withdrawn from the competence of the Palestine courts, and if it considered that procedure satisfactory and of a nature to ensure justice being done to the various Christian communities concerned, the States represented on the Council might be the more content not to resume the difficult task of endeavouring to agree among themselves regarding the constitution of the commission. There can, however, be no certainty that the Council would regard the matter in this light; and Mr. Chamberlain feels that the balance of argument is on

the whole against any communication being made to the Council on the subject. He will be glad to learn whether Mr. Secretary Amery shares this view and is disposed to modify the last sentence of the draft despatch to Sir H. Samuel accordingly.

7. I am further directed to enquire, with reference to paragraph 4 of Foreign Office letter of the 24th October, whether the duties hitherto performed by the Spanish consul at Jerusalem in connection with Russian property have now been transferred to a trustee appointed by the Palestine Government.

I am, &amp;c.

D. G. OSBORNE.

[E 2727/214/65]

No. 115.

*Memorandum communicated by the United States Embassy, May 9, 1925.*

THE American Embassy refers to a note dated the 10th December, 1924, from His Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and to the Embassy's reply dated the 19th December, 1924, relative to the question of the jurisdiction of the Palestinian authorities over United States citizens, and to the desirability of a continuance of the discussions relating to this subject since the conclusion of the Palestine Convention signed on the 3rd December, 1924, between the United States and Great Britain. Reference is also made to an informal enquiry of the Foreign Office as to whether the United States Government is prepared to proceed to the exchange of ratifications of the convention.

In particular, this correspondence raises again (1) the status of certain cases, involving American citizens or interests, adjudicated by the Palestine courts in contravention of the capitulatory rights of the United States and in disregard of the provisional arrangement made in 1922 and 1923 between the American consul at Jerusalem and the legal secretary of the Palestine Government, as to the procedure to be followed in civil and criminal cases arising in Palestine, in which American citizens or interests should be defendants; and (2) the necessity of this Government's assent to the imposition upon American citizens or interests of any dues or taxes not contemplated by the capitulatory régime, or to the collection from its nationals or interests of any increase in such dues or taxes.

The Embassy learns that, in disregard of the agreement between the American consul at Jerusalem and the legal secretary, eight judgments against American citizens or interests have been rendered by the Palestine courts, that two of such judgments have been executed without the assistance of the consulate, and that there is now pending in a Palestine court one case wherein an American citizen is named as defendant. In each of the cases referred to the consulate has lodged a written protest against the action of the Palestine authorities.

In making such protests the consul has based his action on the following considerations: Article 8 of the convention of the 3rd December, 1924, provides that it shall enter into effect only upon the exchange of ratifications by the contracting parties; article 8 of the mandate for Palestine (incorporated in the preamble to the convention) provides that, during the period of the mandate, "the privileges and immunities of foreigners, including the benefits of consular jurisdiction and protection as formerly enjoyed by capitulation or usage in the Ottoman Empire shall not be applicable in Palestine;" and the United States Government has consistently maintained the position that the privileges and immunities in question could be relinquished only by treaty agreement.

The conclusion logically to be drawn from the foregoing considerations is that, pending the exchange of ratifications of the convention of the 3rd December, 1924, the consul at Jerusalem should continue to exercise extra-territorial jurisdiction in cases, involving American citizens, which, under the capitulatory régime, were properly within the jurisdiction of the American Consular Court. And this view the United States Government maintains. That this conclusion was accepted in principle is shown by the above-mentioned agreement concluded in 1922 and 1923 between the consulate and the legal secretary of the Palestine Government.

Before proceeding to the exchange of ratifications of the convention of the 3rd December, 1924, the American Embassy, under the instructions of its Govern-

[13651]

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ment, is therefore desirous of ascertaining whether His Majesty's Government is prepared to give assurances in the following sense:—

1. That the pending case will be dropped;
2. That the two judgments, already rendered by the Palestine courts and executed in disregard of the provisional agreement, will be cancelled, and that sums collected from American citizens without the assistance of the consulate will be refunded; and
3. That the six judgments, already rendered but not as yet executed, will not be executed after the exchange of ratifications.

The American Embassy adds that, after the entering into effect of the convention of the 3rd December, 1924, the United States Government would, of course, have no objection to the retrial of the nine cases in question. A further reason for desiring these assurances is that, in some, if not all, of the cases in question, judgment was rendered *in absentia*, the American defendant having absented himself from the court of trial upon the advice of the American consulate and as a protest against the assumption of jurisdiction by the Palestine court.

The question of the imposition upon American nationals of the increased Palestine import duties which have not received the assent of the United States Government is reserved for further discussion.

*United States Embassy, London, May 4, 1925.*

#### CHAPTER IV.—SYRIA.

[E 239/239/89]

No. 116.

*Consul Smart to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received January 15.)*

(No. 1.)

Sir,

*Damascus, January 3, 1925.*

WITH reference to Mr. Vaughan-Russell's despatch No. 160 of the 14th October last, I have the honour to report that an *arrêté* of the High Commissioner (No. 2973 of the 3rd December, 1924) has now been published, definitely appointing Captain Carbillet Governor of the State of the Jebel Druze.

I have, &c.

W. A. SMART.

[E 451/357/89]

No. 117.

*Consul-General Satow to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received January 26.)*

(No. 4.)

Sir,

*Beirut, January 9, 1925.*

DURING the last few weeks of 1924 the Administration was, so to speak, in a state of partially suspended animation. General Weygand had left on the 5th December, and General Sarraïl, his successor, had not yet arrived. It was realised that many changes would occur, and the natural tendency therefore was to mark time.

In May 1923, shortly before the arrival of General Weygand, there had been an outbreak of brigandage and murder in the Shouf district, and the old feuds between Druzes and Maronites showed signs of revival in a serious form. To deal with the situation special measures were taken; a kind of civil court-martial was created and a Military Governor of the district was appointed. These measures succeeded, and towards the end of 1924 the Military Governorship of the Shouf was abolished.

In August last several cases of raiding by brigands from Transjordan occurred in the Damascus State, regarding which Mr. Smart fully reported. Thanks to the energy of the Palestine authorities, steps were taken to deal with the situation, which relieved and reassured the French authorities, who had become seriously alarmed.

The steps taken somewhat later in the year to stamp out brigandage in the Bekaa were, I think, in part at any rate a sequel to this. The Bekaa brigands were reputed to be in touch with their colleagues in Transjordan. Even if they had not been, their activities were a sufficient source of annoyance to justify strong action, and, after a French non-commissioned officer had been killed on the Baalbeck road, this action was taken by a column under Colonel Carron. The brigands and their leaders, of whom the chief was Milhem Kassem, were forced to surrender, and the villages of the district were for the third time disarmed, the number of weapons collected being very considerable.

Owing to better relations with the Turks, raids in the north by bands known as "chetchs" ceased as from the end of March, while no trouble of any importance occurred in the eastern desert. The statement made on the departure of General Weygand that, during his tenure of office, public security had been improved and order maintained rests therefore on a substantial basis of fact. This does not mean, of course, that crime is non-existent, but if it be taken into consideration that many parts of the country, including the Lebanon, are still very backward and that only a few years have elapsed since the war which left the country well stocked with arms, public security may be said to be good. The extent to which motor transport is used everywhere is a proof of this, and may even in part be a cause.

There is nothing very special to relate in regard to the administration of the State of the Great Lebanon. One innovation introduced was the separation of the offices of Governor and of delegate of the High Commissioner, which had up till then been held by the same person. Complaints are made that there are still too many officials, and that in the remoter districts the poorer classes of the community are apt to be treated in an arbitrary fashion. Naturally, in these districts there



are no resident French advisers. A body known as the Council of State was created during the year with a native president and two members, one Lebanese and one French. Owing to death the Representative Council acquired a new president in the person of Me. Emile Eddé, a local lawyer.

After the withdrawal of Commandant Trabaud, a personally charming French naval officer, who was from all accounts a pretty useless Governor, and interregnum occurred, during which a M. Aubouard, of the French Colonial Service, was in temporary charge of the Great Lebanon. About the end of June General Vandenberg took up the post. He is an old soldier with a distinguished record whose last active service had been on the Rhine at Wiesbaden. Despite his 68 years, he has shown a surprising energy and capacity for hard work. He has endeavoured to give as much personal supervision as possible and to establish the principle that the best men, regardless of the religious confession to which they belong, should be employed. His services have, however, recently been dispensed with in circumstances which are described elsewhere.

As regards finance, the Great Lebanon appears to flourish. In 1923 the receipts amounted to £2,014,000 (Syrian) with a surplus of £28,000 (Syrian). The estimated receipts for the financial year ended the 31st December were £2,159,400 (Syrian), and it is believed these receipts have been realised. In the estimates for the year ending the 31st December, 1925, receipts figure at £2,482,950 (Syrian). All these figures only refer to direct taxation collected by the State. There has been no fresh taxation, and the increased yield is due to more efficient collection. Salaries have been increased, and various expenditure has been incurred, or is contemplated in connection with a motor car and official residence for the Governor. There is, of course, also indirect taxation collected by the Public Debt, while the customs revenue is collected by the High Commission and credited to the various States on a *pro rata* basis. I understand that a considerable surplus over the estimate is likely this year.

The Public Works Department has come in for a good deal of criticism. While making all due allowances for the poor quality of road material available and for the considerable motor traffic, one is forced to the conclusion that there is something wrong. It is patent even to a layman that the methods in use are faulty, and that when a road is either repaired or remade the work is scamped. The result is that even a remade road only lasts for a few months. The main roads, which receive the most attention, are therefore usually in poor condition. The best roads are those which have but little traffic over them. The contractors are the only ones who benefit by the system. A new method of tendering had been devised, but has been rejected by the Representative Council. Under it an amount was to have been fixed for which the work could be properly done with a fair profit. Any tender under this amount was to have been rejected, on the theory that the tenderer's only way of making a profit would be to scamp the work.

Roads have a very special importance to the Lebanon. It is held, and rightly, that one of the main sources of its prosperity should be its summer season. To get the visitors to their summer quarters and to enable them to derive some pleasure from their stay in the way of motoring trips, reasonably good roads are essential. Thanks to an advertising campaign, a very large number of visitors, estimated at between 10,000 and 15,000, came to the Lebanon last summer. Most of them were from Egypt, but Palestine, and even Irak, contributed their quotas. It is to be feared that, owing to the short-sighted rapacity of the Lebanese, many of these visitors went away disappointed.

It is unnecessary to say much about the importance to Beirut of the trans-desert motor routes which have been in regular operation for over a year. As a means of transport for passengers the utility of these routes is definitely established. As regards the possibility of developing a goods and parcels traffic to Irak and on to Persia, a matter in which the French are keenly interested, the future alone can show whether the hopes cherished are justified. One thing, at any rate, seems clear, and that is that the passenger rates must, with increasing competition, decrease.

As regards the Education Department of the Great Lebanon, one paper has remarked with a certain bitterness that it consists of a director and several offices, but produces no results. It is, of course, the declared policy of the Administration to leave, for the time being at any rate, secondary education in the hands of foreign institutions, religious or lay. But too great a proportion of the educational facilities appears to be concentrated in or near Beirut. In certain outlying regions there are still no schools, either primary or secondary. Beirut, with two universities,

St. Joseph (Jesuit) and American, turns out an unceasing flow of doctors, dentists and lawyers. What seems to be as much needed as anything are facilities for technical and agricultural instruction. The Beirut "Ecole des Arts et Métiers" has been reopened, but it seems to be working only in a modest way. Also, a normal school for training teachers was opened during the year.

To an onlooker it seems as if agriculture were rather neglected. The Government, on the whole, appears to adopt rather a passive attitude towards it. It is especially strange that no active measures are taken to combat the diseases of orange and kindred trees, which are obviously doing much harm. After all, even if the orange groves of Tripoli and Sidon cannot rival those of Jaffa, these are, at any rate, a source of revenue.

The silk industry has certainly revived, and has regained much of the ground lost during the war. The authorities have done their best to aid and encourage this industry. Recently fears have been expressed as to the harm likely to result to it from the ever increasing use of artificial silk. Competent authorities in France have expressed the opinion that these fears are baseless. They have, however, pointed out that the Lebanese silk is prepared in a primitive fashion, and that to this fact is due the existence in France of an unsold stock of this silk. Until more modern methods of preparation and winding are introduced, local producers would do well to export only cocoons which can be wound in France.

More could undoubtedly be done to profit by the fruit-growing possibilities of the country, and I believe that an effort to develop the export of fruit to Egypt is to be made. As regards cereal crops, some drainage work has been undertaken in the Bekaa plain, which is intended to render its southern extremity less liable to flooding and therefore both more productive and more healthy. The possibilities of cotton-growing have received attention. The main centre (the Idlib region) is outside my district, but I may perhaps mention that recently a M. Bérard, who is connected with the Banque de Syrie et du Grand Liban, was here in the interests of a company known as the "Société cotonnière de Syrie," which is to put up a cotton-ginning plant at Idlib. The company will also export cotton. The Crédit foncier d'Algérie et de Tunisie is financially interested in this company.

Various schemes for granting concessions for the development of water-power, for the building of hotels and for the creation of a sewerage system in Beirut have been under discussion, but nothing has so far materialised. The question of hotels is apparently inextricably bound up with the question whether gambling should or should not be allowed in the Lebanon. At present it is forbidden by law, but it is a pastime which makes a strong appeal to the natives and probably also to many of the summer visitors who have at present little else to occupy their time.

Although there is no society of which the avowed aim is to create a "Brighter Lebanon," the installation of electric light in the various Lebanese summer resorts is actually bringing this about. The enterprises are usually in the hands of some group of local notables, and the plant used is apt to err on the side of cheapness.

As regards Beirut itself, some attempt is being made to clean up the place. An enforced colour-washing of houses and walls abutting on the public roads, although not welcomed by the landlords, who as a rule prefer to see their houses drop to pieces rather than spend money on repairs, has certainly made the town less dingy. Also a good deal of building is in progress, and parts of the town torn down by the energetic Azmi Bey, who was Vali during the war, are being rebuilt. The Armenian refugees have helped to render building less costly. Complaints are heard that they are undercutting the natives and forcing them to emigrate. But emigration has long been a custom of the country, and it is more likely that the success of the Armenians is due to the fact that they are prepared to do better work at a less price.

This is hardly the place to discuss the probable commercial future of Beirut. Its inhabitants can, I think, fairly be described as a race of parasites who create themselves little or nothing and live largely on the percentages derived from selling the products of others. With a decreased sphere of influence it is clear that the profits so derived must be smaller. Nevertheless things go on much as before; imports are maintained at a high level as compared with exports, and, although many business houses are reputed to be shaky, they somehow succeed in weathering the storm.

There are still signs of a certain nervousness as to the future, and the mere appointment of a new High Commissioner with a believed Franklin-Bouillon outlook as regards the Turks has sufficed to set going rumours as to a possible cession of some part of Northern Syria to the Turkish Republic. It is, however, difficult to believe that such a first step on the downward path can be contemplated.



As regards the Alaouite State, which is nominally within my district, I can, as I have never visited it, say nothing at first hand. The district has up till now enjoyed the blessings of direct, or practically direct, French administration, and has been in the capable hands of such men as Colonel Nieger, General Billotte (until recently at Aleppo) and M. Cayla, the present Governor. It is reputed to be prosperous, and the town of Lattakia, its capital, has, from all accounts, made considerable progress, a statement which I should like to confirm by a personal visit this spring. The State is now an independent entity, having cut loose from the Syrian Union, a fact which has been marked by an issue of its own postage stamps. It has, however, still some connection with Beirut in judicial matters. It was also during the past year provided with a Council of its own, but I should imagine that this body is well under the control of the Governor.

As far as I can judge, the people in the two States which form this consular district have really very little to grumble about. Taxation has increased here, although not in the same proportion as elsewhere; the franc is unfortunately unstable and the commercial hinterland of Beirut has permanently decreased in size: but, unless the new High Commissioner introduces some very startling changes, which is, I imagine, unlikely, there seems to be no reason why things should not go forward, steadily if slowly.

I have, &c.

H. E. SATOW.

[E 541/471/89]

No. 118.

*Mr. Phipps to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received January 31.)*

(No. 256.)

Sir,

*Paris, January 30, 1925.*

I HAVE the honour to inform you that, during the debate in the Chamber on the budget for the Ministry for Foreign Affairs on the 23rd January, the question was raised of the possibility of the cession by France of various portions of Syria to the neighbouring countries. It was stated by certain Deputies that rumours were current that Alexandretta, Antioch and even Aleppo were to be ceded to Turkey, while Djézireh was to be handed over to Great Britain. It was further suggested that the railway from Deraa to Caiffa was to be ceded to Palestine. In reply, M. Herriot asserted that there was no truth whatever in any of these rumours, and that the French Government had no intention of handing over any portion of Syrian territory.

During the same debate M. Franklin-Bouillon, the president of the Chamber Commission on Foreign Affairs, made an interesting statement regarding the attitude of Turkey towards Syria, the main points of which were as follows—

"I can affirm that nothing is further from the truth than to say that the Government of Mustafa Kemal is determined to claim some part of Syrian territory. In making this statement, I speak as the negotiator of the Angora Treaty. The truth is that after long discussions between Mustafa Kemal and myself, the frontiers were determined in all good faith on both sides, without reserve. The position taken up by the Turks is the natural result of the new conceptions upon which the Angora Government is founded. Modern Turkey has accepted from the very beginning that the penalty of her action in joining with the Central Powers during the war was the loss of all her non-Turkish possessions. Since it is one of the principles of Turkey's present policy not to occupy territory which is not Turkish, we may be assured that the Government of Angora will keep its word.

"Since, however, certain elements of the Turkish population have of necessity remained on the French side of the frontier, and since there are Turkish interests on both sides of the line from Alexandretta to Djerablous, the Angora Government demanded the establishment of a *modus vivendi* which should prevent a conflict. To assume from this that the Turkish Government is anxious to reconquer those territories which it has recognised as being Syrian is more than an error—it is an injustice. We run the risk of creating artificially an 'irredentism' which does not really exist, and, under the pretext of defending French interests, we shall do them grave harm. Our policy should be to maintain that the frontier which has been fixed in all good faith between the two nations is definitive. But at the same time a policy of complete friendship should be carried on on both sides of

the frontier, so that no boundary incident can arise. The greater our determination to remain in Syria grows, the more friendly must our policy towards Turkey become. Without this, Syria can only be a millstone around the neck of France."

I have, &c.

ERIC PHIPPS.

[E 1135/1135/89]

No. 119.

*Consul Hough to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received February 25.)*

(No. 21. Confidential.)

Sir,

*Aleppo, February 12, 1925.*

I HAVE the honour to submit the following notes on the present state of political feeling among the Turkish element of the population of the Alexandretta sanjak. My sources of information are too varied for enumeration, but I have satisfied myself that the statements are accurate.

2 The Turkish attempt to create an "irredentist" movement may be said to have definitely failed. While the Turks on this side of the border have no active sympathy for the French, the reflection that, if their homes were a few miles further north, they would be liable to the hardships and miseries of service in the Turkish army is a powerful incentive for them to tolerate the French mandate. At the same time they are not averse, on general principles, from giving the French Administration as much trouble as is consistent with the maintenance of their fortunate position. Thus, formerly they were in active sympathy with the marauding bands that came over the border. This has, however, changed, as they ended by finding the bands an intolerable nuisance to their own affairs and by arriving at the conclusion that they would be ill-advised to continue assisting a movement whose aim is the incorporation of themselves in an empire of which they have no desire to be citizens. The gratifying result is that such Turkish "chétés" as have recently crossed the border have been promptly seized by the villagers themselves and handed over to the French authorities. The French have even entrusted the mukhtars of the villages with rifles with which to defend themselves against the "chétés."

3. I quote from a Turkish notable, of Antioch, a rather amusing explanation of a good deal of the apparent pro-Turkish feeling that still exists. His view is that, so long as Turkish elements maintain an affectation of "irredentism," their favour will be sought by the French, their various demands will be granted, where possible, and they will be in a strong and privileged position, which they would abandon if they allowed the French to understand that they were entirely content with their mandate. There is almost certainly a good deal of truth in this.

4. There is no doubt that, apart from the above considerations, they are genuinely impressed with the advantages of living in a country where public security is guaranteed and economic welfare vigorously striven for. Many of them are peaceable cultivators, who may be counted on to support the régime under which they have the best chance of sowing and reaping unmolested and of obtaining a good price for their products.

I have, &c.

W. HOUGH.

[E 1062/362/65]

No. 120.

*Mr. Austen Chamberlain to the Marquess of Crewe (Paris).*

(No. 808.)

My Lord,

*Foreign Office, March 7, 1925.*

THE Secretary of State for the Colonies has called my attention to a certain ambiguity which appears to exist regarding the section of Syrian territory separating the western frontier of Irak from Turkey.

2. According to the Franco-Turkish Agreement signed at Angora on the 20th October, 1921, the northern boundary of Syria separating that country from Turkey ran from Nisibin along the old Nisibin-Jazira road and ended upon the Tigris at Jazira, those two towns being left within Turkey. The country south of this line



(indicated thus = || = || = || = || on the accompanying map\*) upon the right bank of the Tigris, and north of whatever may be the northern boundary of Irak to the west of the Tigris, was thus included in Syria.

3. The frontier between Syria and Mesopotamia, as laid down temporarily in article 1 of the Franco-British Convention signed at Paris on the 23rd December, 1920, is described as (a) the Tigris from Jazira as far as the boundary of the former vilayets of Diarbekir and Mosul, i.e., up to the point marked "A" on the accompanying map\*; and (b) from that point as following the aforesaid boundary of the former vilayets southwards as far as Roumelan-Koeui. Section (a) of this line is indicated thus o - o - o - o - o on the map, and section (b) thus + + + + +.

4. The boundary laid down in the Franco-British Convention of the 23rd December, 1920, has never been delimited on the spot, as provided in article 2; and in actual practice the boundary between Syria and Irak has, since the signature of that convention, always been regarded as a straight line from the junction of the Khabur and Tigris to Tel-Roumelan (indicated thus - - - - - on the map). The junction of the Khabur and Tigris, together with the village of Faish-Khabur immediately to the south of that junction, have been occupied by the British, for obvious strategic reasons, ever since the Mosul Vilayet was taken over from the Turks in 1918; and the line laid down by the Council of the League of Nations at Brussels on the 30th October last as representing the *status quo* upon the signature of the Treaty of Lausanne (24th July, 1923) starts from the junction of the Khabur and the Tigris.

5. Technically, however, by the Anglo-French Convention of the 23rd December, 1920, Syria extends along the Tigris as far south of that junction as the point marked "A" on the accompanying map.\*

6. In July 1923, French officers visited Faish-Khabur and their escorts toured the area on the right bank of the Tigris opposite that village. It is not believed that any French posts are to be found in the part of Syria bounded by the line Nisibin-Tel-Roumelan-the Tigris at point "A"-Jazira; but the Turks are supposed to have posts to the south of Jazira and west of the Tigris, though they do not appear to have any posts south of the Karachok-Dagh (opposite Faish-Khabur).

7. The British military authorities consider it of the utmost military importance to guard against the possibility of the French allowing the Turks access to the right bank of the Tigris between Jazira and the boundaries of the former vilayets of Mosul and Diarbekir, since if such access were allowed, the strategical value of the boundary which His Majesty's Government have claimed for Irak before the League of Nations (starting from the junction of the Tigris and Khabur, and running eastwards along the rivers Khabur and Hazil) would be materially lessened. On the assumption, therefore, that the French regard the frontier between Irak and Syria as running from Tel-Roumelan to point "A" on the map, and not to the Khabur-Tigris junction, it is desirable to make sure that the French cannot by some agreement with the Turks give Turkey the right to occupy the area south of Jazira and west of the Tigris opposite Faish-Khabur, and on the right bank of the Tigris as far south as the line running from Tel-Roumelan to point "A."

8. I should be glad if your Excellency will cause discreet enquiries to be made at the French Ministry for Foreign Affairs on this subject, with a view to elucidate their attitude as regards the regions indicated in the preceding paragraphs.

I am, &c.

AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN.

[E 1493/362/65]

No. 121.

*The Marquess of Crewe to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received March 13.)*

(No. 625. Confidential.)

Sir,

Paris, March 12, 1925.

WITH reference to your despatch No. 808 of the 7th March, I have the honour to report that a member of my staff called at the Quai d'Orsay yesterday afternoon and raised the question of the position in the section of Syrian territory separating the western frontier of Irak from Turkey.

The circumstances regarding the frontier of this district as described in paragraphs 2, 3, 4 and 5 of your despatch were explained to the Département d'Asie at the Quai d'Orsay. It was pointed out that in view of the fact that the southern

\* Not reproduced.

portion of the frontier between Syria and Mesopotamia, as laid down in the Franco-British Convention of the 23rd December, 1920, had never been delimited on the spot and of the fact that the territory south of the line between the junction of the Tigris and Khabur rivers and Tel-Roumelan still remain in British occupation, it was clear that considerable uncertainty prevailed regarding the whole district. Moreover, it was understood that while there were no French posts in the area in question, it was possible that Turkish posts existed south of Jazira and west of the Tigris. It was, of course, a matter of great importance to His Majesty's Government that the Turks should not have access to the territory on the right bank of the Tigris, south of Jazira, as it was quite clear that their presence in such proximity to the Irak frontier would be undesirable.

The head of the Département d'Asie stated that there was no intention whatever of allowing the Turks to penetrate into this region, nor of entering into any agreement for such a purpose. Such action would indeed not be consistent with the position of France as mandatory for Syria. M. Clinchant alluded to the statement made by the President of the Council in the Chamber of Deputies on the 23rd January, in which M. Herriot asserted that the French Government had no intention of handing over any portion of Syrian territory. This statement and a statement made by M. Franklin-Bouillon at the same time were reported in Mr. Phipps's despatch No. 256 of the 30th January. With regard to the suggestion as to the absence of French and presence of Turkish posts in this area, M. Clinchant undertook to make enquiries from Beirut and to furnish further information.

As regards the facts mentioned in paragraph 4 of your despatch concerning the continuance of the provisional boundary line from the Khabur-Tigris junction to Tel-Roumelan, it is worth noting that M. Clinchant expressed surprise that the correct boundary should be from Tel-Roumelan to the point "A" on the map enclosed in your despatch and not from Tel-Roumelan to the Tigris-Khabur junction. He seemed, in conversation at least, to be unaware of any question of the Tel-Roumelan-point "A" boundary. In the course of the conversation M. Clinchant showed a map indicating the demands which have been made by the Turkish Government in the negotiations now proceeding for the modification of the Franco-Turkish frontier line between Nisibin and Jazira. As far as it was possible to ascertain accurately what the Turkish proposals were, they appeared to be a request for territory west and north of a line running from Jazira through Anjiwa and Masr to Girzerin. From Girzerin the line turns west and passes somewhat north of Hakemi to Girzerak, proceeding thence to Haiaki and thence westward in a line roughly the same distance southwards and more or less parallel to the Nisibin-Jazira frontier line as fixed by the Angora Agreement. A rough *tracé* indicating the Turkish demands is enclosed, but I would mention that it was only possible to note the names somewhat hastily from the map shown to the member of my staff by M. Clinchant, who agreed to the names being noted.

M. Clinchant expressed the opinion that the Turkish demands were ridiculous and that there was no question whatever of their being accepted as regards the whole of the territory indicated on the enclosed *tracé*. In particular, one serious objection to the Turkish proposals was that a strip of land would be left between the Tigris and the line of Jazira-Girzerin, communication with which from the rest of Syrian territory would be most inconvenient. It seemed likely that such concessions as would be made on the basis of the Turkish demands would be made further to the west.

I have, &c.

CREWE.

[E 2056/471/89]

No. 122.

*The Marquess of Crewe to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received April 6.)*

(No. 805.)

Sir,

Paris, April 2, 1925.

IN my telegram No. 102 of the 14th March I had the honour to report the departure of M. Franklin-Bouillon for Angora. Since that date there has been a plentiful crop of rumours as to the nature of M. Franklin-Bouillon's activities in Turkey. Yesterday a report appeared in the "Sans Fil" to the effect that an

\* Not reproduced.



arrangement had been reached for the retrocession to Turkey of Alexandretta, Antioch and Aleppo.

It was probably in consequence of this report that the French Government issued a *démenti* to the effect that English newspapers had announced that M. Franklin-Bouillon had been entrusted with negotiations in the name of the French Government regarding the cession of certain Syrian territories to Turkey. These reports were without any foundation. It should be observed, moreover, that M. Franklin-Bouillon had gone to Angora in a purely private capacity, and that in no way whatever had he received a mandate to carry on negotiations on behalf of the French Government.

This *démenti* is commented on in one or two of this morning's newspapers. The "Petit Parisien," for instance, after quoting the *démenti*, states that it must be observed on the other hand that the various questions outstanding between the two Governments are in a fair way of settlement. With regard to the reported cession of Antioch and Alexandretta, the "Petit Parisien" writes that there was never any question of their return to Turkey. There had, however, been a question of setting up an autonomous Administration in conformity with the Angora Agreement. That Administration had now been set up to the complete satisfaction of the Ottoman Government. With regard to the schools, out of forty scholastic establishments, twenty-two had adopted Turkish as their principal language, including the *lycée* at Antioch.

The "Petit Parisien" continues that the question of the delimitation of the Turco-Syrian frontier is equally on the point of settlement. Differences of opinion had only occurred in connection with a very small part of that frontier on the north-eastern extremity of Syria, where a mixed commission had examined the frontier. There was no difference of opinion with regard to that portion of the frontier which lay along the Bagdad Railway. As regards the Ottoman debt, there were hopes of an early agreement regarding the payment of coupons. Negotiations with regard to these various matters were, nevertheless, within the competence of M. Sarraut, the newly appointed French Ambassador.

The "Sans Fil," in publishing the *démenti*, also refers to various information which it has received, tending to show that M. Franklin-Bouillon's conversations have, in fact, touched upon the special régime to be given to the Vilayets of Antioch, Alexandretta and Aleppo, and states that the Turks are very anxious to see the terms of the Angora Agreement put into force in this connection.

I have, &c.  
CREWE.

No. 123.

Consul-General Satow to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received April 10.)

(No. 9.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Beirut, April 10, 1925.

DAMASCUS telegram No. 2.

Lord Balfour arrived without incident yesterday evening, and he proceeded on board, where he will remain.

(Sent to Jerusalem.)

No. 124.

Consul Smart to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received April 10.)

(No. 2.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Damascus, April 9, 1925.

LORD BALFOUR arrived yesterday amidst hostile popular demonstrations. To-day police dispersed second hostile demonstration by firing over heads of the crowd. At least one of the crowd killed. Lord Balfour, on recommendation of French High Commissioner, left this afternoon by car for Beirut, where he will go straight on board Messageries Maritimes boat now in port.

(Repeated to Jerusalem and Beirut.)

[E 2446/1065/65]

No. 125.

Consul Smart to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received April 24.)

(No. 59.)

Sir,

Damascus, April 14, 1925.

IN continuation of my despatch No. 57 of the 26th ultimo, and with reference to my telegram No. 2 of the 9th instant, I have the honour to report that from the date of Lord Balfour's arrival in Palestine the agitation here against him continued without intermission in the press, in the Representative Council and by distribution of mourning ribbons and leaflets calling on the people to display their sympathy with their Palestinian brethren and their detestation of Zionism. A protest against the policy of Lord Balfour's declaration, signed by various notables and students, was sent to the League of Nations and to both British Houses of Parliament. On the 4th instant the Representative Council approved the despatch of a protest to the League of Nations through the French High Commissioner. The French version of this protest is enclosed herewith. The Council then suspended its sitting for five minutes in sign of mourning.

On the 30th ultimo I received a telegram *en clair* from His Majesty's High Commissioner at Jerusalem, asking me to reserve hotel accommodation for Lord Balfour's party and giving exact dates of its progress through Syria. This unfortunate telegram rendered impossible any mystery about his Lordship's movements.

The train by which the party was coming from Palestine was due to arrive at Damascus at 8 p.m. on the 8th instant. In order to evade the demonstration being organised at the Hedjaz Station, where Lord Balfour would normally descend, M. Béjean, the French Adviser of Police, Nicolas Shahin, the native Acting Director of Police, and myself proceeded with cars to Kadam, the first station outside Damascus, and brought the party in by road to the Hotel Victoria, where we arrived shortly before the train, which we had caused to be delayed at Kadam, steamed into the Hedjaz Station.

The crowd at that station, finding that it had been tricked, came down the broad avenue leading to the bridge over the River Barada in front of the hotel, being swelled by many new recruits on the way. It would have been quite easy for the police to have held this bridge and thus denied access to the hotel site. The crowd, unhindered, gathered before the hotel and indulged in noisy manifestations. Cries of "Down with Balfour!" were uttered, and one person made a speech inviting the people to strike on the morrow and collect in the Omayyad Mosque to prevent Lord Balfour entering it. Finally, the police, mounted and unmounted, which, under the direction of M. Béjean and Nicolas Shahin, were guarding the hotel and had hitherto remained curiously passive, began to react. About a score of the more obstreperous demonstrators were seized and carried off to the neighbouring police-station, and the crowd was eventually altogether dispersed.

The demonstrators, who were largely students of the Schools of Law and Medicine, probably numbered a few hundreds.

Lord Balfour agreed not to leave the hotel on the following morning, and, before returning to the consulate, I obtained assurances from M. Béjean regarding his Lordship's safety at the hotel. A car-drive outside the town was planned for the following afternoon. A tour inside the town was considered unsafe.

On the following morning the bazaars were closed and the students of the various schools went on strike. A large crowd, which included the students of the Greek Orthodox School, gathered in the Omayyad Mosque, with the intention of closing the doors, when Lord Balfour's expected visit took place. Eventually, finding that he was not coming, the crowd left the mosque and proceeded towards the hotel to demonstrate. The Syrian gendarmerie and police, who were drawn up to bar the approaches to the hotel, after trying in vain to check the rush by ordinary methods, began to fire over the heads of the mob, which was already indulging in stone-throwing and other acts of physical violence. This firing in the air lasted for about ten minutes, and the persistence of the crowd was quite remarkable, for in Damascus a few shots generally suffice to scatter any mob. The military now began to intervene. Spahis came galloping on to the scene, and used the flats of their sabres with considerable effect. Towards 1 p.m. the crowd was entirely dispersed. At least one man of the crowd was killed, though the French, now anxious to minimise developments which exceeded their calculations, subsequently denied this fact, which at the time they admitted to me. A number on both sides were wounded and received contusions, but of these, only two or three of the crowd were seriously wounded.



The town was then occupied militarily; armoured cars were sent to protect the Jewish quarter; the mixed Syrian Legion was brought out; more French cavalry was introduced from outside; aeroplanes circled low over the city; General Sarraïl, who happened to be staying at Damascus, put himself prominently in view on the bridge over the Barada leading to the Victoria Hotel; and generally a sufficient military display was made to render any further demonstrations improbable.

As soon as the firing began I got into telephonic communication from the consulate with the French delegate, M. Schœffler, and assured myself that Lord Balfour was in no danger. I then proceeded by a roundabout way to the hotel, whence M. Béjean called on me, nursing an elbow bruised by a stone thrown from the crowd and looking rather sorry for himself. He said that the temper of the town was such that he must decline any responsibility for Lord Balfour's safety if the latter were, as previously arranged, to go out for a drive.

I then called on M. Schœffler with Mr. Antonius, Assistant Director of Education in Palestine and delegated by the Palestinian Government to look after Lord Balfour. I take this opportunity to express my appreciation of Mr. Antonius's tactful co-operation, which was most valuable to me. M. Schœffler was of the opinion that Lord Balfour should not even go out for the visit he had arranged to pay at 3 P.M. to General Sarraïl. The French delegate had news of another demonstration in course of preparation. With regard to the dinner at the Residency, to which we had all been invited, M. Schœffler said he would come to see me at the hotel and let me know his opinion after he had visited the general. He suggested that it might be desirable for Lord Balfour to leave for Beirut at once. He thought it better to omit the visit to Baalbec, which was a nest of Shi'a fanaticism and without a French garrison.

A half an hour after my return to the hotel General Sarraïl himself arrived with M. Schœffler. The general was ambiguously in favour of Lord Balfour's immediate departure for Beirut and of his going that night straight on board the steamship "Sphynx," the Messageries boat on which the party was to sail. This boat was already in port at Beirut.

Accordingly, shortly after 4 P.M., Lord Balfour and his party, preceded in a car by M. Béjean with armed policemen, and followed by several cars also full of armed policemen, left by car for Beirut, and in little more than an hour passed safely out of my purview.

There exists locally a widespread feeling that the French encouraged these demonstrations from anti-British motives. No proofs are ever obtainable in such cases, but my personal opinion, based on some experience of Eastern crowds and disorders, is that these violent demonstrations could not have taken place if the populace had known from the beginning that the French were resolutely opposed to their occurrence. In Eastern towns of the Damascus type, inhabited by an unwarlike, good-natured population, riots only occur when the authorities are favourable to their occurrence, as in the more serious outbreak of 1860, or when they are taken by surprise, as in the Crane riots of 1922. On this occasion the element of surprise was, of course, entirely lacking. I think that the French were not displeased that popular hostility should be diverted from themselves to us, and that the attention of the local Nationalists, who have been getting more and more troublesome, should be turned from Syrian preoccupations to some outside grievance for which we were held responsible. Unfortunately, it is difficult to limit a popular agitation allowed to grow. There can be no doubt that the demonstrations went beyond French calculations, and that the final bloodshed was directly against their own interests. The Arabs, when cooled down, will hardly look back with pride on their treatment of an old and unarmed guest. It is not England which in the long run is likely to suffer in the eyes of the local population. It is rather French authority, armed and responsible, which appears to the Arabs as having been powerless to afford adequate protection to its guest and as having allowed itself to be intimidated by mob violence. Moreover, it is the French who will be saddled with the popular resentment caused by the repression and the casualties.

I have spoken to M. Schœffler with as much frankness as was compatible with formal suavity. I told him that, before reporting to London, I wished to talk to him frankly. Lord Balfour, I said, had, as I had pointed out to M. Béjean during the disorders, been a fortnight in Palestine without suffering from serious demonstrations. He had not been twenty-four hours in French mandated territory before he had been the object of two violent demonstrations. Insinuations were already being made that the French did not mind these demonstrations. British

newspaper correspondents, who accompanied the party, might give credence to such insinuations. The result of all this might be a most deplorable impression in London. Why, for instance, I asked, had not the police, by holding the bridge over the River Barada in front of the hotel, stopped the crowd, the night of Lord Balfour's arrival, descending from the station to the hotel? Finally, I said that, if the French authorities anticipated disorders, they should have warned the Palestine Government that this visit to Syria was undesirable.

M. Schœffler, who appeared to be rather nervous, replied that he had not anticipated such serious trouble, which was largely due to Ramadan effervescence. The French authorities supposed, from the grave information communicated to them by the Palestine police (see Mr. Consul-General Satow's despatch to you No. 44 of the 6th instant), that the Palestine Government was fully aware of the dangers of the journey. It could hardly be said that the French were indifferent, since they had been attacked by the rioters. It would, he maintained, have been useless to hold the Barada bridge on the night of Lord Balfour's arrival, as the crowds would have found roundabout ways to the hotel.

Lord Balfour was naturally much distressed at the tumult his presence had provoked. He did not understand why Syria should be so much interested in his historic declaration, and seemed not to have realised that from the foot of the Taurus Mountains to the edge of the Sinai Desert is one country, physically, ethnically, sentimentally, economically, though now partitioned owing to the exigencies of world politics. And of this country Damascus is the heart, easily played on by agitators operating from anywhere within those confines. The Damascenes no doubt regarded Lord Balfour's visit as a gratuitous provocation, but my information tends to show that their resentment was fanned by native organisations in Beirut and Palestine.

Lord Balfour appeared also not to have realised the intensity of Arab feeling against Zionism. He expressed regret that he had not been warned beforehand that his presence in Syria would be unwelcome.

On this last point I cannot help feeling that Lord Balfour has a just grievance. I do not know how or why this journey to Syria was arranged. I received no official advice of its preparation. I only learnt privately from French sources that the visit was intended. Presumably, therefore, it was arranged between His Majesty's High Commissioner at Jerusalem and the French High Commissioner at Beirut. My first official intimation was the above-mentioned *en clair* telegram from Jerusalem. As the Palestine police were in possession of information even more serious than mine regarding the possibilities of Lord Balfour's journey in Syria (see Mr. Satow's despatch above referred to), I could only conclude that, for reasons beyond my competence, there existed a determination to disregard Arab opinion. Lord Balfour, however, told me that, had it even been hinted to him that his presence in Syria might cause trouble, he would have gladly given up the trip. Had I been consulted beforehand, I could not, of course, have prophesied the disorders caused by French mismanagement, but I must have replied that his Lordship's journey in Syria would undoubtedly cause considerable local commotion. I gathered from Lord Balfour that it would have required even less than such an intimation to have deterred him from the journey. The French authorities, even had they cherished no disloyal intentions, might have found it difficult to discourage officially the visit of a distinguished Allied statesman, but it would have been my natural duty to give my opinion frankly, had it been sought.

The results of this visit are unfortunate for all Europeans living in this inland metropolis of Islam. It has stirred up the xenophobia always latent in Asiatic peoples unwillingly subjected to European domination. No doubt the present excitement will quickly subside, but such incidents leave behind them residues which, with due accumulation, provide the soil favourable to the growth of many a noxious plant.

I have, &c.

W. A. SMART.

Enclosure in No. 125.

*Text of Representative Council's Protest to League of Nations.*

LE peuple syrien de tous rites et de toutes classes saisit l'occasion de l'arrivée en Syrie de Lord Balfour pour renouveler ses protestations contre la déclaration attachée à son nom et qui a fait saigner le cœur de ce pays.



Le peuple syrien continue à voir dans la Société des Nations un tribunal juste organisé pour la protection des nations faibles qui n'ont d'autres armes pour leur défense que celles que leur accorde la justice et le droit.

Le Conseil syrien se présente à votre Excellence avec cette protestation, qu'il a votée, pour être transmise à la Société des Nations, vous priant de croire à sa haute considération.

[E 2696/1065/65]

No. 126.

*Consul-General Satow to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received May 7.)*

(No. 50.)

Sir,

Beirut, April 26, 1925.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 44 of the 6th April and to my telegram No. 9 of the 10th April, and to complete the account of Lord Balfour's visit to Syria, given in Mr. Smart's despatch No. 59 of the 14th April, I have the honour to report that his Lordship reached the port station here at 9 p.m. on Thursday the 9th April. He had been brought into the town by a circuitous route, and his car was accompanied by two other cars containing secret police and gendarmes. On his arrival he was received by the local chiefs of police and by myself. The authorities had taken measures of precaution and police officers were much in evidence; but there was no sign of anything unusual, and Lord Balfour's arrival passed unnoticed. He at once went on board the steamship "Sphinx," where he remained until the vessel sailed on the Sunday morning. The secretary-general of the High Commission called on him that night and again on the following morning, while the High Commissioner, who only arrived from Damascus late on Saturday, also paid a visit. No demonstrations occurred during Lord Balfour's stay in Beirut, although an attempt was made to organise one. I understand that the demonstration was to have taken the form of closing the shops, and that the Christians were invited to take part in it. They did not, however, wish to do so, and some kept their shops open on Good Friday when they would otherwise have closed them.

I would add that, like Mr. Smart, I received no official advice regarding Lord Balfour's journey, and that, like him, I received on the 30th March an *en clair* telegram from Jerusalem as to securing hotel accommodation. My first knowledge of the visit was derived by chance from the assistant secretary-general of the High Commission, who showed me some time towards the end of March a letter from Sir Herbert Samuel to General Sarraill announcing the impending arrival of Lord Balfour, the date then given being, according to my recollection, the 4th April. I next, late on Saturday the 4th April, received a telegram from the acting inspector-general of police at Jerusalem asking me to warn the French that he had reliable information that an attempt would be made on Lord Balfour's life in Syria, Beirut being mentioned as a likely place. The High Commissioner, the secretary-general and his assistant happened all to be absent from Beirut at the time, and it was not until Monday that I was able to hand a copy to the "chef de cabinet." He told me that they had already had a similar warning, presumably sent through the French consul-general in Jerusalem, and that the "Directeur de la Sûreté générale" had that day gone to Baalbeck to make arrangements. The next morning the director called on me, and for the first time I learned Lord Balfour's complete programme. The director did not seem in any way alarmed at the prospects, but was anxious that, when Lord Balfour took his projected motor drive in the Lebanon, he should know the exact itinerary to be followed in order that he might make arrangements. I therefore prepared a list of suitable drives and sent it to Mr. Smart asking to be informed which one Lord Balfour would select in order that I might notify M. Fanjeau. Subsequent events rendered this unnecessary.

In conclusion I would state that neither the Director of Public Security nor those officials of the French High Commission with whom I had dealings regarding the visit gave any indication that it was either unwise or unwelcome. It was not for me to suggest that the visit had better be cancelled, but I gave them several opportunities of hinting this, which were not taken. In the circumstances I can only imagine that the French authorities were ill-informed as to the strength of public feeling in the matter, and that they thought that any demonstrations which might occur would be of a mild character and such as would redound to French advantage.

I regret that this report is somewhat belated, but it has been delayed by the fact that I had to take my local leave at notice so short that I was unable to write it before I left.

I have, &amp;c.

H. E. SATOW.

[E 3567/3440/89]

No. 127.

*Consul Smart to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received June 17.)*

(No. 93.)

Sir,

Damascus, Syria, June 4, 1925.

I HAVE the honour to submit some general observations on the situation being created by the growing anti-British propaganda in the native press and schools at Damascus.

2. The two intellectual centres of Islam are Cairo and Damascus. The persistent hostility of the Cairo press to England is a fact already well known and, anyhow, outside my sphere of competence, except in so far as its anti-British influence is exercised in Syria. The Cairo papers, being better supplied with news, are unfortunately the sources from which the Damascus press draws most of its news and even transcribes entire articles. The hostility of the Damascus press is of more recent growth but is becoming equally marked. These two streams of anti-British propaganda effectively cover the whole of the Arabic-speaking East. Of the two streams, that issuing from Damascus has perhaps the greatest potentiality for evil.

3. No love is lost between the Egyptians and the Arabic-speaking peoples of Asia, and his long-established hostility deprives Egyptian propaganda of some of its force. But Damascus is an object of affection and pride to all the Arabian world. An anti-British propaganda organised from Damascus would find willing listeners anywhere in Arabian lands.

4. Besides the hostility of the press, there is that of the schools at Damascus. This hostility loses no opportunity of demonstrating itself by telegrams of protest on suitable occasions, by anti-British demonstrations, as in the case of the Lord Balfour incident.

5. Many of my native acquaintances have spoken to me of this growing hostility to England at Damascus, and its existence is now a fact to be examined, and, if possible, neutralised with care.

6. At Damascus any paper which writes anything offensive to the French is suppressed. No such restraint exists in the case of press attacks on England. It is obvious that this fact alone would encourage the press, powerless against France, to attack chauvinist approval by attacking England.

7. The same holds good of the schools. The slightest manifestation of anti-French sentiment on the part of the students is promptly and rigorously repressed. Anti-British ebullitions are subject to no such restraint. For instance, at the time of the murder of the late Sirdar of the Sudan or of Lord Balfour's arrival here, the students of the schools were allowed freely to demonstrate violent hostility to England.

8. The danger from this state of affairs alone would be sufficiently grave. Unfortunately, we have not only to count on French apathy towards such anti-British manifestations. We have to count on deliberate French encouragement thereof.

9. I have had neither the staff nor the time to keep you comprehensively acquainted with the anti-British tendencies of the local press. But I have studied them as carefully as my limited time would permit, and this study has revealed evident signs of French dictation. I would, as an instance, invite a reference to my despatch No. 87 of the 27th ultimo regarding "Al Mufid" newspaper.

10. The anti-British influence exercised by the French in the schools is partly evident in the tone of their own schools, and partly in the obvious encouragement, given by anticipated impunity, to native schools to indulge in anti-British manifestations.

11. Of course the French are doing themselves harm by these tactics. By showing the natives so clearly that they regard us as enemies to be attacked, the French encourage native opposition to themselves. Every Arab here knows that England



is stronger than France. If, then, he argues, France looks on England as an enemy, there is some chance that sooner or later such a redoubtable enemy and the Arabs between them will make things sufficiently awkward for France that she will have to disappear from the Arabian scene. In this order of ideas, a native acquaintance, in connection with the publication in the local papers of extracts from the Parisian press accusing us of supporting Abd-el-Krim, remarked to me recently that the Damascenes, knowing England's power, could only conclude that the Riffis, thus secretly backed by her, were likely to give France a very bad time. Obviously it is to France's interest to make the Syrians think that we are on her side generally, whether we are or not.

12. Such a comprehension of France's real interest is of course not to be expected from the present French delegation here, whose chiefs are not men able to take general views of things, and are, moreover, blinded by anglophobia. Possibly, however, at Paris it might be understood that, whatever inconvenience may be caused to us by French encouragement of anti-British sentiment at Damascus, the results for France may be infinitely more serious. England's positions in the Arabian world are long established and far flung. A weakening or a retirement here or there would not involve a general eclipse. But a French failure in Syria would mean the disappearance of France as a considerable political factor in the Near East.

13. Yet, in view of the general character of the officials France sends to her overseas possessions, it would be unwise to count on any consistent French co-operation in this matter. We must rely mainly on our own resources to neutralise the danger.

14. We can, *firstly*, exercise a moderating influence at Damascus by letting the French know that we are watching the situation. I have in my immediately preceding despatch reported the action recently taken by me with regard to press attacks on England. From time to time, it would, I think, be desirable that His Majesty's consul should give such signs to the French of his interest in anti-British propaganda at Damascus.

15. *Secondly*, we can directly restrain the Damascus press by threats of interdiction of circulation in our mandated territories. The Damascus papers depend for much of their revenue on subscriptions from persons in Palestine, Transjordan and Irak, and interdiction of circulation there involves a severe financial loss for the organs concerned. I have only twice warned an editor that I should have to recommend such action to our mandated authorities, once in the case of outrageous attacks on our political agent at Bahrein, and once in the case of equally offensive attacks against Lord Balfour. In both cases the warning was effective. If I have been so sparing in using this defensive weapon, the reason has been that I did not know how far our mandated authorities would find it convenient to co-operate in such action. Needless to say, this weapon should be used sparingly and with moderation, and always in consultation with His Majesty's consul at Damascus, who alone is in a position to appreciate the opportunity of severity or leniency, as the case may be.

16. *Thirdly*, we can, by educative effort, endeavour gradually to turn back this anti-British current. It is with little optimism that I venture to mention this last remedy. England has in the Near and Middle East persistently left the schools to her rivals, whose educational network has become a vast national propaganda. There is not a single English school in Damascus technically equipped to an adequate degree, and yet the desire of an English education is widespread and sincere. In every country educated persons must lead the people, the mass of which, especially in the East, exercises little influence. If in Syria the educated classes are to issue mainly from schools hostile to England, we can hardly expect that the ruling elements of the future will be animated by friendly sentiments towards us. If, therefore, we are unable to found adequate schools and take our part in forming the minds of those who are to lead the masses in Syria, we must resign ourselves to general Syrian anglophobia as a permanent factor in the Arabian scheme of things.

I have, &c.

W. A. SMART.

[E 3591/357/89]

No. 128.

*Consul Smart to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received June 18.)*

(No. 96.)

Sir,

*Damascus, Syria, June 5, 1925.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 24 of the 30th January last, I have the honour to report that two parties have now, with the authorisation of the Government, been constituted in view of the elections next October for the Representative Council, namely, the "Party of the People," which is the Nationalist party, and the "Party of Unity," i.e., Syrian unity, which has been formed to support the present Government. In its ranks are to be found the Ministers and a number of the present Deputies.

If the elections take place next October they are likely to be embarrassing to the mandatory Power. Captain Bourgeois, director of the press, expressed the opinion, in the course of conversation with me, that the situation in Syria would soon be the same as that in Egypt when a Zaghlulist majority came into power in 1924. In other words, a Nationalist majority would form a Government which would not try to work with the mandatory Power.

It will be much more difficult for France to "make" the elections this time so thoroughly as in 1923. Unless, however, a successful effort is made in this sense, a Nationalist majority appears inevitable, with a consequent breakdown of the Parliamentary system or the effacement of France to a degree incompatible with her mandatory function. It would appear that the French Government is now alive to the danger of the policy instituted by General Sarrail in Syria immediately on his arrival and before he could have any real knowledge of the situation. From a remark let drop by M. Brunet, the Deputy sent by the French Government for a general enquiry in Syria, it would seem that the mandatory Power may decide that the country is not yet ripe for Constitutional Government. The organic law, now under consideration, might then be framed so as to make the Government independent of the variations of a popularly elected Parliament.

It is to be hoped that France will find some satisfactory solution of the difficulty, for it is not to our interest that anything like the Egyptian situation should develop in Syria, on the borders of our mandated territories.

I have, &c.

W. A. SMART.

[E 3713/357/89]

No. 129.

*Consul-General Satow to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received June 22.)*

(No. 79. Confidential.)

Sir,

*Beirut, June 11, 1925.*

IN the latter part of my despatch No. 45 of the 9th April, I referred to a scheme of electoral reform prepared by the present Governor of the Lebanon and to the cool reception with which the scheme had met. It was this lack of enthusiasm which decided the High Commissioner to submit the scheme to Paris for instructions. The reply has now been received and made public. It is to the effect that no change is to be made before the promulgation of the new Organic Law, and that the elections are to be held under the old system. The decision is no doubt a wise one, as, although the new scheme had certain advantages, it was undoubtedly of a very advanced nature for a country which has in its essentials in no way changed since the departure of the Turks. The rejection of the scheme is naturally considered as being somewhat of a rebuff to M. Cayla and to General Sarrail also.

2. In any case the matter is settled, and the electors of the first degree will cast their votes on the 28th June. For every 250 such electors one elector of the second degree will be chosen. These latter will, on the 12th July, elect thirty Deputies. The seats have been allotted on a confessional basis, one Deputy being allowed for every 20,000 adherents of each particular rite. The representation will be as follows: Maronites, 10; Sunni Moslems, 6; Shiah Moslems, 5; Greek Orthodox, 4; Greek Catholics, 2; Druzes, 2; Minorities, 1 = total 30.

3. The new council will be required to propose to the High Commissioner the names of three candidates for the post of Governor and then, provided all three names are approved, to elect one of them.

[13651]

Q 2



4. The Lebanon is thus in the throes of electioneering and seething with intrigue, doubtless to the great satisfaction of the inhabitants, to whom such things are as the breath of life. Bribery and corruption are not unknown, and a good deal of money will no doubt be made, mainly by the secondary electors.

5. There seems to be good reason for believing that the Government intends to "make" the elections so as to ensure that the right men are elected as Deputies. The present secretary-general of the Lebanon is reputed to be an adept in such matters. The fact that the elections are being held under the old system should facilitate things, as it is easier to influence the relatively small number of secondary electors.

6. As regards the choice of Governor which will have to be made by the new council, it is permissible to foresee that it will decide that, in present circumstances, a French Governor is still necessary, and that the right man for the post is M. Léon Cayla, the actual Governor.

7. M. Brunet, the Deputy mentioned in my despatch No. 62 of the 12th May as having come out to hold an enquiry, still here, but it is expected that he will leave within the next fortnight. He is reported to have spent much of his time in interviewing lawyers, journalists, politicians and the various others who consider their views as to the situation to be of value. The rest of his time he seems to have spent in accompanying the High Commissioner in the latter's rapid tours about the country. He is a personal friend of General Sarrail, and it is therefore assumed that he will report that everything is for the best both in Syria and the Lebanon. At the same time his arrival to hold what is regarded by many as an enquiry into complaints made both against the High Commissioner and the Governor of the Lebanon cannot have failed to weaken their authority and prestige in the country. There are, indeed, various signs that this is the case.

I have, &c.

H. E. SATOW.

[3628/1065/65]

No. 130.

*Mr. Austen Chamberlain to Consul-General Satow (Beirut).*

(No. 13.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, June 22, 1925.*

PLEASE see British liaison officers' memorandum of 26th May regarding recognition from British Government of officer and trooper wounded during Lord Balfour's visit.

Recommendation should have been made through you. I shall be glad to learn whether you consider presents from His Majesty's Government would be appreciated by recipients and improve general feeling. If so, please suggest form of presents.

## CHAPTER V.—GENERAL.

[E 429/175/44]

No. 131.

*Mr. Austen Chamberlain to Mr. Lindsay (Constantinople).*

(No. 90.)

Sir,

*Foreign Office, January 21, 1925.*

THE Turkish Minister, whom I had not seen since my first reception of the Diplomatic Corps, called upon me this afternoon by appointment made at his request.

2. Zekiai Bey observed that he had had more than one conversation with Sir William Tyrrell, but this was his first opportunity of speaking to me about the relations between our two countries. It appeared to him that Turkey offered a great sphere for economic collaboration between the two countries. Were there, he asked himself, any political obstacles to such economic collaboration? He saw no insuperable obstacles either on the Turkish or on the British side. He thought, therefore, that such a collaboration was possible, and that the "little affair" of Mosul ought not to interpose an obstacle. All depended upon the attitude of the British Government and whether it was disposed to see Turkey established as a strong and stable Power.

3. I replied that there was no desire on the side of His Majesty's Government or the British people except to cultivate friendly relations with Turkey as now established.

4. Encouraged by this expression of our general policy, the Turkish Minister approached the question which really lay at the root of his demand for an interview. Why could we not settle together the question of the Mosul boundary without waiting for the decision of the League of Nations? For Turkey this was a vital matter. She could not acquiesce in the division of the Kurds. If we could agree to cede Mosul to Turkey, arrangements in regard to economic interests could easily be made. We might, he indicated, have the exploitation of the oil-fields and a guarantee from Turkey, as far as she was concerned, of the integrity of Irak as thus delimited.

5. I told Zekiai Bey that I regretted that the Turkish Government and our own had been unable to reach an accord on this subject at Lausanne. In spite of Lord Curzon's express declarations, the Turkish Government appeared still to be under the illusion that the policy of the British Government was influenced by some interest in the oil-fields which might be found in that quarter. This was a complete delusion, but, putting that misapprehension aside, and turning to the substance of his proposal, what was the actual position? We had agreed to refer our difference to the League of Nations. We had stated our case in our capacity as the mandatories of Irak and trustees for the people of that country, and it was impossible that I should bargain away their rights or interests against economic concessions to Britain or British citizens. Having once referred the matter to the League, we had better await the League's decision, which His Majesty's Government had in advance pledged themselves to accept.

6. Zekiai Bey then began to suggest that if the decision of the League was adverse Turkey might be unable to acquiesce. I told him that I could not suppose that in this he was speaking the mind of his Government. It would be a serious thing for the Turkish Government to defy the British Empire, a still more serious thing, perhaps, for Turkey to place itself in opposition to the body which represented, as far as anything could represent, the consensus of civilised opinion. I was sure that there was too much wisdom in the councils of Angora for them to take so very grave a decision.

7. Zekiai Bey turned around this point for some time, developing Turkish difficulties, suggesting an exchange of populations and so forth; but I declined to alter my position. I was wholly at one with him in desiring friendly relations between Turkey and Great Britain. I saw great economic advantages, especially for Turkey, in a cordial friendship between us, though I warned him incidentally that there could be no idea of a loan from the British Government; but I added that I did not think that we could usefully take up again the fruitless discussions of Lausanne, and that we should be wiser to await and to accept the decision of the Council of the League.

8. The Minister then asked me whether I refused to consider any proposals for an understanding. I told him that if the Turkish Government authorised him to make specific proposals I would, of course, give them most serious consideration, but



I deprecated his making any such proposals if their basis was to be the cession of Mosul in return for economic concessions, for to such proposals I could only return a negative; and, in the second place, I insisted that if any proposals were to be made they must not be mere feelers on his part, for which the time had gone by, but proposals definitely authorised by his Government and by which that Government was prepared to stand.

9. Before leaving, Zekia Bey asked whether, in the event of Turkey deciding to join the League of Nations, Great Britain would support a request by her for a permanent seat on the council. I told him that this was a request which apparently was going to be made to me by every country in turn. I could only say to him, as to others, that I must reserve our liberty till the question arose at Geneva.

I am, &c.

AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN.

[E 2421/788/44]

No. 132.

*Sir O. Russell to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received April 23.)*

(No. 56.)  
Sir,

*British Legation to the Holy See,  
April 18, 1925.*

WITH reference to my telegram No. 5 of the 14th instant, I have the honour to transmit herewith translation of a note from the Cardinal Secretary of State enquiring whether the French claim to protect Catholics in Egypt is recognised, and whether the relative liturgical honours are admitted as being rendered to the representative of France *quâ* protecting Power.

When Cardinal Gasparri informed me that he was addressing me a note on the subject, I told him of the terms of the declaration to Egypt of February 1922, and said that the French claim appeared to me to be wholly inadmissible. I promised to lose no time in referring his note to you, although I had no doubt as to the answer.

His Eminence told me that the French Government had put forward their claim on the eve of their resignation, and with some warmth described their attitude as a farce.

I have, &c.

(For the Minister),

CECIL DORMER.

Enclosure in No. 132.

*Cardinal Gasparri to Sir O. Russell.*

(Translation.)  
Sir,

*Vatican, April 17, 1925.*

THE French Government have informed the Secretariat of State that the French protectorate of all Catholics, as it existed in the former Turkish Empire, with the relative liturgical honours, has always been admitted in Egypt, even after that territory was removed from Turkish dominion, and during the British occupation. They claim that it should still be maintained, notwithstanding the Treaty of Lausanne, which does not concern Egypt.

The undersigned Cardinal Secretary of State is desirous of ascertaining the exact position and would be grateful for information on the following points:—

1. Have the local authorities in Egypt admitted the intervention of the French representative on behalf of Catholics of other than French nationality? And are they disposed to admit such intervention in the future?
2. Have they tolerated hitherto liturgical honours being rendered to the representative of France as the protecting Power over Catholics, and are they disposed so to tolerate them in the future?

The undersigned Cardinal avails, &c.

P. CARDINAL GASPARRI.

[E 2421/788/44]

No. 133.

*Mr. Austen Chamberlain to Field-Marshal Viscount Allenby (Cairo).*

(No. 437.)

My Lord,

*Foreign Office, April 29, 1925.*

I TRANSMIT to you herewith copies of a telegram\* and of a despatch† from His Majesty's Minister to the Holy See regarding the French claim to a general protectorate over Catholics, and to special liturgical honours at Catholic services, in Egypt. There is reason to believe that the French *démarche* at the Vatican is due to recent action on the part of the Catholic authorities at Alexandria in connection with Catholic services last Easter.

2. I shall be glad if your Lordship will furnish me with a full report on the present position of this question in Egypt, with particular reference to the two questions asked by the Cardinal Secretary of State.

3. As you may be aware, His Majesty's Government have recently secured the termination of the French protectorate, and of the special liturgical honours which were dependent on it in Palestine, and on general grounds of policy it will probably be necessary to dispute the corresponding French claim in Egypt. Should this necessity arise, it is possible that the necessary basis may be furnished by the opening sentence of the third paragraph of the French note of 22nd March, 1922, which reads as follows:—

“Le Gouvernement de la République, fidèle à l'esprit des accords du 8 avril 1904, est tout disposé à reconnaître en Egypte au Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique, sous le nouveau régime [*i.e.*, independent Egypt], les droits qu'il eût tenus de l'exercice régulier du protectorat.”

I am, &c.

AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN.

No. 134.

*Sir O. Russell to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received April 15.)*

(No. 5.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Vatican, April 15, 1925.*

I UNDERSTAND from Cardinal Secretary of State that on the eve of their resignation French Government demanded Vatican recognition of French protectorate over Catholics in Egypt and liturgical honours. Vatican will not give way without knowing views of His Majesty's Government and are sending me a note. I said that claim was preposterous.